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CH.A PTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
A. The Problem of the Dissertation 
The problem of this dissertation is to compare and 
evaluate the interpretations of religious experience in the 
thought of Frederick R. Tennant and Baron Friedrich von 
Huegel. The study will examine the definitions of religious 
experience which are stated or implied and developed by the 
two thinkers; and also their specific contributions to the 
problem of religious knowledge will be considered. On the 
basis of the affinities and disagreements discovered, the 
two interpretations of religious experience will be compared 
and evaluated. 
B. Limitations 
Only those writings of F.R. Tennant and Baron von 
Huegel which have specific relevance to their interpretations 
of religious experience will be considered. The references 
will include relevant sect i ons from the magnum opus of each 
writer: F.R. Tennant's work, Philosophical Theology (two 
volumes, 1928 and 1930), and Baron von Huegel's The Mystical 
Element of Religion as Studied in Saint Catherine of Genoa 
1 
and her Friends (two volumes, 19~§). In addition, other 
books by Tennant will be used for relevant background ma-
terial: The Origin and Propagation of Sin, 1902; The Sources 
of the Doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin, 1903; The 
Concept of Sin, 1912; Miracle and Its Philosophical Pre-
suppositions, 1925; Philosophy of the Sciences, 1932; and 
The Nature of Belief, 1943. References will also be made 
to additional writings of Baron von Huegel which discuss the 
area of religious experience: Eternal Life, 1912; Essays and 
Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion, 1921; The Reality 
of God, 1931. Attention will be given further to the many 
letters written by von Huegel to his erudite friends. The 
material for t his resource will be taken f rom Selected 
Letters (1B96-1924) edited by Bernard Holland. Relevant 
periodica l material and dissertations will a ls o be used. 
C. Frevious Research in the Field 
No study has been previously undertaken dealing with 
the specific contributions of F. R. Tennant and Baron von 
Huegel to the interpretation of religious experience and 
comparing and evaluating their work. However, several 
dissertations have touched on the area of religious experi-
ence in the thought of Tennant or von Huegel along with 
2 
other areas of theological concern. A. Hazard Dakin's 
doctoral dissertation at Princeton University entitled Von 
Huegel and t he Supernatural (1934) discussed t he contributions 
of von Huegel to re ligious experience together with other 
major theological concepts. Two other disserta tions were 
concerned ""lith other aspect s of von Huege l' s thought~ in-
directly discussing his theory of religious experience: Paul 
Clasper's The Interpret atign of Christian ~sticism in the 
Life and Writings of Baron von Hue~el, Union Theological 
Seminary, 1953; and Douglas Steere's Critical Realism in 
the Thought of Baron von Huegel, Harvard, 1935. 
In a similar manner, several dissertations have been 
concerned with the contributions of F. R. Tennant to theo-
logical thought, indirectly dealing with his theory of re-
ligious experience: Peter Bertocci's Empirical Argument for 
God in the Thought of Martineau, Pringle-~attason, Ward, 
Sorley and Tennant, Boston University, 1935;_ Delton L. 
Scudder's Religious Faith in the Writings of F. R. Tennant, 
Yale, 1939; and James Buswell's The Empirical Method of F.R. 
Tennant, New York University, 1949. Several of these 
dissertations, three in published form,l will be used in 
this study. 
D. The Methodology of the Dissertation 
The expository, comparative, and critical methods will 
be followed. A brief investigation into relevant biographi-
cal material will be made in order to discern the diverse 
1. See bibliographical material. 
3 
influences affecting F. R. Tennant and Baron von Huegel. 
This will be followed by an examination of the thinkers' 
methodological and epistemological presuppositions. Such 
an examination is imperative for a fair and comprehensive 
approach. Out of this examination will appear the problem 
of definition, specifically that of the terms 'religious' 
and •experience.' Accurate definition will aid . in the 
clarification of the major points of agreement and dis-
agreement between Tennant and von Huegel in this area of 
theological thought. The study will then proceed to a 
comparison of the affinities and disagreements found in 
the expositions of their methodology, epistemology, and 
interpretations of religious experience. This comparison 
will afford material for evaluation. 
E. Biographies 
1. Frederick Robert Tennant 
Frederick Robert Tennant was born at Burslem in 
Staffordshire, England, in 1866. He was educated at New-
castle-under-Lyrne school and later at Caius College, 
Cambridge, 1885-1889. Tennant's first interesta' 'Wel"e 
scientific rather than philosophical or theological. He 
was awarded first class in both parts of the Natural Science 
Tripes, the special subject of his study in Part II being 
chemistry. His religious and philosophical interest were 
4 
aroused by certain lectures delivered by Thomas Huxley in 
1889, which dealt with the conflict between scientists and 
the established principles of religion.l The "Higher 
Criticism" of the German scholars, Ferdinand Christian Baur 
and David Friedrich Strauss and the effect of scientific 
research on religious faith motivated Tennant in the di-
rection of theological education. Preparation for ordi-
nation in the Church of England was the natural result of 
this concern. 
During the years 1891-1894 as senior science master 
at Newcastle-under-Lyme, Tennant undertook theological 
training while continuing his scientific studies. His 
marriage to Constance Yates and his ordination ak :deacon 
took place in 1891. From the University of London Tennant 
received his B.Se. degree in 1894, and from Cambridge 
the M.A. degree in 1895. He was ordained as priest in the 
Church of England in 1894. During this period he held the 
curacy of Hartshill. 
From 1894 to 1897 Tennant served as curate of St. 
Matthew's, Walsall. After this period he returned to 
Cambridge as Chaplain of Caius College. He held this po-
sition along with the curacy of Shelford and Great St. 
1. D.L. Scudder, Tennant's Philosophical ~heology (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1940), 1. 
5 
Mary,' s Chur•ch in Cambridge until 1899~ At this time he 
came unde1 .. the influence of the psychologist and philosopher 
James trard~ Tennant acknm,rledges the large degree of his 
ov-m dependence upon 11Tard when ad vi sing add i tional study 
for young theologians~ 
BUt at the beginning, 1vhen he [th.e theological studeny 
is at the mercy of his teacher, I vrould advise resort 
to portions . of '!.IJard 1 s formidable v.rork @.:sycholoe;ical 
Principles7~ Wot because I myself regard it as the 
greatest single ·Hork , of any age, on the human mind; 
but on account of several specific characteristics of 
its mast erliness, that make it pre-emine-ntly suitable 
for the purpos e now in view. 
The influence of James 1vard upon the struct.ure of Tennant 1 's 
theological thought is especially discer-nible in the first 
volume of Philosophical Theology. 
Out of this Cs~bridge background came additional in-
fluence upon Tennant. His study at Cambridge included 
logic as v1ell as theology. Along vri th the strict demands 
of logica l thinking , Tennant came into contact vJith a group 
of tough- minded. Ce,mbridge teachers such as McTaggart, Broad, 
Russell·, Hobson, and Barnes. The thought of these critical 
thinkex•s he,l ped Tennant to develop his o1·r.a r eligious faith 
and to articulate the controlling ideals of this faith, 
amo11g 'Hhich uere these: ttf'act, log ic, clarity, and pre-
cis ion 1 an intense hostility for rhetoric 1'7hich is the be-
fuddlement of thought and for mysticism i;Thich escapes exact 
1~ F.~ffi T:enna.nt, Philosoohical Theology {(Cambridge: . 
C.ambridge university Press, 1928)', I-~ vii~ 
6 
definitions and sharply draim inferences~ nl 
During the academic year 1901-1902 F~R. Tennant de-
livered the Hulsean Lectures at the Univers ity of Cambridge. 
These lectures were published. as The Origin and Propagation 
£! ~}~~ While serving as rector of Hockwold from 1903 to 
1913 he 1'rrote several books. In 1903 The Sources of the 
Doctrines of the Eall ~nd Original Sin was published, re-
flecting his early studies in philosophy, especially the 
influence of Lotze, Leibniz, and vrard~2 An essay on The 
7 
Being of God in the Light of Physical Science followed in 
1905, indicat ing more clearly Tennant's agreement i•rith 
Ward's epistemological position. His final book on the 
general topic of sin, The Conce.E!! of Sin, was published in 
1912~ 
In 1904 Tennant v-r8.s awarded the B.D. degree from 
Cambridge followed by the D.D. in 1906~ He became University 
Lecturer in philosophy of religion at Cambridge in 1907. 
Ho1-mver, it was as Lecturer in Theology at Trinity College, 
Cambridge , that he devoted the largest portion of his pro-
ductive life~ This period extended from 1913 until his 
retirement in 1938. During this period he produced his mag-
~ ~~~' Philosophical Theology, volume one a ppearing in 
1928 and volume two in 1930. This work rece·i ved praise 
from uumex•ous philosophical and theological critics. It 
1~ Del ton Lei>lis Scudder, Tennant • s Philos o·()hical Theology 
( New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940), 2. 
2. Ibid:~ 
was fittingly recognized by the honorary D.D. given the 
author by OXford in 1929, and by his election to the British 
Academy in 1935. 
Ehilosophical Theology was preceded by another book in 
1925 taken from three lectures given in London University, 
namely, Miracle and Its Philosophical Presuppositions. An-
other book, ~he .. Philosophy of the Sciences, 1932, was the 
result of the Tarner Lectures. Tennant's last book, The 
Nature of Belief, was published in 1943. 
A recent obituary concerning Tennant affords some in-
sights into the man as well as the philosopher and theo-
logian.1 He is described as an agreeable companion, and 
interesting although not a sparkling conversationalist. In 
addition to his writing and teaching, Tennant enjoyed his 
gardening which consisted mainly of growing rare Alpine 
plants. He loved music. He had a fine collection of 
classical records, and enjoyed play±hg the cello accompanied 
by his friend, Professor G.E. Moore at the piano. For many 
years he suffered from partial deafness which eventually 
prevented tim from dining in the Hall, to the great regret of 
his friends in the College. Tennant's death occurred 
September 9, 1957, when he was ninety-one. 
2. Baron Friedrich von Huegel 
Friedrich von Huegel, Baron of the Holy Roman Empire, 
1. The Times : (London), September 13, 1957, 13. 
8 
was born at Florence, Italy, on May 8, 1852. His father, 
Baron Karl von Huegel, a member of a noble Catholic Rhine-
land family, was appointed by the Emperor of Austria as 
ambassador to the Grand Ducal Court of Tuscany. There the 
children o!. the family were born. After eight years in 
Tuscany Karl von Huegel was transferred to Brussels as 
minister to Belgium. After his retirement in 1867, his 
family moved to Torquay in England. Karl von Huegel, fifty-
seven years old at the time of Friedrich's birth, was an 
enthusiastic amateur horticulturist and natural scientist 
as well as an able and distinguished military and civil 
leader. This interest in nature bequeathed to his son, 
Friedrich, a scientific spirit which is evident in the 
latter's religious writings. As a youth Friedrich von 
Huegel devoted himself to geology. 
As a boy, I grew up with a keen interest in ento-
mology and geology; they helped to develop in me, I 
think, a double consciousness, of cumulative evidence 
as an instrument of knowledge, of successive stages 
of development as a subject-matter of knowledge.l 
Karl von Huegel married Elizabeth Farquharson when she 
was twenty and he fifty-six. She was of Scottish descent, 
daughter of General Francis Farquharson. ShBrtly after 
her marriage she was converted from the Presbyterian to the 
Roman Catholic Faith. 
Fr1edrich von Huegel's education was informal. He 
\ 1. Michael de 1a Bedoyere, The Life of Baron von Huegel (London: J.M.Dent and Sons, 1951)-,-17. --
9 
missed regular schooling of any formal type and never had 
the privilege of university training. Private tutors were 
appointed for his education. The foremost influence in this 
regard was Alfred von Reumont, the Catholic Pru.s:sian minis-
ter in Brussels. In England young von Huegel was tutored 
to some extent by the schoolmaster-geologist, William Pen-
1 
10 
gelly. This lack of a formal education and academic degrees 
was not a loss to the young scholar. His own desire for 
learning required no formal discipline or educ ationa l sta tus. 
Baron von Huegel's natural inclination toward geology 
and scientific research might have continued along with that 
of his younger brother Anatole, the distinguished Cambridge 
anthropologist from 1883 to 1921, had it not been for two 
events: the death of his father and his contracting of 
t yphoid fever a t the age of eighteen~ This disease left 
him with a de afness that increa sed through the years, and 
with an extremely nervous and delicate: physical constitution. 
These events of death and disease tempora rily shattered the 
2 bright world of the young von Huegel. It was through the 
influence of a Dutch Dominic an friar, Fa ther Raymond Hocking, 
/ 
and the Vic ar of Sa int Augustine in Paris, Abbe Huvelin, 
that von Huegel was drawn into the spiritual circles of 
religious thought and devotion. 
In 1873 von Huegel married Mary Herbert, daughter of 
1 • Ibid . , 16. 2. Ibid., 18. 
Sidney Herbert, Gladstone's friend and ministerial colleague, 
1 
and Lady Herbert of Lea. This marriage gave von Huegel the 
opportunity for meeting the Catholic social-clerical world 
of London. It also afforded the opportunity for meeting 
the leading thinkers in English society interested in the 
religious and scientific issues of the day. 
Three daughters, Gertrud, Hildegaard, and Thekla, were 
born to Baron von Huegel and Lady Mary. All of them were 
given an education from their father himself. This indi-
cates his personal devotion and love for children. 
Von Huegel considered England his home, for he was 
drawn by the strong ties of an English wife and three 
British-born daughters. He remained in England from his 
early years, except for nine winters in Rome, a summer in 
Westphalia, and two short visits to Jena, Heidelberg, 1 
Wuerzburg, and Tyrol. He was, however, a strange sight 
to English eyes, with his wide-brimmed hat, massive cloak, 
and black woolen gloves. During the first World War some 
people thought that this strange figure was ; a German spy. 
Von Huegel's first scholarly effort in the field of 
religion was to study Greek and Hebrew in order to do re-
search in the historical criticism of Biblical documents. 
This task appealed to his scientific interests. It was in 
this area that the weakness of Roman Catholic scholarship 
1. Selected Letters, edited by Berhard Holland (London: 
J.M. Dent and Sons, 1927), 6. 
11 
became apparent to him. He worked to obtain real respect 
for Catholic research, and from this task the principal 
struggle of his life emerged: "the defence of Catholic en-
lightenment in the face of obscurantists in the Church on 
one side and her non-Catholic critics, especially in uni-
versity circles, on the other." 1 This struggle for Catho-
lic enlightenment brought von Huegel into contact not only 
with the foremost English minds of the day such as William 
George Ward, John Newman, James Martineau, George Tyrrell, 
Clement Webb, A.E. Taylor, Canon Li lley, Claud Montefiore, 
Evelyn Underhill (Mrs. Stuart Moore), and Norman Kemp-Smith, 
but also with such Continental leaders as Archbishop Soder-
/ blom, Ernst Troeltsch, Rudolph Eucken, Abbe Leisy, and 
Bishop Mignot. Von Huegel desired to know the intellectual 
endeavors of these men and other who were writing in the 
religious and philosophical fields. 
This • . • involved him in a large correspondence 
with men and women of various countries, to whom he 
usually wrote in their own tongues--German, French, 
Italian, or English--and into his letters, as into 
all that he did2 he put the most minute and consci-entious labour. 
This correspondence and personal acquaintance with the 
astute minds of Europe placed von Huegel in the center of 
the "Modernist Movement." This movement, originating at 
the close of the nineteenth century and active during the 
early part of the twentieth century, grew out of Lessing's 
1. Ibid., 78 • . 
2. Selected Letters, 7. 
12 
publication Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts and sub-
sequent scientific contributions such as the Darwinian 
theory, historical research, and the application of the 
1 
evolutionaFs philosophy to history. The radical opposition 
within the movement to the authority of the Roman Catholic 
Church in matters of criticism, scientific and historic, 
caused, in turn, a division within the movement itself as 
found in Catholic circles. Baron von Huegel supported the 
stand of Tyrrell and Loisy for Biblical criticism but di-
verged from them and from the "Modernist Movement" in 
general on the immanental view of religion which was ab-
horrent to him. 2 The Papal Encylical of 1907 would have 
confronted him with excommunication if he had been forced 
to sign the anti-modernist pledge which condemned all the 
efforts of modernism. However, he was a layman rather than 
a teacher or priest, and this fact spared him from signing 
the pledge. The fear of being excommunicated from the 
Roman Church remained with von Huegel throughout this 
period. 
Baron von Huegel's influence was not limited to this 
reforming cause of Biblical criticism within the Roman 
Catholic Church. During the years after the publication of 
his first and largest book, The Mystical Element of Religion, 
von Huegel 1 s religious and philosophical··thought spread from 
1 • Ibid. , 15. 
2. The Times (London), January 28, 1925, 18. 
13 
Great Britain to Germany and America. 
Von Huegel was a quite extraordinary religious influence, 
bringing home persuasively to minds enmeshed in the theo-
ries of Pantheism, Monism, Idealism, Materialism, all the 
various philosophical misbeliefs that hold captive such 
great tracts of the modern thinking mind, the great the-
istic truth of the transce£dent, spiritual, personal God, 
and man's relation to him. 
His association with the Synthetic Society and with the 
London Society for the Study of Religion increased his 
philosophical and religious influence. 
During the last years of von Huegel's life, academic 
honors were bestowed upon him in recognition of his books, 
articles, and lectures. His books included The Mystical 
Element of Religion, 1908i Eternal Life, 1912; The German 
Soul, 1916; Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of 
Religion, 1921; and Reality of God, 1931. St. Andrew's 
University in Scotland awarded him an honorary LL.D. de-
gree on June 24, 1920. When the University of Oxford pre-
sented von Huegel with an honorary doctorate of Divinity 
in 1921, he became the first Catholic to be so honored 
since the Reformation. In 1922 he was offered the Gifford 
Lectureship in Edinburgh for 1924-1926, but had to withdraw 
due to his failing health. He continued to work on his 
manuscripts until a day before his death on January 27, 
1925, at the age of seventy-three. 
1. Selected Letters, 31. 
14 . 
CHAPTER TWO 
TENNANT'S METHODOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY 
A. Methodology 
1. The Analytic-genetic Method: Its Task 
Tennant's interpretation of religious experience grows 
out of his analytic-genetic method. This method traces the 
development of the knowledge-process from its simplest forms 
and earliest stages. It includes what Tennant labels the 
"necessary regress" in the philosophical inquiry. 
The structure: and nature of our knowledge can only be 
ascertained by analysing it, ascertaining its sources, 
seeing how its ingredients have actually been compounded 
••• or with what mental cement its objective data have 
been compacted.l 
The primary and necessary data for philosophical inquiry 
are the prima facie facts, the common sense knowledge, gained 
from every area of experience. These facts constitute the 
presumptive knowledge involved in experience. It is the task 
of the analytic-genetic method to examine the composition of 
this presumptive knowledge in order to find its relation to 
actual experience. The method is empirical. It proceeds 
from the facts derived from actual experiences and works in-
ductively to its conclusions. 
1. Tennant, Philosophy of the Sciences (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1932)~3. 
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Every experience is subject to the critical examination 
of its presumptive knowledge by the analytic-genetic method. 
Religious experience is no exception. It also comes under 
the scrutiny of this method which undertakes a thorough in-
vestigation of the nature and validity of its specific type 
of knowledge. No unique type of religious cognition is per-
mitted to claim exemption from this examination. 
This method holds that all knowledge whether it be 
scientific or religious is a continuous process which de-
velops from the earliest stage of the inarticulated experi-
ence of sensory perception to the most advanced stage of 
theoretical abstract concepts. It also holds that there 
is no abrupt transition within this process which allows the 
abstract concept to have complete independence from its 
earliest perceptual origin. 
Further, the analytic-genetic method views sensory per-
ception, which it finds to be involved in all knowledge, as 
the first, original, and underived immediate contact which , 
man has with actuality~ Sensation is thus the sole and 
original certificate of actuality. This holds true in the 
area of religious experience. Its concepts are derived like-
wise from the immediate sensory contact with actuality. They 
are outgrowths from ordinary knowledge of the world and men 
derived from man's earliest experiences of actuality. 1 
1. Tennant, QE· cit., 168. 
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Holding these facts as primary, the analytic-genetic 
method investigates the nature of knowledge as it develops 
from the perceptual level into the area of the complex 
concept. It finds that the concept becomes not only 
increasingly eomplex but also progressively mediated as 
it is separated from immediate sensory control. Concepts in-
v~lve a venture in faith as they lose this primary contact 
with sensory control and enter into the phase of anthropic 
analogising; that is, the "reading-into" experience rather 
than "reading-b.flf" the immediately actual in perception. 
The task of the analytic-genetic method is to keep 
before the exp~rient the fact that all his concepts, in-
cluding both scientific and religious concepts, are n ot 
immediately given but are the mediate and interpretative 
synthesis of e l ements which are "read-into" the fundamental 
perceptual facts. It is necessary, therefore, to give a 
reason for the relevance of these concepts to~ tbe less 
complex concepts which are grounded in the perceptual data, 
which in turn are known to be nonconceptual and actual. 
The analytic-genetic method is thus the necessary 
approach, according to Tennant, to the empirical study of 
science, philosophy , and theology. All areas of know l edge 
must be open t~ its psycho -genetic ana l ysis of cognition 
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in order to recognize the essential relationship between 
sensation and the developed concept. Without this recognition 
knowledge might be established as irrelevant to sensory 
control and independent of other areas of conceptual ex-
perience. 
2. Its Advantages 
In its task of examining the nature of knowledge, 
the analytic-genetic method has several advantages 
over other philosophical methodologies. Its starting 
point with the prima facie facts, with the presumptive 
knowledge taken over in the crude from common sense, 1 
provides the basic foundation for a philosophy of actual 
experience. It not only affords a common ground for 
every inquiry, scientific and philosophical, but it 
also acknowledges the one external control which prevents 
irrelevant speculation and metaphysical witchery which 
have no touch with actual experience. Any philosophy 
that disregards the prima.,.facie facts of knowledge gives 
sufficient reason, Tennant maintains, for disregarding 
that philosophy. "Common-sense knowledge is the 
original, or rather the only extant version of the 
original, of which metaphysics should be a translation; 
philosophy, as here conceived, is not :free composition."2 
Another advantage of the analytic-genetic method is 
1. Tennant, Philoso}hical Theologj[ (Cambridge: University 
Press, 1928-1930 , I, 3. 
2. Ibid., 2. 
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that in its approach to the psychology of cognition there 
are not previous metaphysical conclusions as to the nature 
of the mind or the process of knowing. The psychological 
study of the description and analysis of the data can be 
impartial to metaphysical presuppositions. There are no 
preconceptions as to the reliability of realism over 
idealism~ dualism over monism. The prima facie facts are 
discovered and examined, the theory is made according to 
the facts and not the facts according to the theory, and 
then the philosophy is formulated. 
In addition~ the analytical-genetic method provides 
the means to elucidate the origin, nature, scope, and 
limitations of the knowing-process and the means for in-
vestigation of the concepts and modes of thinking.l These 
advantages, its rootage in actual experience, its freedom 
from metaphysical presuppositions, and its means of eluci-
dation and investigation, furnish Tennant with adequate 
reasons for emphasizing the analytical-genetic method. 
This is not to assume that the psychogenetic study 
of the nature of knowledge does not include a body of 
presumptive knowledge as found in all other areas of science 
and philosophy. Its foundation is not built upon certainty 
and indisputable truth, but is open to the difficulties of 
1. Tennant, Philosophy of the Sciences, 44-45. 
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e.ll empirica l sciences. The provisional and unstable faun-
dation of 1 ts methodology is s hared by all empirical sciences 
'l,·;hich contribute any kn mvledge of actuality vmrth having . 1 
Tennant employs an interesting compari s on in order to 
illustre,te the advan tage and strength of the analytic method. 
lie compares knovJledge in the comprehen s ive sense of a 
structure of act s and gen eralization to the ground-floor 
of a house~ The cellar is comparable to the 11 analytica 
and log ical presuppositions, "2 v-1hile the floor above the 
ground-flool .. is compared to philosophical interpretations~ 
One enters the house by the door on the ground-level from 
which point he can proceed to explore from cellar to roof. 
To discover kn o~,rl edge of the house by any other means 'tTould 
do violence to the structure of the house , the foundation· 
of kl1o\.'fledge~ A' house bull t by imaginative means, sub-
stituting its structure for the structure of the house, is 
pe1~is sible but perfectly vain. The house is to be entered 
on the ground-level~ Knowledge b egins ,,.,i th facts and 
gen erali za tion s ~ 
Thi s compa:ri son elucidates another es s en tial factor 
which is recognized by the analytic-genetic method. The 
founda tions of a house are first constructed , but in philos-
ophy the foundation is already laid, mea11ing ·the existing 
1~ Tennant; Philosophical Theology, I, 2~ 
2. ~~, 5~ 
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structure of empiric fact and obscure concepts.l Philosophy 
cannot begin from a logical structure alone. It begins in 
mediis rebus not from a strictly a priori foundation. The 
a priori assumptions of philosophical methodology which have 
grown out of the original sin of Platonic abstractions, 2 
i.e., pure mathematics, have no relation to the actual world 
in which men live. Pure mathematics when applied to the 
actual world, becomes as tenative and problematical as 
other areas of science and philosophy which find their 
basic assumptions derived from actual experience. 
The analytic-genetic method begins in mediis rebus. 
It enters the house by the door on the ground level, exam-
ining the structure of facts and generalizations already 
given by its foundation. Proceeding to the cellar, it in-
vestigates the logical presuppositions in order to have 
intelligible understanding of the entire house. 
3. Ordo Concipiendi: Ordo Essendi 
The preceding illustration implies that there are 
two ways of proceeding from presumptive knowledge to phi-
losophy. One of these methods is the nongenetic "episte-
mological," or rational method. It enters the house by 
way of the cellar door, the logical conditions of knowl-
edge and its possibility, neglecting to enter at the 
ground level, the actual preconditions of these 
1. Ibid., 4. 2. Ibid., 6. 
logical conditions~ 
It firs t assumes or presupposes what log i cally perfect 
kn m·rledge 1·rould be and thelJ proc eeds to examine the 
~ concipiendi or logic a l steps by l·rhich this ideal 
g oa l is realized l'lithout any conce1"11 .,.,rh a tsoever for 
the a c t ual preconditions of its prem ises ~l 
Tennant finds that this ord o concipi e:nd i method pre-
suppos &s lrnmvl ed ge to be a finished produc t and reas on to 
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be a fully deve loped faculty "\•rithout realizing its embodiment 
in hlU11ani ty which has evolved from early beginnings. The 
method ology is indifferent to genetic s tudies and to the 
individual experi en ce, emphas i z in g the universal experience 
in lmm·ring;. It e·stablishes no re l at ion bet1·reen psychological 
conditionings and logical presuppos itio~as ~ The log ical 
i mplications of propositions and the logica l connec t ions of 
2 i deas are independ ent of orig in and development. 
The ordQ concipiendi me thodology can ass ume an ordo 
es s end i, a metaphys ica l ord er., i n it s reliance on a body 
of knm·rled ge that is knmm §: ~oriori. The methodology of 
ordo essend1, ratio ~ssendi, beg ins l'l"ith an ideal situation 
and then attempts to deduce from the various phases of the 
ideal or idea realm particular truths applicable to human 
life;. Ordo essendi, the order of metaphysical priority, 
Tennant excludes as a methodology for philosophical inquiry. 
Metaphysical knowledge is the last kind to be attained, if 
1. D.L. Scu.dd er, ~enn~nt's Philos ophical Theology, 36. 
2~ Tennant, Philosophical TheolQgi, I, 10;. 
r-
it be attainable. 
Not until we have passed, by way of the sciences, to 
metaphysics, can we set up a metaphysical system and 
speak of degrees of approximation to a metaphysical 
standard. This order, being conceivably knowable only 
after our pursuit is accomplished, cannot give us 
guidance while we are pursuing.l 
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Ordo concipiendi, the order of logical priority, is also 
eliminated as a method by Tennant along with ordo essendi. 
Philosophy of the actual begins with the brute elements of 
sense and the subjective effects not with logical pre-
suppositions of knowledge. The logically prior, except 
for a few empty forms, is only known from the logically 
posterior. 2 The profitable philosophical inquiry begins 
with the fact-data which belong to the actual world. The 
a priori structure of pure thought belongs to an ideal 
world of irrelevant relations. 
4. Ordo Cognoscendi 
The other method of proceeding from presumptive knowl-
edge to philosophy is the ordo eognoscendi, the analytic-
genetic method which Tennant supports. This method uses 
the ground level entrance, recognizing the importance of 
accounting for the origin and context of philosophical 
concepts. It considers a study of the actual sources and 
preconditions of knowledge and actuality essential in 
~ 
the philosophical inquiry. The genesis of man's knowledge 
cannot be ignored if philosophy is to be more than idle 
1. Ibid. 
speculation without rootage in actual experience. Ordo 
cognoscendi, the order of the actual knowledge-process from 
beginning to end,l is the method of inquiry which begins 
with the 'brute facts' of experience, with things as they 
appear to be with as few prejudices and preconceptions as 
possible, and then proceeds inductively from this common 
experiential basis to ascertain critically what may or may 
not be the truth. The methodology does not presume to know 
for a certainty of the existence of any ideal ·,or absolute 
realm outside of the experient at the outset of its 
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investigation. Accordingly, the first task of the inquiry is 
with the facts established by psychology concerning indi-
vidual experience, working its way up to universal experi-
ence. 
No less is meant than that the ordo cognoscendi is the 
sole route that possibly may lead to a known ordo 
essendi: that psychology is the fundamental science, 
the first propaedeutic to philosophy, rather than a 
science to be placed somewhere between chemistry 
and history.2 
B. Analysis of Experience 
The analytic-genetic method, beginning with the facts 
and generalizations of experience, finds as its first task 
the analysis of experience, the origin of all knowledge. 
The fact that there are selves aware of their own existence 
and mentality becomes the primary crude datum of experience 
1. Scudder, Tennant's Philosophical Theology, 37. 
2. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, I, 11. 
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and thus the starting-point for analytical psychology. This 
awareness, the self's awareness of its own existence, im-
plies consciousness. "To be conscious is to be: in the fact 
~ cognitans. ~' being and thinking meet.ul Awareness of 
consciousness, meaning self-consciousness, presupposes the 
basic datum consciousness. This datum is an ultimate con-
cept. The assignment is now for analytical psychology to 
define it. 
1. Definition of Consciousness 
Definitions of consciousness are varied. The many 
meanings conveyed by the term present a warning against 
using an ambiguous term as if it were univocal. The 
substitution of the word 'experience' for 'consciousness• 
has not clarified this ambiguity. 'Experience' carries 
with it the uncertain mean±ngg which are found in the 
term 'consciousness.• 
Selecting the word 'consciousness,' Tennant observes 
that the definition can be formulated only by its denotation 
not by its connotation. The attributes of the word only 
point to other synonyms, but the various kinds of acts 
which consciousness denotes point toward an adequate defi-
nition. 'Consciousness• has a wider denotation than does 
•awareness'; a narrower denotation than 'mental' or 
'psychic' which imply the realm of the unconscious and 
memory-trace.2 Consciousness is a unique ~rlebe~ which is 
1. Ibid., 13. 2. Ibid., 15. 
present in sensation, perceiving~ enjoying or thinking. 
This unique Erleben denotes not knowledge or the simpler 
kind of acquaintance, but being that is prior to knowing.l 
It is a particular type of "living through" that "shines by 
its own light."2 
2. The Subject of Consciousness 
The second fundamental principle which analytical psy-
chology must consider in its analysis of experience, grows 
out of the first principle. The fact of consciousness means 
in addition, that consciousness involves a subject. The 
assertion is now made that the subject is, not what the 
subject is.3 Experience involves an experient, Attempts 
to reduce consciousness into "pure experience," "conscious 
states," or "contents of experience 11 without a recognition 
of a subject that is aware of such states or contents, be-
come empty abstractions and logical absurdities. Aware-
ness is a meaningless term unless it is used to express an 
awareness of something by something. The distinction 
between subject and object must be made even when it is 
not known by the subject. If consciousness is unique, 
a unique Erleben, it is from first to last a quality in 
unity.4 
1. Ibid. 2. Ibid., 16. 3 . ~bid • , 17 • 
4. Tennant, ~hilosophical Theology, I, 20. 
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The subject appears in all theories~ even in theories 
which deny the subject. The data of science would not 
emerge without the work of individual subjects. Scientific 
research requires an impersonal attitude in its conceptual 
phase but returning from this status, it seeks personal 
acceptance and verification. In this process science re --
states the subject-object duality of experience. 1 The 
awareness of a subject as it confronts an object is the 
primary sphere of psychological inquiry. It is the 
starting-point for a theory of knowledge. 
3 . Subjective Elements in Consciousness 
The psychological analysis reveals three subjective 
elements in the activity of consciousness in addition to 
its basic Erleben . These elements are feeling, conation, 
and active receptivity or attention. All of these elements 
make possible the presumptive facts of experience. \'/i th-
out these elements, a subject would be unable to respond 
to the object. 
Feeling is defined by psychology as the affective 
states of pleasure and displeasure (pain) which in some 
degree accompany perception of objects. 2 Feelings are not 
sensations. A subject may experience the color red with-
out a feeling of pleasure or displeasure. The sensory 
experience of redness is not conditioned by a mental 
1. Ibid.~ 22. 2. Ibid. , 2 9 . 
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disposition of the subject's feeling. Feeling, therefore, 
is a subjective ac t ivity of the subject as it reacts to 
the perception of objects. 
Conation is not synonymous With feeling. rl,he dis-
tinction is seen in the fact that in longing for a 
pleasurable object, the \'/ant is distinguishable from the 
feeling of pleasure evoked by the object. If the subject 
desires a delicious apple and such an apple is withheld, 
certainly the desire for the apple is different from the 
f eeling derived when he bites into it. 
P,ctive receptivity or attention is the third function 
of the sub ject. This activity is presupposed by feeling 
and conation. Tennant refers to attention as the act ive -
pass ive receptivity of impression in consciousness. This 
receptivity is not pure passivity . There must be as much 
subject ive reaction on the part of the subject as is 
required for receiving an impression . 1 The subjective 
a ctiv ity of attention cannot be explained. It is the 
ultimate and underivable conscious activity of t he 
subject. 2 
In summarizing Tennant's position as discussed to this 
point, it is important to remember during the following 
presentation of the objective factor of experience that 
the prima facie facts, the data of pre sumptive knowledge, 
1. Ibid. 2 • Ibid. , 30 . 
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could not be what they are unless (1) there is a unique 
kind of ~leben. consciousness, which (2) in~olves an 
existent subject that (3) has determinate states and 
activities such as feeling, conation and attention. 1 
4. The Objective Factor of Experience 
The objective factor of experience is the sense-
impression. Its reception by the subject is the source 
in which perception and thought originate. The sense-
impression (sensation) is not a feeling, the subjective 
activity of sensing which often accompanies the presen-
tation of sensation. The sensation of the color blue as 
presented by way of the sensory organs may be accompanied 
by a feeling of pleasantness in the subject. This feeling 
is not sensation in terms of the mere presentation of the 
color blue. It is a feeling which accompanies the act of 
sensing the sensation of the color blue. 
Sensation is what the mind experiences by way of the 
sensory organs. It is the objective side of experience. 
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To be objective is to be an "object over-against a subject."2 
The objective is not reducible to subjective states or 
modifications. Sensation is that element which first 
breaks in upon the subject with qualia and relations of 
its own. These gualia and relations stand over against 
-1. Ibid. , 32. 
2. Ibid., 35. 
the will of the subject. To anticipate a certain degree of 
heatl from a fire which warms the hands is different from 
receiving from that fire a certain degree of heat which 
burns the hands. The recognition of this fact, the 
objective quality of sensation, makes meaningful the 
terms 'primary presentation' and 'impression' which 
have been used synonymously with sensation. 
The presentation, order and nature of impressions, in 
so far as involuntary or non-selective attention is 
concerned, are thrust upon us willy-nilly: that is what 
renders the impressional psychologically ultimate and 
inexplicable. The analytically simple data of all 
knowledge as to our actual world, are thus posited for 
us, not by us: they constitute an irrational surd which 
pure thought cannot eliminate.l 
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To whatever degree sensation may be discussed as the 
objective side of experience, there remains the impossibility 
of establishing xensation as a 'pure' actuality. ''Pure' 
actuality may be discussed as an hypothesis but in actuality 
it escapes such abstractness. In order to discriminate and 
describe a patch of color as blue, there is more activity 
than the impression of the sensum blue. This process re-
quires the act of sensing which receives, retains, and 
discriminates the color as blue. Sensation is a joint-
product with the act of sensing. It is from the first 
impression not a 'pure' but rather a relatively simple 
1. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, I, 36. 
percept. If this were not the case, perception and 
knowledge could not develop from ~ensation. The products 
of thought would then have no connection with the actual 
world and no basis for common experience among experients 
would exist. Impression from the simplest beginning of 
experience contains the kernel of the developed percept 
from which images are derived, and from images ideas 
are mediated. 
We can see now the truth in the assertion that there is 
nothing in the understanding that was not previously in 
the senses. We have also made first acquaintance with 
the evidence for the fact that sense and understanding 
have a common root. The actual process commonly called 
sense, is from the first possessed of the promise and 
potency of thought.l 
Two er:eo~s in regard to sensation are discussed by 
Tennant. One error is to conceive sensation as separate, 
discriminated presentations2 without any unity in a con-
tinuum. These particular sensations are not to be con-
sidered the ultimate actuality of experience, for such a 
concept supports an atomistic and disconnected view of 
experience. The ultimate actuality of experience prior 
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to analysis by conceptual thought3 is a stretch of change 
within which particular sensations are discriminated. Change 
is the fundamental reality which becomes the background for 
the coming and going of sensations into the field ofconscious-
ness. It is against this background that sensations are 
1. Ibid., 37. 2. Ibid. : 3. Ibid., 38. 
differentiated and their objectivity as being over 
against the conscious subject is established. 
The other error noted by Tennant is the assumption 
that sensations are formless and that it is the unique task 
of the mind to give them structure. Tennant holds that 
such an assumption does not account for the givenness of 
sensation which is recognized and organized by the mind. 
Any discontinuity between sensation and developed thought, 
whether it be in the reception of sensation by the· mind or 
in the nature of the sensation, is discredited by Tennant. 
An assumption which posits a continuity between sense and 
thought is more consistent with the facts that indicate an 
interaction between sense and thought in the actual world. 
In summarizing the nature of sensation and its contri-
bution to experience, three factors are important: (1) sen-
sations are objective, having qualia and relations of their 
own, but (2) they are not 'pure' impressions. They are 
germinal percepts which (3) are acted upon by the subject 
which receives them. The task before analytical psychology 
is now to examine the ways in which the subject acts upon 
the sense-impressions. 
5. The Mind Itself 
Passive reception of impressions by the mind is equally 
as empty an abstraction as is the 'pure' impression. The 
mind acts upon the reception of impressions in the ear]est 
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stages of the mental process according to its own structure. 
This structure involves three irreducible subjective 
activities: retention, complication or fusion, differentiation. 
Retention is the subjective activity of the mind which 
involves persistence and change resulting from the after-
effects of impressions. ~fter an impression has disappeared 
the mind keeps the impress ion as a residuum \-Thich is dis-
1 
tinguishabla from the impression itself~ This residuum is 
held by the mind in relation to the interest of the mind. 
If the mind did not have this retentive function at the 
primary level of experience, sensations ·would come and go 
vvithou.t any identity beyond thems.elves. This \-muld prevent 
sensations from having any meaning for the mind. Retention, 
therefore, is the primary and necessary activity of the mind 
in order for meaning to appear as e. r esult of interaction 
between sensation and the mind itself~ 
Complication or fusion is the assimilation vlhich fuses 
old presentations of their residua ~rith ne't'>"~ 2 The con-
struction of percepts or images is dependent upon this 
primary function of the mind~ A percept is not constructed 
from one impression received by the mind~ It requires more 
than one impression. The activity of complication merges 
different impressions into one percept·~ It places the color 
1. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, I, 40 ·~ 
2~ Ibid~' 42. 
orange and the spherical shape together to mean juiciness 
before the sensation of juiciness is received by the mouth. 
The activity of differentiation is most clearly under-
stood in relation to the functions of retention and fusion. 
Differentiation is active in the organizing of sensations 
in the retentive activity of the mind, and in discriminating 
sensations for percept-building by the fusing activity of 
the mind. This activity illustrates the mutual dependence 
of all the functions of the mind itself upon each other. 
Retention, fusing and differentiation are the irreducible 
subjective activities of one mind, functioning in the mind 
itself. 
5. Initial Stages of the Cognitive Process 
After examining the subjective activites of the mind 
itself and the objective factor of sense-impression on the 
elementary level of the individual, private experience, the 
analytic-genetic method proceeds to consider the initial 
stages of the cognitive process which advances beyond the 
elementary level of experience. The advancement into the 
cognitive stage of experience appears in the processes of 
perception, the imaginal, memory, and ideation. 
a. Perception 
The percept is constructed out of the private world of 
the experient. It appears without communication with other 
selves and before the subject has reached the level of 
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common or social experience. Cognition not perception is 
the result of the common experience. 
Perception moves beyond the elementary activities of 
retention, fusion, and differentiation. It involves 
localization in the experient's private world, and it 
entails reification by which sensa come to be regarded 
as qualities of 'things.'l It is in this way that the 
·u germinal perception" is enlarged into the developed 
perception.2 
The developed percept is not objectively 'pure' 
any more than the sensation is 'pure' actuality. The 
percept always has a foot in both the objective and sub-
jective worlds.3 It is conditioned subjectively by the 
fusing activity and particular interests of the .mind. 
Objectively, the developed percept is conditioned by the 
"unalterable relations" of the sensations. 
The percept is not simple or immediate. It is a 
complex act, conditioned by previous experience, and 
involves synthetic activites which are unnoticed by the 
subject in the act of perceiving. Any theory, Tennant 
insists, which denies this complexity has failed to 
recognize that in the experience of perception the subject 
1. Ibid., 44. 
2. Peter Bertocci, Empirical Argument for God in Late 
British Thought (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1938), 199. 
3. Tennant, QE· cit., 45. 
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is often unaware of these synthetic activities due to the 
psychological immediacy of th~ experience. 
The involved, developmental process of perceiving 
begins with the experient•s own body. The body is made up 
of a constant group of sensations which form a constant 
background for all other sensations. By analogy man builds 
up his first crude notions of permanence, unity, and 
individuality. The categories of substance and cause 
also find their actual source in these interpretative notions 
derived from the interaction of the mind with a permanent 
group of sensations which it comes to regard as its own 
body. These categories are constructed by the interested 
mind and become the instruments of the mind in the 
construction of its world •1 "The logically ~ J2riori forms .· .. 
of our understanding and knowledge are derived from life, not 
from logic; they are regulative while they are constitu-
tive; they are both anthropic and mundane."2 
The fact that percepts are subjectively and 
objectively condtioned, developing from the humble 
beginnings of the experient 1 s own awareness of his body, 
makes apriorism untenable. Any theory which ignores this 
development and declares that concepts are read off from 
1. Bertocci, op. cit., 200. 
2. Tennant, Q£• cit., 50. 
the external world, is scientifically unwarranted and 
philosophically dogmatic. 1 
b. The Imaginal 
It is necessary to analyze the relationship between 
the perceptual and the imaginal, since the latter is the 
necessary step between the impression and the idea. The 
imaginal is the ultimate source of the idea. It constitutes 
a further abstraction from the subjective activity and the 
objective factor involved in the impressional experience. 
In order to see this development, it is helpful to con-
trast the imaginal and the impressional experience. 
Impress·ions have a status of independence which 
cannot be shared by images. Psychologically, impressions 
are independent of each other and of impressions and 
images presented the moment before. Images are dependent on 
previous impressions. Nothing can be imaged that has 
not previously been sensed. An image of a drggon, for 
example, always contains various impressions sensed before 
the image is made. Impressions are thus seen to be primary, 
images secondary. Images are conditioned as to existence 
and nature by impressions. 
Impressions have a stable and retentive quality 
in contrast to images which are usually in a state of 
1. Ibid. 
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fluz or flickering. To retain the impression of the 
color yellow is a simple task compared to retaining the 
image of a face which has been absent for days or years. 
Even with the effort to regain the image, the difficulty 
increases. However, there is no effort to retain the 
impression of the color yellow. It is tied, as are all 
percepts, to the whole presentation-continuum which is 
aceessible to the experient. 
The imaginal and the impressional are essentially 
different orders of the objective. This is illustrated 
by the fact that the experient can form an image of a blue 
rose but can never see a red rose as blue at the same time. 
Impressions are less psychologically conditioned 
than the imaginal. The imaginal and the ideas which 
are derived from the imaginal, are conditioned psychologi-
cally in their order and relations. These conditions are 
controlled by the volition of the experient. The volition, 
in turn, is affected by such things as the experient's 
feeling and conation, his memory interests and prejudices. 
Images are not tied to the impressional core found in the 
percept. 
This contrast between the imaginal and the im-
pressional indicates that the two processes are distinct 
and subject to different laws. However, this contrast 
shows the imaginal and the impressional in their purest 
form. This pure form is difficult to discern in actual 
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experient. Subjectively~ the imaginal and the impressional 
can be fused in experience. The c ommon links intermediate 
between them illustrat e t h is fusion.l 
The wo r d 'imagina l' is us ed by Tennant in pre f e r enc e 
t o ' i magination .' The latter term is more suggestive of 
illusion. The notion of illusion cannot arise at this 
initial stage of the cognitive process. It can only appear 
when the private experience is transcended by the common~ 
socialized experience. Both the impressional and the 
imaginal are open to illusion but again the judgment of 
error belongs to advanced stages of cognition when the 
object of the private experience is related to the 
common object of the socialized experience. 2 
c. Ideation 
The transition from image to general idea is 
difficult to discern. The process is gradual. It 
1. Tennant~ ~· cit., 53-56. 
2. Ibid., 20. Tennant clarifies future reference to these 
terms and his method of indica ting them. "When these 
terms denote wha t is over aga inst, other than pre-
sented to, and individual object, or are used in the 
psychologic a l sense~ they sha ll here be printed with 
sma ll initial letters; spelt with a capital, they will 
refer to what is common to the many, the conceptua l, 
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more or les s abstract thought-constructions of 'uni vers a l' 
experience ••. used in their epistemologica l s ense. 
The same device will be used to d is tinguish the re a lity , 
encountered in the objective experience, from Rea lity 
ascribed to the conceptual and common." 
produces no distinctiv~ break that indicates when the 
perception or imagination or even the act of sensing ends 
and when ideation, culminating in pure conception begins. 1 
Indications of this transition are noticed when the atten-
tion of the subject shifts from the actual to the possible 
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and from the existence of things as posited in the impressional 
to the essence of things dealt with in abstraction. 
The beginnings of ideation are seen in the sub-
jective activities of the mind itself; in the functions 
of retention, fusion, and differentiation. They are also 
present in recognition which is implicit universalizing 
of the particular and in preperception of qualities not 
at the moment in sensu. 2 In these humble beginnings, 
invauing trial and error, abstract thinking is born. 
Only gradually through a process of development and 
refinement is the idea freed from sensation and from 
the image. 
Ideas are not immediate in the sense that the 
impressional is immediate. They involve more than 
the instant thrust of sensation. Ideas are derived 
from the imaginal, one step advanced from the im-
pressiona l. In the image certain impressional con-
stituents essential to the original percept are often 
1. Ibid., 61. 2. Ibid., 62. 
eliminated. Detail can also be voluntarily eliminated 
when it is irrelevant to the purpose of the experient. 
An example of this is found when the basic point of 
interest for the experient is the particular shape of 
an object instead of its size or color. At this point 
nothing more rema ins of the image than its shapeness. 
When shapeness is considered without direct reference 
to a particular object from which it has been derived, 
a general idea has been reached in the process of 
thought. This general idea is void of the impressional, 
but the objectivity of the idea remains due to its origin 
in the impressional. Ideas are not created out of nothing. 
They have reference to the impressional, although they 
do not consist of the impressional. 
The idea is not actual or real as is the percept. 
Its validity is not to be identified with reality be-
cause it has abstracted its impressional core found in 
the percept. The validity of an idea is found in 
relation to the perceptual in which it was implicit 
and from which it has been abstracted. Validity is not 
reality. 
Concepts derived otherwise than directly from the 
percepts to which they are to be applied, e.g. 
from objects of constructive imagination uncon-
trolled by the perceptual, may or may not apply 
to things, and may or may not have actual or real 
counterparts. There is no ground for supposing 
that they will or must. Hence the importance of 
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limiting the scope or range of ideas to the par-
ticular contexts whence they have been elicited. 
Transcend that context, and ideas may become as 
irrelevant or invalid as they are empty or unreal.l 
Ideas are man-made tools derived from the imaginal. 
Tennant compa~es the experient•s idea to a key 
fashioned by the experient with materials of his own 
world. The experient makes and tries his key with the 
intent to open the lock of reality. The lock, not the 
key, decides the adequacy or inadequacy of the key. 
When the experient•s key appears to have met the re-
quirements of the lock, the possibility still remains 
that other keys of an entirely different sort might fit 
the lock as well or better than the key of the experient•s 
fashioning. 
Ideation has two characteristics which carry it 
beyond the perceptional and imaginal: (1) it is an ab-
straction of certain qualities from an object which 
involves the transition from reality to validity, (2) 
it is an explication of relations which at the other 
levels of the cognitive process were only implicit and 
indefinitely apprehended.2 The involuntary associ-
ation of ideas and images which often occurs on the 
impressional and imaginal level of experience is 
now replaced by a selective and relational association 
1. Tennant, op. cit., 62. 2. Ibid !'I 66. 
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among objects by conceptual thought. This 
relational association reveals the idea as valid but 
not as actual. 
The process of ideation further supports the 
conviction that sense and thought are continuous. 
Thought is not innate, nor is sense passive. The two 
processes are interwoven and interrelated, each con-
tributing to the other in the development of individual 
experience. 
The question may arise in the reader's mind at 
this point concerning the relationship between this 
analysis of individual experience and Tennant's in-
terpretation of religious experience. The relevance 
is seen in the conclusions gained from this analysis, 
and their relation to the understanding of all ex-
perience including religious experience. These con-
clusions are as follows: (1) experience on the private, 
individual level contains both the subjective activities 
of the mind and the objective factor of sensation; (2) the 
impressional core of the perceptual experience is the 
primary reality and the objective source of all 
knowledge as to actuality or reality; (3) the imaginal 
is the ultimate source of ideas and constitutes a further 
abstraction from the impressional core of perceptual 
experience; (4) the idea or concept derived from the 
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imagina l has reference to actua lity but is not actual or 
rea l; (5) the validity of an idea is est ablished by its 
rela tion to the impressional core of the perceptual 
experience i n which i t is implicit~ and from which it 
has been abstracted; and {6) validity is not to be 
identified with reality. 
In view of these conclusions~ the reader may 
expect to find in Tennant's interpretation of religious 
experience references to the necessity of this devel-
opmental process of ideational construction and the 
use of the method of inference from facts perceived 
originally by the senses. The concept of God, for 
example, is not given as a logical and abstract fact. 
It is inferred from the humble beginnings of sensory 
impression. Religious knowledge arises in the same 
way as knowledge in other areas. Man found the world 
without any direct experience of God involved in the 
facts of the world. He then developed, by analogical 
construction, the concept of God which when "read into11 
the experienced world gave him his religious concept. 
Man derives his religious idea of God at the end of 
"implicit" analogical reasoning.l 
In addition to the validation derived from the 
1. Scudder, Tennant's Philosophical Theology, 99. 
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reference to the impressional core of perceptual experi-
ence, all concepts require a further development which 
comes from common agreement among more than one experient. 
The latter process presupposes a wider experience than the 
individual, private level of awareness. At this point the 
analytic-genetic method examines this level of experience 
which includes man's knowledge of himself, other selves, 
and the world. 
C. Analysis of the Subject 
1. The Self 
The origin and development of man's knowledge of 
himself is derived from man's awareness of his own body 
as differentiated from other perceptual objects. This 
consciousness of the body as one among other extended 
things results from organic sensations which affect the 
body from within which, in turn, condition feeling and 
conation. In addition to this localization of organic 
sensations within the body, another factor distinguishes 
the body from other perceptual objects. This is the 
discovery that the body is the one thing which remains 
as constant and is the unique possession of the subject. 
While other perceptual objects come and go, one per-
ceptual object, the body, remains for the subject. The 
first crude notion of the self is thus derived from 
the bodily self. It is interesting speculation but 
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certainly not the subject of knowledge to inquire about 
the attainment of self-consciousness without embodiment. 
It will remain speculation until a testimony is given 
by a "subject that has not known the bitter-sweet 
experience of being 'clothed upon with o~ habitation which 
is from' earth."l 
When this degree of self-consciousness is reached 
by the experient, the belief in other selves can be 
attained. This belief is mediated through analogy. 
After the self is known through awareness of the bodily 
self, the subject can perceive other persons' bodies 
to be and to behave like his own bodily self. This 
analogical ejection is later pragmatically justified 
by developed abstract thought. 
other selves are not directly apprehended like the 
brute fact of sense-data. The subject cannot tell what is 
going on in another subject's mind or to know what emotions 
that subject is experiencing. All presumptive knowledge 
whether it concerns common sense or science, rests on the 
assumption that the subjective Erleben of the subject's 
self is active in other selves. 
The higher levels of self --knowing are reached through 
observing, imitating and understanding other selves. These 
activities require the private self to become the social 
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self. During this development the self is distinguished 
from its thoughts. This refinement results in the notion 
of the pure ego as distinguished from the empirical self.l 
2. The Pure Ego 
A psychological distinction is made between the 
pure ego as the subject known and the empirical self 
as the subject knowing. The pure ego is the underlying 
and uniform reality which is the basis of the empirical 
self's activities. It does not have the properties of 
the empirical self, namely, the acts of feeling, willing, 
and knowing. The properties of becoming or causality 
are~descriptive of the pure ego. This becoming or 
causality is the unifying agent (pure ego) which makes 
individual and coherent the various acts (empirical 
self) of feeling, willing, and knowing. The pure 
ego is the enduring self which is Actual, making pos-
-sible the empirical fact-knowledge of the primary 
datum. Synonymous terms for it are the 'abiding subject' 
and the 'soul' • 
The pure ego is not phenomenally known. It is 
noumenally inferred. The qualia found in impressions 
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1. The purpose of this dissert ation is not to develop 
Tennant's theory of the self and its f aculties. How-
ever , the concepts of the pure ego, the empirical self, 
and persona lity are relevant to the subject of knowledge. 
are missing. The qualitylessness or transparency of 
the pure ego suggests that it can only be known as idea. 
The pure ego is known about, not known immediately. This 
knowledge about the pure ego is also found in the knowledge 
about the external world. The world is known about through 
relationships among the self, other selves, and the 
world (objects). Correspondingly, the pure ego is 
known about in relationship between itself and the 
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are missing. The qualitylessness or transparency of 
the pure ego suggests that it can only be known as idea. 
The pure ego is known about, not known immediately. This 
knowledge about the pure ego is also found in the knowledge 
about the external world. The world is known about through 
relationships among the self, other selves, and the 
world (objects). Correspondingly, the pure ego is 
known about in relationship between itself and the 
objects presented to it and feelings evoked in it. Tennant 
acknowledges acquaintance (known immediately) with mental 
states, the empirical ego. He maintains, however, that 
the pure ego, in abstraction from these states and acts, 
is not an object of acquaintance in contrast to these 
states which involve it. 
The pure ego is constructed as the bond which gives 
unity to the phenomena of consciousness. It is needed 
to unify not only the single act of cognition by the 
subject, but also to give continuity to the subjective 
states of the subject. The theory of the pure ego 
explains the temporal continuity, unity, and order of 
the mental life which would be impossible without such 
an abiding subject. Experience is not confined to a 
present instant. It is change and experience of change. 
I~ order for this change to be observed and recognized, 
there must be an abiding subject which persists in 
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experience. The pure ego is thus precondition and not 
the result of distinguishable experiences. 1 
3. The Empirical Self and Personality 
The empirical self is manifested in personality. 
It is not to be identified with the pure ego. The 
empirical self is the subject knowing as distinguishable 
from the subject known (the pure ego). Psychologically 
this distinction can be made. Ontologically, the pure 
ego and the empirical self are one entity with two 
aspects, one substance with two roles. 
Personality is determined by three factors: (1) the 
pure ego which is the source of idiosyncrasy discernible 
in personality; (2) the sum of inherited endowments; 
(3) social nurture and physical environment. Per-
sonality is a relative thing, an ·attribute of the em-
pirical self, objective to its pure ego. 2 It is not 
to be identified with mere subjecthood and its conscious 
activities. This is the fundamental precondition, not 
personality itself. Personality is conditioned by 
1. Disagreement with this theory is found · in the thought 
of Bertocci, Brightman, and Scudder among others. "A. 
pure ego which has, but which is neither thinking, 
willing, nor feeling, is completely meaningless to us. 
The self is a conscious complex of feeling and willing 
and knowing. These are not properties of an underlying 
and uniform reality." Bertocci, Empirical Argument for 
God, 207-208. 
2. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, I, 124. 
sense-knowledge, by the body, and by social life 1-vhich 
med i a te s reas on and morality. 1 To be a person requires 
more than knm~Jled ,ge of self-identity~ It also entails 
he;ving t astes , Edms, and character~ Personality has a 
continuing and e xpanding possibility which cannot be 
limited. by def'ini tion. Like the grovring body, it is 
always in a develop ing and fluctuatin g status. 
To SUlllmarize, it i s essential to notice that it 
is from the k1.1o1trledge of the self' 
that our f'unde.mental categories of iden tity, con-
tin uan ce, substance, causal activity, end, in terms 
of vrhich vre 11 knmv11 --i. e., interpret--the w·orld are 
derived~ That of personality is the same case; and 
it is our highest interpretative concept~2 
If interpret a tion thus derived promises anthropomorphism 
it is 11ot to be regretted. Such anthro1;)omorphism i s the 
inevitable and grand mould in vThich all human thought is 
cast and th...rou.gh ivhich man comes to t hink as man and to 
und.erstand and assimilate to himself the objects of' life.3 
D. Theory of Kn o1-Jledge 
A tl:Bor.y of lrn ovtled ge, Tennant maintain s, must 
support the an a lytica l-genetic analysis of experience 
and of the subject;. This ana lysis finds knoi'lledge con-
cerl1ing Actuality to be the result of process, be-
ginnin g ~tri th individual perceptual exper i en ce and 
1~ Ibid~' 125. 2. ];bid .' 127;. 3. Ibid. 
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working its way up from the impressional into the 
imaginal and finally into the conceptual stage of 
shared knowledge. A reliable and workable epistemology, 
therefore, sets out from the Actual, the observable 
fact-data, in order to discover their preconditions 
which are applicable to the conditions of developed 
thought. A theory of knowledge which begins with 
presuppositions concerning the conditions of thought and 
the nature of ultimate Reality is untenable. The task 
of epistemology is to discover Reality as known not as 
presupposed. 1 
1. Empiricism and Rationalism 
Empiricism and rationalism are two theories of 
knowledge concerned with the origin and nature of 
knowledge. They are not compatible, however, in method 
or conclusion regarding its origin, nature or validity. 
In contrast to rationalism which finds the origin 
of knowledge to be independent of sensory experience, 
empiricism establishes the sensory experience as the 
ultimate and original occasion of a~l knowledge. The 
mind itself is not possessed with perfected knowledge 
or pure reason as innate in perfected form at the first 
instance of receiving impressions. It has a priori 
1. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, I; 219~ 
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capacities for knowledge not a priori knowledge. In . 
this sense, "reason comes not so much out of, as through 
or by means of sense." 1 
Concepts and universals which are free and in-
dependent of the impressional are not existents in the 
same sense as are the percepts fromW1ich they are de-
rived. The existence and truth of these concepts and 
universals are established by relation to Actuality and 
not be abstract thought. The validity of their logical 
.relation appears in correspondence to the world from 
which they have been derived and to which they apply. 
Rationalism conceives the nature of knowledge to 
be the immediate apprenension of the self-evident and 
consequently the indemonstrable yet necessary axioms. 2 
These axioms are the underived premises of all knowledge 
and are "read off" with infallibility by the innate 
reason. These axioms are thus self-evident. 
Empiricism, at this point, raises the episte-
mological question concerning the relationship between 
the self-evident axiom and the knower. If the axiom 
does not apply to the world of the knower, it is void 
of meaning. Apart from relevance to the empiric a l 
world, an axiom as described by a nominal definition is 
not a truth but a convention.3 The conceptua l definitions 
1. Ibid., 197. 2. Ibid., 199. 3. Ibid., 201. 
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which appear to yield axioms independent of the experient 
and the sensory experience are found by empirical inquiry 
to origina te in the experient's mind depending upon 
previous perceptual knowledge. Empiricism finds the 
so-ca lled axioms (underived premises) of pure science such 
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as mathematics could not have been constructed without · actual 
solid bodies to suggest them. Likewise~ the axioms of logic 
which are not derived from intuitive inductions (inductions 
which are mediated by perceptual experience) are found 
by empiricism to be definitions or conventions not truths 
or propositions proper. 1 $uch situations reflect cases 
where the empirically familiar has been mistaken for the 
a priori and inductions have been misread as necessary 
truths. 2 
Rationalism requires the support of realism which 
finds certain ideas and propositions to exist or subsist 
in abstraction from facts and knowers. There is a realm 
of being that is timeless and eternal and has 'Reality' 
of superior order to that of the sensible world. The 
Objects (of this realm) are over against the mind and 
independent of the mind. Empiricism grants the 
Objectivity of concepts as ideal. However, to claim 
that the Objective as ideal is also the real becomes 
1. Tennant~ Philosophical Theol~, ~t', .·207~ 
2. Ibid. 
another matter for consideration. 
It is unwarranted dogma, according to empiricism, 
to .claim that every idea exists and has a counterpart 
that is Real as well as ideal. An idea, such as a 
geometrical theorem, may have a logical existence, 
but this logical priority does not imply priority 
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of existence or priority in Reality. Em~irically, logical 
existence of an idea means no more than its constructibility 
compatibly with the convention which generates it, and 
its Objectivity when abstracted and attended to. 1 
To claim the independence of ideas from thinkers . 
and the thought-process is another unwarranted dogma 
supported by rationalism. This assertion is compared 
by Tennant to a belief in the priority of language 
which exists independently of speakers. The language 
previously formed, now compels recognition of its 
syntax and idioms upon the speakers. There is no real 
and developing relationship between language and its 
users. In a similar manner, the claim which establishes 
the existence of the idea with its counterpart in the 
Real as well as the ideal becomes an irrelevant relation. 
The origin and development of knowledge is thereby ignored. 
The structure of knowledge is not determined by ideas which 
exist independent of thinkers nor is it formed by a 
1. Ibid. , 210. 
faculty of reason which functions without reference to 
sensory experience. It is determined by the structure 
of solid bodies, and by specific qualities and relations 
of the physical world. 1 "Man is in the first instance 
anthropic, and in the second plaee he is embodied and 
environed and his developed 'reason' is the outcome 
of interaction between his intrinsic soul-nature and 
the objective."2 
2. Phenomenalism 
Tennant finds the phenomenalistic theory of knowl-
edge to be most in accord with the empirical study of 
cognition. Neither pure subjectivism nor pure realism 
can account for all the facts involved in the cognitive 
relation. They both fail to present knowledge as a 
product of the coactivity of the conscious :· subject on 
the one hand and of the independent reality on the other.3 
Phenomenalism includes a view of the relativity 
of knowledge.4 This phrase me ans that the onta l is 
not known in its native purity but only with the 
additions and modifica tions due to the experient's 
1. Ibid., 214. 2 • Ibid • , 213. 
a. Scudder, Tennant's Philosophical Theology, 40. 
4. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, I, 249. 
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organs of sense and the structure of his mind. 1 Knowl-
edge is not pure but is a mixture like air which is a 
composition of elements. There is no face-to-face 
vision of the ontal. 
The noumenal is known through the phenomenal, 
according to the phenomenalistic position. In this 
process the phenomenal does not serve the purpose of 
deception. It is the utterance of the ontal to the 
experient. The important factor resulting from this 
utterance is not whether knowledge attained is a pure 
copy of Reality but whether it is relevant to Reality. 
It may be that the pure copy of Reality is without mean-
ing and is thus the least significant and valuable element. 
Tennant illustrates this point by shmlfing that it does 
not matter if paint and tinsel, cardboard treas and 
houses confront man as the 'realities' on the stage 
if as visible from his seat their appearance-effects 
entertain him with a drama full of meaning. The 
impurity of knowledge is irrelevant if knowledge remains 
relative to Reality. 2 
Knowing is neither making a lone nor finding alone. 
It is finding by making. Man doe s not make Reality. 
He receives from Reality its utterance as a subject 
1. Ibid . , 2 52 • 2. Ibid., 252 .-253. 
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embodied with the sense-knowledge of his private world. 
Reality is both some function of the ontal and some 
function of human souls. To know Reality~ therefore~ 
the experient cannot become it. To know and to be 
what is known is never one or the same. Knowledge of 
Reality appears in the relating of impressional data 
to the embodied soul and to the mind's demands. Such 
knowledge is relevant to the self~ other selves~ and to 
the world. It produces humanized truth which neither 
science~ nor algorithmic logic~ nor mysticism can 
1 divest of its anthropic characteristics. 
3. Induction 
Phenomenalism works inductively from the results of 
observation and experimentation in arriving at its 
conclusions. The indictive process used in this case 
is not self-evident or a priori. It requires the 
support of past observations along with the assump-
tion that these observations yield knowledge and a 
certain regularity which conforms to future con-
siderations. This principle of uniformity essential 
to the indictive process is not found a priori nor is 
it conceived by abstract thought. It is rather a pro-
duct of the world of sense and the mind itself. Mankind 
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did not begin its career with knowing but with learning 
through doing. 1 The principle of uniformity was not 
written with bold letters upon natural phenomena so that man 
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could read it off in his primitive state. It was tentatively 
assumed and believed by man as he learned to witness 
nature's regularity. In such a manner, Tennant maintains, 
mankind attained his science, religion, and in particular 
his belief in uniformity. They are gained through the 
means of pragmatic assertions of the hoped for and the 
unknown.2 
It is important to notice what kind of verification 
Tennant ascribes to the inductive process. This issue 
can appear as a criticism of Tennant's position formulated 
correctly or incorrectly by his philosophical opponents. 
The type of verification derived from the inductive 
method is not an absolute certainty, according to Tennant., 
but a probable belief. The postulates underlying 
inductive reasoning cannot be proved logically. 
The efforts to prove them to be necessary truths or 
a priori will fail. 3 This does not imply tha t the 
presuppositions which support the inductive process 
a re untrue. It merely means that these postulates 
1. Ibid • , 2 62 • 2. Ibid., 263. 
3. Tennant, The Nature of Belief (London: The Centenary 
Press, 1943), 41-42.-- ·-· ----
will be believed to be true by science and by c0mmon 
sense until they are proved to be groundless. The 
fact of this applicability to the world does not es~ 
tablish the postulates as valid always and everywhere. 
They are constantly subject to further verification by 
pragmatic efforts not by logical certification. The 
foundations of induction and of science are therefore 
hypothetical and open to new eviderice as discernible 
in relation between the experient and the world. 
4. Probability 
The probable belief connected with the inductive 
method is also active in all knowledge. Tennant uses 
the word 'probability' in his discussion of epistemological 
theories. It is important to know its meaning in relation 
to a general theory of knowledge and in reference to his 
specific view of religious knowledge. 
Probability as applied to beliefs and not to events 
denotes a relation of one proposition or a group of 
propositions to another. It does not denote the in-
trinsic quality of a proposition~ nor does it imply 
a relation which is logical and objective. The probable 
conclusion does not follow with logical necessity from 
its premise such as results when a truly logical relation 
of implication is present. 1 Probability is rather a 
1. Ibid.~ 44. 
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relative conclusion admitting of various degrees of the 
unknowable and the certain. 
Probability is the 'guide of life' and the guide 
of science. 1 In science, as well as other fields of 
thought, man has to purchase rationality (reasonableness) 
with belief which, used in all proving, is itself in-
~ 
capable of being proved. This probable belief which 
underlies all of man's knowledge does not culminate in 
certain knowledge. It invokes instead a sanguine 
trust from man as he advances in reasonable knowledge. 
This reasonable knowledge about the Actual is never 
completely certain nor purely logical in verification. 
5. Belief: Its Epistemological Implications 
It is necessary to point out two distinctions when 
the epistemological implications of belief are discussed. 
The first applies to the difference between logical and 
psychological belief. Logical belief is concerned with 
what is believed, that is, with the propositions as 
finished products of thought in their abstractions from 
believers.3 In this sense logical belief is objective 
and impressional in nature. Psychological belief, on the 
1. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, I, 277-278. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Tennant, Nature of Belief, 4. 
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other hand~ is concerned with belief as a mental process 
called believing. It does not deal with the truth of 
logical propositions but examines the actual causes and 
effects of believing. In contrast to logical belief~ 
psychological belief is subjective and personal in nature~ 
Both psychological and logical belief invaue the 
conviction of certainty. Logical belief provides the 
certainty derived from logical and mathematical truths~ 
the self-evident relations between ideas. Psychological 
belief affords the certainty derived from the immediate 
and incommunicable qualities and relations of sense. These 
two poles of certainty give rise to the second necessary 
distinction required by an investigation into belief and 
its epistemological implications. A distinction must 
be made between the two poles of certainty. In order to 
clarify this distinction~ the term 'certainty' will be 
applied to the objective character ascribed to any logical 
proposition~ while the term 'certitude' will indicate the 
convincedness ascribed to a state of mind in the act of 
believing. Certitude is used in the psychological sense. 
Certainty indicates the logical usage. 
These two poles of certainty~ psychological 
certitude established by the immediate impressions of 
sense and logical certainty established by the self~ 
evident relations between ideas~ do not give knowledge 
of the world. Logical certainty may or may not apply 
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to the world. Psychological certitude remains wihin 
the private experience of the subject. Knowledge of 
the world lies between these two poles of certainty 
and is describable as probable and not certain. The 
probabilities afford the knowledge most relevant to 
the world, and for the conduct of life are labeled 
practical certainties. These practical certainties 
attested by belief arise out of empirical inquiry and 
pragmatic verification. 
The degrees of self-evidence found in practical 
certainties are possible only if there is some cor-
relation between logical certainty and psychological 
certitude. This correlation is found at the level of 
immediate sense-knowledge, at the level of immediate 
apprehension of relations of ideas, and finally in the 
process of retention. In the more developed stage 
of retention (memory), subjective certitude cannot 
be granted certainty, for memory un]ke sense and the 
immediate apprehension of relations of ideas is 
fallible. The objective in the memory is of the 
imaginal or ideal kind and not of the impressional. 
The rift between certitude and certainty first 
appears in memory. 1 
1. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, I, 292. 
62 
Certitude at its maximum degree of sense-knowledge 
is involuntary. Certitude of belief is thrust upon the 
experient. 1 However, there is a subjective element in 
belief which is determined by the subject's wish· to 
believe. This wish to believe is found in the selective 
attention of the subject which is directed to its own 
interests. These interests are likewise conditioned 
by subjective influences. The selective attention 
which is derived subjectively, is the source of personal 
bias as distinct from reasonable conviction. 
Doubt is a necessary factor in the process of 
belief. The personal bias or credulity is corrected by 
the disposition to doubt along with the capacity for an 
open mind. The transition from credulity to reasonable 
belief brought about by doubt and openmindedness pro-
duces belief worth calling belief whichmust often "be 
purchased with the sweat of the brow. 11 2 
Belief, as defined by Tennant, is an assent that 
is not exclusively caused by the impressional and the 
impression-sustained. It is conditioned both objec-
tively, at the level of sense-knowledge, and subjec-
tively by the selective attention of the experient. 
It is manifested when external constraint is but 
partial and when judgments are deemed probable. 1 
1. Ibid. 2. Ibid., 295. 
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From this analysis, it appears that no distinct line 
is to be drawn between knowledge and belief. Knowl-
edge which stands in sharp contrast to belief does 
not exist. Belief and its companion, knowledge, both 
indicate assertions that receive as.sent but which fall 
short of being certain in the epistemological sense 
of knowing Reality face-to-face. 
6. Faith: Its Epistemological Role 
Faith indicates the conative side of experience 
involving venture rather than the cognitive element 
which is emphasized by belief. 2 Belief is more or 
less tied down by act or Actuality which is posited 
for the subject. Faith, on the other hand, reaches 
beyond these facts to the ideally possible which it 
creates in the first instance and then by practical 
activity may realize and bring into Actuality.3 The 
ideal of faith is not the same thing as the Reality or 
existence of what is discovered. This, however, does 
not cancel its effectiveness. Faith applies to the actual 
world as much as the unproved postulations of scientific 
thought apply to the science of the actual world. 
Epistemologically , faith applies to all so-called 
knowledge as well as to theological beliefs. Practical 
1. Ibid_., 296. 2. Ibid., 297. 3. Ibid. 
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certainties established by belief which underlies knowl-
edge are the results offaith which goes beyond the 
apprehension of data to creative imagination. The 
results of faith in all its activities~ scientific 
and religious, are verified by their applicability to 
the actual world and not by logical certificatbn of 
photographic correspondence with Reality.l Therefore~ 
fa i th is not confined to one area of human interest but 
influences all existential and theoretical knowledge. 
Theologically~ faith is not to be identified with 
belief thereby losing its conative aspect~ or with 
an attitude of valuation such as the moral postulate. 
Faith goes beyond appreciative statements concerning the 
ideal and deals with the asse r t i ons conce r ning the 
Reality of the ideal. Theology is an existential science 
which is not derived from value considerations alone. 
Such considerations do not establish the existence of 
a Rea lity. Likewise, faith is not to be identified 
with metaphysical dogma. In such an identification 
faith loses its contact with Reality and becomes a 
subjective ac t without Objective reference. Rel i gious 
faith does not uniquely originate in a supernatural 
source~ for the nature of religious f a ith is identic a l 
with the expr ess i on of fait h wh ich underlie s a ll 
a ttitudes of faith to non-rel ig ious objects. In a 
similar manner, religious belief (psychologically 
speaking) cannot cla im supernatura l causation any more 
than the other kinds of bel ief whi ch are pr es ent in 
sc i ence as we ll as theo l ogy . Therefore, fa ith i s 
to be des cribed as "an outc ome of the inb orn propensity 
to self - conservat i on and s elf -bette r ment which i s a part 
of human nature, and i s no mo r e a miraculously supe radd ed 
endowment than is sens ation or understanding~ 111 
E. Summary 
Tennant's main views discussed i n this chapter 
may be summari zed as follows: (1) the ana lytic-genet i c 
methodology and t he phenomena listic theor y of knowl-
edge establish sensory impression a s t he only origina l 
s ource of knowledge. The simplest percepts derived 
from these f act-data a re the fundament a l beginnings 
from which the imaginal, ideational and univers a l 
concepts are built up by the experient. Feelings and 
conations are in the first instance evoked by these 
1. Tennant, The Nature of Belief, 78. Tennant points 
out an essential distinction between faith and hope 
in the concluding paragraph on this page. Hope is 
relatively pas s ive whereas faith is a creative 
activity provoc ative of effort. The opposi~of hope 
is fear or despair whereas the opposit of faith is 
mental inertia or indifference a s to any spiritual 
beyond. Fa ith, which is neither belief nor trust~ but 
venturesome supposition, has a kinship with hope but 
is not to be identified with it. 
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simple percepts which, in turn, influence the development of 
moral and aesthetic principles. 1 Sense therefore furnishes 
the essential core of the primary meaning of reality. (2) It 
is by the extension of this private world of sense by minds 
through intercommunion with other minds that the common 
standpoint appears. At this point ideas of Reality, science, 
and metaphysics can be entertained. The psychogenetic study 
of the development of knowledge establishes all beliefs, 
scientific a nd religious, a s derived indirectly from man's 
s tudy of the s ensible world ~ the soul, and human history. 
( 3) Scientific knowledge a s well a s religious knowledge i s 
a ffected by human supp osition and p robability. Fa ith also 
is not unique to one a rea of human inquiry but is a c on-
tinuous element whi ch undergirds all knowledge. Ideas of 
God, the world, the soul, and other selves stand in a simi-
2 lar noetic relationship based on faith. These ideas are 
a ll "mediate" inferences drawn (except in the case of the 
pure ego) on the basis of analogies, to account for the 
deliverances of immediate experience. All ideas are thus 
reasonably probable and are not rationally certain in a 
logical sense .3 The idea of God, for example, originates 
in a process of ideational construction and inference from 
1. The theory of ethical value is not developed in this 
dissertation. A study of valuation and theory of ethical 
value is discussed by Tennant in Philosophical Theology, 
I, Chapter Seven. 
2. Scudder, Tennant's Philosophical Theology, 61. 
3 • Ibid 1 _, 89 • 
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facts perceived originally by the senses. 1 These facts do 
not explicitly contain any suggestion of the divine being. 
Man, however, implicitly infers the reasonableness of God's 
existence from a teleological understanding of himself, 
other selves, and the world. 
It is now apparent that Tennant rejects any interpre-
tation of experience which is conceived as interrupting the 
natural process of man's cognitive growth. He questions the 
immediat e givenness of thought as asserted by the ration-
alist, the givenness of underived value as proposed by some 
moralists, and the givenness of God immediately apprehended 
as claimed by the mystic and other religionists. The task 
remains to examine Tennant's exposition of this last 
assertion, the claim of the religious experience to the 
immediate apprehension of' God, including its validity and 
its place in man's teleological understanding of the world 
and God. 
1. Ibid. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
TENN.ANT 'iS INTERPRETATION OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 
A. Religious Experience 
1. Defini tions 
Before examining Tennant's interpretation of religious 
experience, it .is helpful to have his definitions of the 
terms 'religious' and 'religious experience' in view. He 
describes 'religion' not in any exclusive sense in which 
one religious emotion or sentiment involved in relation to 
one kind of Object becomes the pivotal center of the defi-
nition. Such definitions may be precise but they are at 
the same time restricted and partial in scope. Religion · 
is rather a complex of sentiments, a complex mental atti-
tude of the whole personality of man, responding to sup-
posedly actual superhuman (personal) beings or powers. 1 
This response involves a cognitive factor; that is, an 
idea of divine power, varying from the crude notions of 
primitive man to the refined concepts of ethical theism of 
modern man.2 It involves an emotional factor; that is, a 
complex feeling of loyalty and love, awe and adoration for 
1. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, I, 307. 
2. Scudder, Tennant's Philosophical Theology, 18. 
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the object apprehended by cognition. And it involves a 
volitional factor; that is, a practical reaction to the ob-
1 ject in terms of conduct. 
Religious experience is described by Tennant as an 
experience which consists of a complex emotional and prac-
tical response to a superhuman (personal) object known 
through interpreted sense-data presented by the world, man, 
and human history to the knowing subject. 2 An experience 
is constituted religious, according to Tennant, when it is 
conceived as coming from a superhuman personal object which, 
in turn, provokes emotional and volitional responses. The 
idea of God precedes the experience of God. The religious 
experience which converted Saul the Pharisee into Paul the 
Christian was preceded by his knowledge of the Christian 
religious idea. Paul's religious experience gave new mean-
ing to his life but this only occurred after he had acquired 
for himself the unique religious ideas of Christianity. 
There is as much truth in the claim that religious experi-
ence enriches theology, Tennant asserts, as there is in the 
statement that religious experience is presupposed by theo-
logy.3 
Tennant's definition of religious experience which 
1. Ibid. 
2. Delton Scudder's research has been helpful in presenting 
a concise definition of 'religious experience' as held by 
Tennant. See Tennant's Philosophical Theology, 18. 
3. Tennant, "Theology," Encyclopaedia Britannica, 14th ed., 
Vol. XXII, 62. 
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i ncludes the conviction that the idea of God determines 
religious experience, grows out of his analytic-genetic 
study of the nature of knowledge. All knowledge of the 
world, man, or God arises in the sensorily perceptual. The 
idea of God, therefore, appears as a belief whi ch has been 
constructed by man out of his perceptual contact with the 
world, man, and human history. This belief requires the 
validation which comes from philosophical theology; that 
is, the arguments for theism which are derived from the 
ev idence found in the natural world. In view of this_, it 
is only natural religion (the belief in God which is con-
structed from man's contact with other men 2nd the world) 
which can be phi losophically and reasonably ·,justified as 
having a measure of objective certainty. 
Tennant insists that natural religion, or natural 
religious experience such as Christians may acquire 
today, precedes revealed religion, or such religious 
experience as was open only to special individuals 
of a former day, and that philosophical theology - -
such a s examines the truth-claim of religious belief 
on basis of the common results of psychogenetic 
analysis of cognition--must precede revealed or dog-
matic theology.l 
2 . Normal Religious Experience 
Tennant examines the normal re ligious experienc e in 
relation to his contention that a ll knowledge arises out of 
man 1 s ·perceptual con tact with other men and with the world. 
1. Scudder, Tennant's Philosophical Theology, 21 . 
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He distinguishes between the normal religious experience 
and the mystical experience by stating that the term 'norma l' 
in this case indicates that type of religious experience 
which does not claim the highest stage of raptness where 
the empirical self is silenced and all sensation is ended . 
This stage is the highest point of the 'mystical' experi -
ence; it is not found in the normal religious experience. 
The normal religious experience claims the apprehens ion 
of distinctive data which involve the natura l intuitional 
functioning of the human mind. This intuit i onal function-
ing, however , is essentially different from any involved in 
the ordinary: knowledge of the world and man. It apprehends 
a uniquely re ligious ingredient which cannot be reduced to 
any other kind of sentiment. This religious ingredient ha s 
been labelled the 1 numinous . 11 The numinous attitude re-
sults from the immedia te apprehension of a numinous · Ob ject 
making such an experience un i que and distinguishable f rom 
other experiences. 
Two assertions result from this apprehension. First, 
there is a unique constituent or quality ~rhich is ultimately 
constituted or determined by the unique Object that evokes 
religious affectiveness . This means that there is an in-
dependent source of religious knowledge whi ch is not derived 
by way of the natural process of cognitive growth. Second, 
1. Rudolf Otto , Idea of 'fue Holy (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1926). 
the claim is made that this numinous Objectivity is cog-
nized with immediacy like that of sensory impressions and 
as distinct from the objectivity of the imaginal or the 
1 ideal order. The particular quale of impression found in 
the sensory experience is not found in the apprehension of 
the numinous Reality. The experience of the numinous re-
ality is given without a corresponding quale. 
These two claims of the normal religious experience, 
Tennant maintains, need careful examination in light of 
·the empirical approach. It is necessary to investigate the 
nature of the object which causes the religious experience 
in order to avoid a dogmatic conclusion concerning its 
noumenal reality. 
The very fact that all data are received ad modum 
recipientis, that knowledge is phenomenal-rin all 
cases, we should say, except in the basic instance 
of self-experience), invites caution in deciding the 
nature of the noumenal.2 
The first claim of the religious experience to an in-
dependent source of knowledge raises the difficult questions 
concerning error. If religious knowledge is determined by 
a unique Object, then there should appear common agreement 
concerning the nature of this Object among religious experi-
ents. This, however, is not the case. The numinous Object 
of the religious experient appears to enter equally well 
1. Tennant, __ Philosophical! :Theology, I, 309. 
2. Bertocci, The Empirical Argument f ·or God, 222. 
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into conflicting ideas concerning its nature. The refer-
ence to the unique quality of the religious Object is not 
enough in itself to establish its nature as noumenal Realit y. 
Too many errors and contradictory statements have been made 
about its nature which have resulted, in turn, from religious 
experiences. 
The second claim of the normal religious experience 
concerning the nature of the numinous Object is also sub-
ject to Tennant's critical investigation. If the numinous 
is apprehended by the religious experient without the par-
ticular quale of impression as found in sensory experience, 
then the numinous is more comparable to a concept rather 
1 than to a sensible percept. The vague original quality of 
the numinous suggests to Tennant the imaginal and ideal 
rather than the underived such as encountered in the con-
crete percept. The ability of the numinous to enter equally 
well into various mythologies and religions seems to indicate 
that it has more the nature of the image or idea (the vague 
generic idea) than that of an underived and 'perceptual' 
? 
object.-
The religious experient often confuses objectivity with 
Reality. The objective, Tennant insists, is not coextensive 
with the Real. The imaginal and ideational are objective 
1. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, I, 309. 
2. Ibid. 
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and t hey are capable of evoking emotion. A man's idea con-
cerning the character of his friend can compel that man to 
a loyalty which goes beyond what his friend's character 
merits. Nevertheless, the idea is forcefully objective to 
the man although his friend's character may be far from 
matching that objectivity with the true facts. The numinous 
or spiritual environment to which religion is a response and 
an adaption must be objective. But it is an additional ques-
tion whether this objectivity is Real or is derived from the 
imaginal, ideal, or even the illusory activity of the mind. 
Tennant agrees with otto concerning the numinous feeling as 
having an indubitable immediate and primary reference to an 
object. He also agrees with William James• position regard-
ing the sense of reality found in human consciousness which 
extends beyond the individual into a sense of an objective 
presence. 1 However, the crucial issue still remains un-
answered. Is the objective the Real? This question cannot 
be answered upon the level of private experience. It re-
quires the verification of the common world of experience 
where men share and discuss all areas of knowledge. Re-
ligious experience is not exempt from this method of veri-
fication. It must pass beyond the private (psychic) level 
of personal biography into the common (conceptual) level of 
certainty. 
1. Ibid., 310. 
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Ordinary religious experience is usually and willingly 
open to this verification although it may not consider its 
opinion valid or final. The mystical experience, on the 
other hand, is more inclined to remain within the enclosure 
of the mystic's private world. It asserts its own method 
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of validation. This is the challenge that confronts Tennant 
in his analysis of mystical experience. 
3. The Mystical Experience 
The mystical experience differs from the normal experi-
ence in its assertion of a unique acquaintance with the 
numinous that is not found in perceptual things. This ex-
perience requires special preparation of the mind for the 
reception of the numinous wherein the mind is brough to 
certain states for the direct cognition of the Real. These 
certain states of the mind receive the non-sensory 'im-
pressions' which yield truth unmediated by understanding, 
ideation, or normal reason. 
a. The Ineffable Experience 
The highest stages of the mystical experience involve 
an ineffable quality that denies the ordinary procedure 
of normal experience. The ineffable experience of mysticism 
only emerges when the empirical self and the outer world are 
silenced. There is then no awareness of time, no reception 
of sensory impressions, and no awareness of the self as 
II 
distinct from Reality. The metaphysical oneness or the ~ub­
ject with the Object is thus assumed. Certain indubitable 
elements also appear in the inerfable experience. There is 
present (1) an exaltation Which iS realized in an onrush Of 
vitalizing energies with the (2) intrusion or objective 
presentations which are apparently as external as those 
present in normal perception of things, resulting in (3) a 
maximum of psychic certitude that these objects and affective 
states involve an enfolding presence from which source come 
revelations of truth and glimpses of Reality that are not 
found in any other experienee. 1 
At this point Tennant asks certain questions concerning 
the ineffable experience of mysticism. These questions in-
volve the relation between psychic certitude of the mystical 
experience and epistemological certainty which extends beyond 
the private certitude of the experient. It is only at the 
level or epistemological (conceptual) certainty that the 
essential questions can be examined. Is the enfolding 
presence of the ineffable experience Real? Are the alleged 
revelations of the mystical experience true or valid of the 
existent? Is there a transcendent faculty of the mind which 
apprehends the Real? Does this transcendent faculty function 
when the normal activity of the mind is silenced? These 
questions require consideration if the study of the self in 
1. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, I, 313. 
relation to other selves, the world, and the Real, is to 
push beyond the biographical interest found in the psychic 
certitude of individuals into the common interest wherein 
all individuals can share thoughts concerning Reality. 
The experience of the mystic presents data for the 
epistemologists and psychologists as well as for the mystics. 
The mystic's claim to psychic certitude concerning his ex-
periences and the resulting truth-claims is not to be denied. 
"Here he ,Lthe mysti.£7 is 'invulnerable' as he is harmless." 1 
However, when the mystical assertion extends beyond psychic 
certitude and claims epistemological certainty as to the 
immediacy, validity, and inference for metaphysical impli-
cations of the experience,then the questions may legiti-
mately appear from all areas of investigation. The summons 
comes at this level for psychological, epistemological, and 
philosophical examination. 
The mystical claim to truth resulting from the ineffable 
experience is one such assertion which needs to be examined 
from the standpoint of epistemological certainty. Tennant 
finds such an assertion concerning truth an unwarranted 
claim. Truth is not truth which results from experiences 
which defy expression, articulation, or translation into 
terms of imagery or thought even for the experient himself. 
The cognition of truth is not silent. It is not a type of 
1. Ibid. 
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unanalysable or indescribable experience, nor is it an 
affective state. 
Nor is truth the existence of existents; i t is a 
relation between two distinct kinds of entity: ob-jects of some kind, and judgments about them that 
are valid of them. Where such intrinsic duality is 
absent, truth is in irrelevant predicate, a non-
significant word. 
Tennant defines truth as the correspondence of thought with 
Reality thereby making knowledge of ineffable truth a con-
tradiction in terms. Thought involves articulation as truth 
involves meaningful relations. The silence of thought would 
involve the uselessness of truth. 
Mystical affirmations are sometimes made which result 
from the alleged i mmediacy of the ineffable experience as 
being comparable to . the immediacy of the sensory experience. 
However, the immediacy of sensations is not the experience 
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of truth as previously defined but rather the non-conceptual 
apprehension of sensory objects. The bare datum-presentation 
does not yield truth but only evidences itself. Truth enters 
at the level of intercommunication not at the level of psychfu 
immediacy. To establish the same epistemological status be-
tween the immediacy of sense and the immediacy of the mysti-
cal experience is to draw an untenable conclusion. This 
conclusion .could only be established without question if 
sense were identified with ultimate Reality rather than with 
actuality of phenomenal status. The only point of common 
1. Ibid., 3l c~:. .. 
affinity found in their epistemological status is in their 
psychological objectivity. The questions concerning this 
objectivity present important differences in their relation 
to Reality. Tennant agrees that there are no grounds for 
proving the objectivity of the mystics• data irrelevant to 
ultimate Reality. However, he does contend that there is 
no good reason for asserting that the mystics• data have 
relation to Reality which theistic mysticism claims, until 
1 
theism is first established. 
The possibility remains that there may be other data, 
other modes of synthesis beyond those of sense by which 
~~knowledge of the sensible world is attained. There 
may well be more in the universe than normal experience 
can understand. However, the fact remains that mystical 
knowledge apprehended in the ineffable experience does not 
yield truth which establishes a meaningful rapport between 
individuals and Reality. These experiences yield only the 
fact of their psychic occurrence with no critical differ-
entiation between the psychic and common objectivity. 
b. The Articulate Experience 
The articulate experience offers some if not all of 
its details for translation into terms of ordinary imagery 
and knowledge. The truth-claims of such experiences are 
related to the actual world for testing. The subject of 
1. Ibid., 316. 
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this mystical experience does not speak in terms of in-
effability but affirms an active presence which possessed 
him and commanded his whole attention. This forceful 
seizure of the subject convinces him as to the Reality of 
this presence. In this regard the subject has a maximum 
of psychic certitude but not of epistemological (conceptual) 
certainty. Thus the familiar distinction between psych-ic 
certitude and epistemological certainty appears in the 
articulate religious experience as well as the ineffable 
experience. 
The psychic certitude when examined from the conceptual 
standpoint is found to consist in the mistaking of reading-
in for reading-off; that is, for reading into the supposed 
bare fact an additional interpretation which has been pre-
viously read-off from facts given and organized in the ex-
perience of the subject. The immediacy of psychic certi-
tude is often found to be the unawareness of the experient 
at the moment of immediacy of the dependence of that ex-
perience on previous conditionings, familiar supposition, 
and inferential complements. 1 The epistemological certainty 
which is indirectly apprehended or mediately assigned, is 
assumed by the experient at the psychic level of certitude. 
The common confusion of the mediate with immediate elements 
in experience is seldom recognized by the mystic in his 
1. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, I, 318. 
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in his conception of religious experience. Tennant finds 
this confusion to arise from the ready ability of subjects 
to read-in immediately what has previously been read-off 
from the facts of experience. 
When the mystic believes he intuits God with sense-like 
immediacy, he is perhaps but causally interpreting his 
elation, peace, etc., by aid of a concept already to 
hand. For all he knows, his interpretation may be er-
roneous~ his inference {seeming to him direct appre-
hension) illusory.l 
The possibility remains that beyond the private conviction 
of the mystic there is another sufficient and natural ex-
planation of his experience at the level of epistemological 
certainty. 
The case of mystical experience supporting a certain 
theological position strengthens the contention that the 
alleg~d '.; i mmediate reading-off resulting from the mystical 
experience is but the interpretative reading-in which pre-
supposes the convictions of the particular theological 
position. Mystical revelations support the doctrinal and 
metaphysical systems in which they are nurtured. The 
Buddhist has his mystical experience in terms of Buddhistic 
concepts; the Christian in terms of Christian concepts. 
The Buddhist does not have a mystical experience of the 
Cross or the Trinity. 
The metaphysical assumptions of oneness and optimism 
result from the ineffable and articulate mystical experiences 
1. Ibid. 
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alike. Such metaphysical assumptions coming out of the 
psychic certitude of the mystical experience, become am-
biguous and impossible to maintain. The mystical claim to 
monism, to oneness with the Absolute, raises the difficulty 
of the ego having no self-awareness as the result of this 
identity. The mystic, however, returns from the mystical 
lapse into the Absolute with a conscious awareness that he 
had such an experience. 
These mystical claims to metaphysical oneness, in the 
view of Tennant, are not Objective. Such assumptions are 
the natural issues of experiences which involve the affective 
states of rapture and peace along with a sense of selfless-
ness.1 The experience of oneness and ecstasy, therefore, 
can be accounted for by the affective factors present on 
the psychic level (man's private world) and not from the 
conceptual standpoint where such experiences can be examined 
empirically. 
In view of these foregoing difficulties, Tennant main-
tains that the mystical as well as the normal religious ex-
periences have no special claim to religious autonomy. Both 
experiences need to be investigated empirically, that is, 
in light of more comprehensive knowledge about the world 
2 
and man. 
4. Five Issues 
The claims coming from both the mystical and normal 
1. Ibid., 320. 
2. Bertocci, The Empirical Argument for God, 225. 
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types of religious experience present five main issues for 
Tennant's empirical inquiry. These issues are: (1) the 
nature of the numinous object apprehended in the religious 
experience, (2) the assertion of immediate knowledge of the 
numinous object without sensory control, (3) the discrim-
ination between psychological certitude and epistemological 
certainty, (4) the distinction between the objective and 
the Real, and (5) the actual metaphysical counterpart to 
the religious experience. 
a. The Nature of the Numinous Object 
It is important to .remember that Tennant discredits 
any claim which would establish theology as independent from 
other areas of experience. All knowledge, including the 
study of theology, is related to a similar adventure in 
faith. A theology, therefore, which asserts itself as self-
contained and self-verifying, would be under no obligation 
to scientific or historical data. Such isolation would 
guarantee not only its invlnerability but also its irrele-
vance to the actual world. 
The assertion of theological independence which arises 
from the conviction that its datum is unique as derived from 
the religious experience is especially subject to Tennant's 
criticism. All knowledge, Tennant insists, is ultimately 
conditioned, on its objective side, by sensation. To assert 
a knowledge-claim such as the unique numinous object of the 
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religious experience is to establish another genus or ex-
perience-data which is not derived rrom the sensory or 
sense-derived. The genus or this knowledge would have to 
be validated as being original (as ultimate or irreducible 
as sense-impressions) and as being immediately apprehended 
(as immediate as the sensory impression). Evidence for this 
type or knowledge is not given by the religious experient 
who claims an underived and unique experience of the numinous 
object. The re~ous experience is thererore, according to 
Tennant, without any means of validation. The claim is made 
ror the apprehension of this unique datum but no confirmation 
of this type of knowledge is rorthcoming. 
One factor which illustrates this lack of a means of 
validation is found is a comparison between the nature of 
the religious datum and the nature of the sensory datum. 
It has been stated that the numinous object of the religious 
1 
apprehension is without specific qualities. Sense data, on 
the other hand, have concrete qualities such as color or 
sound whereby acquaintance-knowledge can be established. 
Such acquaintance-knowledge is derived rrom the presentation 
of specif'ic qualities to the subject which, in turn, presents 
definite relations as runctioning between the object and the 
subject. It ;fu,not easy, T~nnant insists, to conceive of 
acquaintance with actual •terms' as distinct from subsistent 
1. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, I, 309. 
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relations which are not corre~ative with the presentation 
1 
of some specific quality. It would .be impossible to have 
acquaintance-knowledge of a blue dress without the appre-
hension of certain given qualities, in the objective sense, 
which present the possibilities for a meaningful relation, 
I see the blue dress, between the subject and objective 
qualities. 
The nature of the religious datum, on the other hand, 
has no specific quality. This is evinced by the various 
and sometimes contradictory testimonies which have been 
evoked by an experience of the religious object. It is 
difficult to reach a common agreement · among experients 
about the nature of the numinous object in contrast to the 
relative ease it requi r es for several people having normal 
eyesight t o identify a particular piece of cloth as be i ng 
a blue dress. It is now apparent to Tennant that the 
numinous object i s not a quasi-perceptual datum of the 
2 
same order of underivedness as the sensory object. A 
claim to the acquaintance-knowledge of the religious object 
cannot be held with an equal degree of possible validation 
as derived from a claim to acquaintance-knowledge of a 
sensory object. 
The absence of a definite quality within the numinous 
object of the r e ligious experience makes it impossibl e 
1. Tennant, Philosophz of the Sciences , 171-173. 
2. I b id., 173. 
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for man to establish specific responses which guarantee a 
genuine apprehension of the Real. There is no objective 
reference such as is found in sensory apprehension. The 
response evoked by the religious experience has no specific 
objective control which indicates conclusively that the 
response has not been caused by the imaginal or the idea-
tional. This ~is evidenced by the fact that there appears 
to be no common religious response as caused by the re-
ligious object. Man's reaction to the numinous object of 
religious experience has resulted in numerous and conflicting 
types of mythology and theology. 
It is apparent from these observations that the nature 
of the numinous object~ according to Tennant, is not unique 
and underived. He rather finds the religious datum to be 
without specific qualities and to be so vague that it enters 
equally well into opposing ideas concerning the nature of 
the religious object. The apprehension of the numinous 
object not only lacks objective control such as that found 
in the sensory experience, but it also lacks any ;universal 
response which demonstrates a consistent contact with the 
Real. The numinous object is not, therefore~ a quasi-
impressional datum uniquely apprehended with genuine immedi-
1 
acy. 
1. Ibid., 174. 
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b;. The Assert,ion of Immediate Knmvled ge 
Tennan t maintains that the term 'immediate• · has b een 
incorl"ect.ly used by many pers ons i·Tho are not a"~.'lare of the 
mediateness presupposed by the immediate experience. Im-
mediacy of cognition can only be claimed on the psychic 
level in the initial stages of sensory i mpressions. This 
level guarantees indubitableness~ Hov-rever, on the episte-
mological level of shared experiences no i mmediacy can be 
claimed 1vithout an element of probability~ Immediate knO"\vl-
edge on the psychologica l level is not Und.erived and certain. 
It is unconsciously mediated and interpreted, and it is 
an ind i rectly and refle ctively acquired kind of knowled ge. 1 
The i mmed iacy which is experienced on the sensory level 
of perception is relatively more certain because of the ob-
jective co11trol i•Thich is derived f rom the obstinate facts of' 
i mpressions;. This is not to claim, Tennant insists, that 
the immediate experience of' s ensory perception g ives direct 
lmm,Tledge of' Reality. It rather indicates tha t on this 
level of sensory perception the subject receives impressions 
for the building of his v-rorld;. This i•rorld needs to be veri-
f'ied objectively by others in order to attain some degree 
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of' probability~ ']his is accom.plished on the psychological 
level of shared convictions. Thus man acquires probable 
knovTledge of the actual world, not from immediate experiences 
of psychic certitude, but from mediated experiences shared 
by men on the common level .of epistemological certainty. 
The religious datum is not immediately apprehended in 
the sense that sensory impressions are apprehended. The 
intuition of immediacy as claimed by some religious positions 
has resulted from previous mediate knowledge on the episte-
mological level which has discerned and developed the re-
lationships existing among the self, other selves, and the 
world. Religious experience is not the result of immediate 
intuitions on the psychic level of certitude but is the 
1 
outgrowth from ordinary knowledge of the world and man. 
The validation of religious experience, Tennant argues, 
is derived not from the religious datum which is claimed to 
be unique and immediate~y apprehended, but it is built up 
from evidence postulated on the psychological level of 
epistemological certainty which is supported by religious 
experience. Religious experience supports the contentions 
of established theism. It does not branch out with unique 
revelations of its own. Tennant's conviction in this regard 
does not entail a dogmatic denial of any value connected 
with religious experience. It rather indicates the quest 
2 
of a critical spirit for real knowledge. The priority of 
knowledge derived from religious experience is not established 
1. Ibid. 
2. Peter Bertocci, "Tennant 1 s Critique of Religious Ex-
perience," Religion in Life, XIII(l939), 248. 
by the claim to the uniqueness and immediacy of the re-
ligious datum. This datum has been shown to lack a dis -
tinctive and controlling quality which would condition 
religious experience into one pattern of expression, the 
expression of the Real. Religious experience does not 
contain a sui generis datum which reveals the Real with 
unqualified certainty. The result is the opposite as ex-
pressed by the varieties of religious experiences which, in 
turn, present numerous ~ insights into the nature of the Real. 
Therefore, religious experience as expounded by T~nnant is 
an experience which consists of complex emotional and imag-
inal and conative responses to what is believed to be Real. 
The knowledge gained in such experiences is discovered 
through interpreted sense-data presented by the world, 
other selves, and human history to the knowing subject. It 
is not discerned from a sui generis religious datum. 
c. Psychological Certitude and Epistemological Certainty 
Tennant's basic conviction in the distinction between 
the psychological (psychic) and epistemological (conceptual) 
levels of man's apprehension has been involved already in 
the previous issues concerning the nature of the numinous 
and the assertion which claimed immediate knowledge of the 
numinous. It is, therefore, not necessary to go into a 
lengthy account describing the essential distinction between 
between the two levels. It is necessary, however, to notice 
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again the important place which this distinction plays in 
Tennant's interpretation of religious experience. 
The private conviction of psychic certitude stemming 
from·the religious experience must be subject always to the 
shared world of examination and discursive thought. This is 
necessary if the experient is to differentiate among the i-
maginal, ideal, and relational objects of experience. This 
is the bold yet essential venture that man must make with 
the precious child of his own private thought. Man is obli-
gated by the structure of the world and the manner in which ' 
his knowledge is acquired to discover whether there is any 
epistemological certainty beyond the private level of his 
own individual convincedness. 
Truth concerning the knowledge of God, as knowledge of 
the self, other selves, and the world, is not acquired at the 
level of psychological certitude. It is rather -\·'a reason-
able working from discursive knowledge about the world, 
human history, the soul and its faculties and capacities; 
and above all, the knowledge of the interconnexions between 
such items or knowledge." 1 
The private world of experience necessitates the en-
richment of the common world of experience in order to arrive 
at some concept concerning metaphysical Reality and to di-
minish the experience of error arising out of the private 
1. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, I, 315. 
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world. An individual may feel within this world of certi-
tude that he is accomplishing God's will. It may be ap-
parent, however, to many persons that this individual is 
destroying values of other persons while he is performing 
his notion of God's will. All knowledge, including religious 
knowledge, requires the additional enlightenment of shared 
insights and convictions which can only be given on the more 
developed level of epistemological certainty. Man does not 
stand alone. Religious experience is not an isolated event. 
Between man and his interpretation of religious experience 
stands the interpretation of humanity. "Entre l'homme et 
le monde il faut l 1humanite.n 1 
d. The Objective and the Real 
The claim coming from the religious experience to a 
knowledge which has immediate apprehension and actual con-
tact with the Real needs further clarification in Tennant's 
opinion. The implications involved in the use of the terms 
'objectivity' and •reality' require careful examination. 
The metaphysical conclusion of this assertion which affirms 
an immediate apprehension with the Real overlooks the dis-
tinction between the Objective and the Real. The Objective, 
Tennant insists, is not necessarily coextensive with actu-
ality or Reality. It is a fact that a purely ideal Object, 
1. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, I, 228. 
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when believed to be Real by an individual, can evoke emo-
tional responses that issue in heroic action or moral 
earnestness. "It is the idea of the ideal woman, which a 
youth sometimes mistakenly reads into a worthless person 
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whom he loves, that then may raise him from a characterless 
being into a chastened, strenuous and high-minded individua1."1 
Psychologically, the Objective includes the imaginal and the 
ideal as well as the actual. The imaginal and ideal are 
capable of arousing feelings and sentiments as profound, 
intense, inspiring, and practically useful as those excited 
2 by perceptual or actual things. Feelings resulting in pri-
vate convincedness are notamugh, therefore, to establish 
the reality or non-idealit'y of the Objects which have pro-
duced the feeling of conviction. 
In this regard the pragmatic argument for the priority 
of religious experience as witnessed by its fruitfulness 
(its pragmatic results) proves inadequate. The pragmatic 
value of belief in an Object, Tennant asserts, is no uni-
versal criterion of the truth of the belief, or of the 
Reality of the Object. "If theology based on religious 
experience would account itself a department of knowledge 
of the actual and ontal, the ability to assert that that 
experience has its objective side is not enough."3 
1. Ibid., 330. 
2. Tennant, Philosophy of the Sciences, 176. 
3. Ibid. 
e. The Actual Metaphysical Counterpart 
Religious experience alone cannot answer the question 
concerning the real or actual counterpart to such objects as 
are present in the experience. The answer extends beyond 
religious experience itself. The data of religious experi-
ence have been established as being neither unique nor im-
mediate. The alleged quasi-impressional but insensible data 
involved therein are found to be derived, conceptual, and 
1 read-in, rather than genuinely immediate or read-off. This 
conclusion leads Tennant to assert that the uniqueness of 
religious experience is only accounted for by previous 
assumptions and propositions concerning the Real or God 
which have been attributed to religious experience. The 
idea of God is not derived from religious experience but 
has been ascertained from experiences concerning man and 
the world. It is this idea, the learned causal interpretation 
of God as derived from all experiences, which evokes the 
specific emotional response connected with the religious 
experience. Tennant finds this cogpitive element (learned 
anthropic interpretation) to be that element which gives 
religious experience its particular quality of religiousness. 
Previously to the acquisition and the causal or inter-
pretative use of this derived notion, experiences such 
as were destined to become religious could not be re-
ligious: they could only be regarded as natural, not as 2 
supernatural--whether aesthetic, moral or of other types. 
1. Tennant, Philo~ophical Theology, I, 318. 
2 • Ibid . , 177 • 
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The religious experience is first colored by the concept of 
God and the belief that He is. "He that would come to God 
must first believe that He is: revealed theology presupposes 
natural religion of some kind, if presupposition here be 
logical, not biographical." 1 
The learned causal interpretation derived from all of 
life is responsible for such Christian statements which ex-
press the immediate sense of the indwelling Christ. This 
belief does not originate in the religious experience. It 
is only the experience of joy, peace, and inspiration which 
the Christian immediately apprehends. On these genuinely 
immediate experiences, he places the causal interpretation 
which he has learned through previous instruction in the 
2 Christian dogma. Tennant admits that the dogmatic content 
may be true, but the fact remains that the belief in the 
indwelling Christ is not the result of direct experience in 
the sense that joy and peace are direct. The emotive value 
of peace and joy apprehended on the psychic level of certi-
tude cannot alone establish the cognitive value of the belief 
in the indwelling Christ asserted as a fact on the conceptual 
level of epistemological certainty. The learned causal in-
terpretation enters in, determining the meaning of emotive 
values of the private experience according to its own theo-
logical content. It is thereby asserted 'by Tennant that 
1 . Ibid. , 32 7. 
2. Tennant, Philosophy of the Sciences, 179. 
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religious experience is not the source of theological beliefs 
but the result of such beliefs. The learned causal inter-
pretation derived from knowledge of the world and man places 
upon an experience of a certain quality the term 'religious' 
implying its uniqueness as previously presented by the in-
terpretation;. 
5. Evidential Value of Religious Experience 
It is evident from Tennant's discus s ion of the pre-
ceding five is sues that the evidential va lue of religious 
experience wi ll not arise out of the experience • s own self-
verifying assertions. The value coming from religious 
experien ce i s not derived from the experien ce per ~· It 
is only after the theistic position has been established 
as the most reasonable explanation of all the facts in-
ferred from the na.tU:re of the world and its relation to man 
that religious experience becomes meaningful in terms of 
evidential value. 
Tennant does not deny that the religious experience 
occurs e,nd that it involves phenomena;. He maintains, hm'l-
ever, t hat the mere occurrence of religious experience does 
not vouch for any causal explanation that is placed upon it 
by the experient;.1 The experience of illusions is an actual 
experience as much as any perceptual experience which is 
grounded in s ensory impression. 
1. Tennant, Phi losophical Theology, I, 329;. 
Evidential value, likewise is not established by psychic 
certitude which accompanies the occurrence of religious ex-
perience. The psychic certitude of immediacy as felt in the 
religious experience is irrelevant to the positing of evi-
dential value. An experience which invoi~es psychic con-
vincedness on the part of the experient may affirm a value 
which is contradictory to the religious value of another 
person who is convinced equally about his own experience. 
In a similar manner, the evidential value of the re-
ligious experience cannot be settled by the appeal to the 
1 
spiritual value and efficacy of the experience. It is 
stated again by Tennant that purely ideal Objects can in-
spire emotional responses resulting in unusual acts of 
devotion when such Objects are believed to be Real. 
The evidential value of religious experience is not 
established, Tennant insists, by the mere occurrence, the 
immediacy, or the spiritual efficacy of the experience. 
It can be affirmed only after man has acquired well-grounded 
belief in its assertions which have been derived from the 
study of the world, man, and self previous to religious ex-
perience. Religious experience does not provide short-cuts 
to the knowledge of God. It only affords evidential value 
in terms of intellectual, moral, and aesthetic inspiratbn 
after theism has been rendered the most probable conviction 
1. Ibid., 330. 
97 
98 
concerning God~ Tennant maintains, hO"'·Ievel~, that this is 
not to present religious experien ce as valueless or illusory, 
but it is to assert tha t religious experience does not offer 
independerJt proof for the existence or nature of God. 
6~ Religi ous Experience and the 1.\fider Teleological .Argument 
Tennant does not explicitly include religious experience 
as part of the cumulative teleological argument for God. In 
a letter to Peter A. Bertocci he 1vri tes: 
As to ·the omission of reference to re.ligious experience 
along with morality, etcetera , in my teleological argu-
ment, I may say tha t the only c onnectio~a in 1vhich it 
could be men tioned is as indicating, along 1vi th human 
rationality and morality, the purpose or goal of the 
des iB~ exhibited in the cosmos; religious experience 
having been represented to be the outcome of ration-
ality and morality, I did not feel it essential to 
emphasize it explicitly in that context, but rather 
supposed the reader would taice it to be i mplied. Its 
place, in :m y exposition, can only be in the description 
of theism and its corollaries after thei-sm has been 
arrived at.l 
The t eleologica l argument proceeds from the facts relative 
to the "\vorld and man. It entails the empirica l method lvhich 
allovrs the actual v;rorld to tell its mm story and offer its 
t . 2 own sugges J.ons. It does not begin with preconceived 
notions concerning the Real. 
Briefly, the teleologic a l argument develops from (1) 
the epistem ologica l argument or the mutua l adaptation of 
thought and t hings whi ch renders kn owledge poss ible, (2) the 
---------------------------------------·-------
1~ Bel'•tocci, "Tennant's Critique of Religious Experience, 11 
Reli~i on ~Q Life, VIII(l939}, 257, note~ 
2~ Tennant , Philosophical Theology, II, 78. 
adaptiveness in organisms which, in turn, indicates directi-
vity in the process of life, (3) adaptation of the inorganic 
life to organic life, (4) aesthetic arguments which evidence 
beauty as objective and not as resulting from the creative 
imagination of mind out of nothing, 1 and (5) the moral a~gu­
ment 111J'hich is not independent of the teleological argument 
2 but is dependent upon it and is found as the coping-stone 
of the entire teleological argument. 3 
It is important to stress at this point that the wider 
teleological argument stands together as one organic structure. 
One argument, such as the mutual adaptation of thought and 
things, cannot be lifted out of context in order to prove 
the theistic position. It is rather essential to understand 
that the teleological argument is built upon more probable 
grounds, namely, "the conspiration of innumerable causes to 
produce, by their ·· united and reciprocal: action, and to 
maintain, a general order of Nature." 4 
A rational or a priori argument which supports the 
ontological argument and religious experience as an indepen-
dent source for knowledge of God proves to be founded upon 
inadequate and shaky grounds in contrast to the teleological 
argument. Its inadequate foundation is found in psychic 
1. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, II, 93. 11 God reveals 
Himself ••• in many ways; and some men enter His Temple 
by the Gate Beautiful. 11 
2. Ibid., 103. "Morality has its roots in Nature." 
3. Ibid., 100. 4. Ibid~ 
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certitude rather than in the common ground upon which both 
science and theology build their probable convictions con-
cerning the world and Actuality. 
B. Specific Problems 
Before concluding this chapter of Tennant's interpre-
tation of religious experience, it is important to present 
1 briefly his empirical approach to the nature of God. This 
consideration will afford a broader perspective in which to 
view his petition. 
1. The Nature of God 
Tennant's empirical approach to the problem of God's 
nature avoids a priori presuppositions and attempts to 
arrive at conclusions from the known facts of the world and 
man. This does not imply that man's knowledge which is 
built up through observable facts and mediated analogies 
will not contain alogical ultimates. No man, Tennant holds, 
1 has a clear idea of the modus operandi of creation. There 
always remains an element of mystery which cannot be ex-
plained in terms of man's experiences. However, this does 
not negate the essential task of the empirical approach to 
the ultimate problems, such as the problem of the nature of 
God and of evil. These problems are open to man's speculation 
1. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, II, 125. 
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which, in turn, is relevant only if it is grounded in his 
own experience derived from the facts around him. 
Tennant conceives God as an "efficient, intelligent, 
ethical Being" 1 in which man believes upon the basis of the 
evidence of intelligence and ethical purposiveness found in 
the world and in man. God is the Creator-Designer of the 
world whose purpose is dynamic and changing. God as 
Creator-Designer is not a static concept derived from the 
evidence of man's experience. It is rather the facts of 
experience which indicate to Tennant that God is dynamically 
related to his creation, allowing for the operation and co-
operation of his creatures in freedom. God, in the sense 
of being the Creator of the universe, is not God without 
the world. 2 The interrelationship between God and creation 
is therefore both dynamic and essential. Creation is con-
sidered by Tennant to be "idea and deed together, and the 
divine transcendence as not temporal priority, but as con-
sisting in the difference between God and His Utterance."3 
God, Tennant insists, is a person. This .does not mean 
that man can empirically exhaust God's nature by reference 
to this attribute. It rather implies that God must be at 
least characterized by intelligence, valuation, and volition 
in order to account for the evidence of intelligence ·· 
1. Ibid., 122. 2 • Ibid • , 12 8. 3 • Ib id • , 12 9 • 
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and purpose which is found in the world by man. 1 Tennant 
will accept the term 'suprapersonal' as a description of 
God's nature if this term means that the attributes of God 
are the fullest e*pression of personality of which man knows 
only a fragmentary part. However, if suprapersonal denotes 
"the non-volitional, non-purposive, and non-ethical, the 
expression becomes a synonym for 'impersonal,' and must be 
rejected. "2 
God as a Person, T~nnant asserts, does not override 
the freedom of his created beings. His omniscience is not 
complete in the sense that He knows the future of every 
existent being. .Tennant compares God's knowledge · of His 
created beings to notes in a symphony which has not been 
played in its entirety.3 God knoW3the symphony only as the 
designing Composer, rather than as a listener who, hearing 
4 it for a second or third time, can know it as a whole. 
God, therefore, in His relation to creation is limited in 
the sense that "He is not an indeterminate being but a 
personal spirit. And He is not The Absolute in the sense 
of the All, since the created world is not Himself, nor His 
modes, but His utterance or deed."5 
God's immanence is to be understood, according to 
'!e nnant, in relation to the activity of nature. It is not 
1. Ibid., 166. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid., 177. 
4. Bertocci, The Empirical Argument for God, 250. 
5. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, II, 173. 
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active in man's conscience or in his moral decisions. These 
choices are made by man without the coercive and immanent 
action of God. The conditions of man's moral decisions and 
religious belief are derived from the known facts of the 
world which are, in turn, made possible by the creative and 
transcendent activity of God, not as the result of God's 
direct, immediate, and immanent contact with man. Tennant's 
conclusion at this point concerning God's immanence as being 
only related to nonpersonal creation illustrates once more 
his contention that religious experience does not afford im-
mediate knowledge of God. If God acts with immediacy in the 
religious experience, then the question can be asked why He 
has not acted in this manner i~ all areas of man's experience 
thus eliminating the fact of moral and natural evil. This 
questiop opens up the final issue for presentation, namely, 
the problem of evil. 
2. The Problem of Evil 
It is possible for a person to assert at this point 
that man's teaeological understanding of his world which 
points to the reasonable belief in theism, is only a small 
segment of the evidence for God in comparison to the over-
whelming evidence against God found in the fact of natural 
and moral evil. Tennant does not deny the real presence of 
evil in the world, but he does maintain in spite of this fact 
that this world is the best possible for the creation of 
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ethical beings who are the products of God's love. The 
issue which now confronts the empiricists is centered upon 
the goodness of God's nature in relation to the activity of 
evil in God's creation. What degree of goodness can be as-
104 
cribed to God if He stands in a dynamic and changing relation 
to His creation which is incomplete? 
Tennant sees the answer in relationship to the kind of 
world which would be best for the development of morally 
sensitive men. 
Since theism teaches that the world-ground is an ethical 
Spirit, or that God is love, it must also teach that, in 
some sense, the world is the 'best possible' of its kind. 
The best possible world • • • or the world that is worthi-
est of God and man , must be a moral order, a theatre of 
moral life and love.a 
The best possible world is not the most pleasurable. It is 
the world which has as its crowning achievement the develop-
ment of moral agents. 
In order for man to attain moral value, God has given 
him freedom. Without freedom, the possibility for man's 
moral development would not exist. This possibility for 
attaining moral character (including the attribute of love) 
comes out of the actuality of God whose actual nature of good-
ness alone could afford this possibility within creation. A 
God whose nature is not grounded in love could not provide 
created beings for moral potentiality. 
1. Bertocci, The Empirical Argument for God, 260. 
2. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, II, 186. 
The universe conceived as a theatre .: of moral life 
and love, includes the possibility of evil. God was not 
naive when he created this kind of world. 
God ••• is responsible: He permits, so to say, the evil 
in order that there may be the good. But for the actual 
emergence of man's moral evil ••• He is not responsible: 
our sin ••• is not God's act1but the product of our volition, or devolv~d freedom. 
Free will is the human being's burden~ It is at the same 
timethe condition of the "glorious liberty of the children 
of God."2 It is the only potentiality out of which charac-
ter can be made and the moral ideal achieved. 
Natural evil~ does not afford conclusive evidence 
against God's goodness. It is true that non-human environ-
ment involves evil that seems to be good for nothing, or to 
be non-essential for man's realization of goodness.3 The 
fact of natural evil, however, is the necessary outcome of 
a determinate cosmos of the particular kind that can sustain 
rational and moral life. 4 
This particular kind of universe is one of order and 
regularity. If certain substances in this determinate and 
calculable world are such as to harm a person at a particular 
time, these substances do not suddenly change so that the 
individual escapes harm. The determinate world-plan remains 
unchanged. Tennant points out that the water which quenches 
man's thirst is also the water which drowns him. This 
1. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, II, 189. 
2. Ibid., 190. 3. Ibid., 199. 4. Ibid. 
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1 illustrates Tennant's concept of God's self~limitation. 
God has imposed a :·_limitation upon Himself by granting to a 
"planted out" world, including both nonpersonal nature and 
man, a limited autonomy. 2 This independence He does not 
negate in His relation to creation. God's essential task 
is to stand in a providential control of the universe in 
order to sustain its order necessary for the development 
of ethical created beings. This control, however, is not 
immanent in the sense that God interrupts the natural order 
in order to prevent any irregularities. Such a super-
imposition would cancel the degree of autonomous freedom 
which God has granted to his creation and to mankind. 
Tennant understands the problem of evil in relation to God's 
self~limitation. God's goodness, His consistent willing of 
a good purpose for creation, is not overcome by the presence 
of natural evil. Natural evil is rather the necessary out-
come inevitably incidental to this particular kind of 
creation which entails a certain independence, the essential 
possibility for man's moral development. 
Nature, man, and God cannot be understood apart -from 
one another. If one part of the whole structure is isolated 
1. Personalistic theism such as represented by E.S. Brightman 
and Peter Bertocci disagrees with Tennant at this point. 
The problem of natural evil is more intelligible in view 
of a finite God whose nature is limited by an internal 
factor which extends beyond God's self-limitation. See 
Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion (New York: Prentice-
Hall, 1940), Chapter Ten. 
2. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, II, 203-204. 
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from the other parts, then the problems of moral and natural 
evil appear overwhelming and insoluble. 
God, man, and the world constitute a chord, and none of 
its three notes has the ring of truth without the 
accompaniment of the other two. To say the same in 
terms of another metaphor: the cosmos is no logico-
geometrical scheme, but an adventure of divine love. 1 
C. Summary 
Tennant's interpretation of religious experience is 
understood in the context of his empirical approach to the 
study of science and theology. (1) Empiricism arrives at 
its reasonable conclusions from the available facts of ex-
perience. It does not employ a priori presuppositions 
concerning the nature of God, man, and the world. (2) The 
claims coming from the normal and mystical type of religious 
experience to the uniqueness of the religious datum and to 
the immediacy of man's knowledge of this datum cannot be 
validated simply on its ipse dixit. These claims do not 
account for the difference between the private world of 
certitude which affords no common basis for validation and 
the conceptual level of shared experience where men can 
move together toward reasonable certainty. Such claims 
also fail to discriminate between the Objective and the 
Real in their affirmations of immediate contact with God in 
the religious experience, and thereby these claims fail to 
1. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, II, 259. 
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answer successfully the question concerning the actual meta-
physical counterpart to such objects as are present in the 
religious experience. (3) The evidential value of the re-
ligious experience is derived in terms of intellectual~ 
moral, and aesthetic inspiration after theism has been 
rendered the most probable conviction concerning God. The 
wider teleological argument, which only implicitly includes 
religious experience, presents this most probable conviction. 
Religious experience alone cannot provide short-cuts to the 
knowledge of God. It cannot be the basis of an autonomous 
theology. 
Until we can show that in religious experience there is 
a datum which, however private (as sensory experience 
also is), upon analysis (a) exerts refractory control 
upon us, and (b) yields to intersubjective discourse a 
common epistemic object, we shall not have touched 
Tennant's belief that religious experience cannot be 
the basis of an autonomous theology.l 
1. Peter Bertocci~ Review of Philosophy of Religion~ by 
David Elton Trueblood~ The Journal of Bible and Religion, 
XXVI(Januacy, 1958), 63. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
VON HUEGEL'' S METHODOLCGY AND EPISTEMOLOOY 
A. Methodology 
1. Presuppositions 
Basic to the presuppositions of Baron von Huegel's 
methodology is the unified conception of man's entire 
personality. According to von Huegel, man functions as 
a complete person. His faculties of reason, will, and 
feeling are not incompatible but are mutually dependent. 
It is unified personality which understands most fully the 
whole of reality. Any approach which separates man's 
faculties and stresses one over the other as the essential 
aspect of philosophical or religious development is in-
adequate. Such an approach results in an abstract method-
ology which does not accurately account for the rich com-
1 plexity of reality. 
Another essential presupposition of von Huegel's 
thought is that there is no final philosophical or religious 
system. Completed systems are unreliable, for reality is 
too rich to be confined within the limits of any one philo-
sophical or religious system. Von Huegel considers both 
1. Von Huege l , The Mystical Element of Religion as Studied 
in Saint Cather ine of Genoa and Her Friends (London: J.M. 
Dent and Sons, 1908}7 I, 43.--- ---
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philosophy and religion to be invitations to embark upon a 
great adventure which will demand both mind and heart . The 
reward of this adventure is realized in a progressive approx-
imation to the knowledge of t1•uth, not in a final system. 
God, our own souls, all the supreme realities and 
truths, supremely deserving and claiming our assent 
and practice--are both incomprehensible and indefi-
nitely apprehensible, and the constant vivid reali-
sation of these two qualities insuperably ·.~ inherent 
to all our knowledge and practice of them~ is of pri-
mary and equal importance.l 
llG 
Von Huegel starts with the proclamation and the estab-
lishment of those facts without which any faith is impossibla 
These facts are . the powers of human reason, the reality of 
the external world, the essential goodness of creation, and 
the presence of an ultimate superhuman Reality. These facts 
are the conclusive evidence of common sense and the nearly 
universal instincts of mankind. Von Huegel rebuts the argu-
ments of those who find the a ssumptions of common sense 
false: the agnostics, the positivists, and the materialists. 
If the argument s of such men can be shown to be unreliable, 
then the belief in the basic assumption is established ipso 
facto. · The truth of the basic belief in the vivid impression 
of something objective and in the sense of something which is 
1. Von Huegel, Selected Letters, 1896-1924, edited by Bernard 
Holland (London: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1927), 71. Here von 
Huegel distlnguishes bet\'leen apprehension and comprehension. 
Comprehension involves conceptual understanding. Appre-
hension may involve some comprehension; but it also en-
tails feeling, intuition~ and other functions of person-
ality . 
transhuman does not depend upon intellectual demonstration. 1 
The belief in the objective world and in a transhuman reality 
is confirmed by life itself. Von Huegel witnesses to this 
belief; he does not philosophically deliberate on its possi-
bility or establish arguments for its probability. 
Deductive arguments for the existence of God are thus 
excluded by von Huegel because these arguments do not come 
into contact with reality. Their case is built upon the 
assertion that God exists. The primary question of the ex-
istence or non-existence of God is left unanswered. The 
chain of reasoning which the deductive method develops re-
mains without rational support for the first link upon which 
the whole chain depends; that is, there is something more 
essential than the consistency between the various links in 
a chain of reasoning, namely, the nature of the first link 
which makes such reasoning possible. Deductive and demon-
strative arguments for God's existence assume the basic 
presupposition of faith. Their conclusions may be intell-
igently exchanged by minds but their presupposition is a 
matter of individual conviction. "I know well that there 
exists no directly transferable, no 'invincibly' demon-
strative argument or formula for any of the realities, which 
2 
are the objects of faith." 
1. L.V. Lester-Garland, The Religious Philosophy of F. von 
Huegel (London: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1933), 13. 
2. Von Huegel, Selected Letters, 238. 
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The task of philosophical inquiry is not thereby elim-
inated by von Huegel. Philosophy is the sensitively docile 
interpreter of actual life and reality and not the harshly 
1 doctrinaire explainer-away. It is to guard against any 
credulous conclusions. The demand is for careful research, 
severe criticism, and daring hypotheses which move within a 
frank recognition of the givenness and otherness of Reality.2 
The crucial question of philosophy is concerned with how 
this knowledge of spiritual reality is possible, not whether 
it is possible. 
Our minds will now range from the Givenness of the pebble 
and the star to the Givenness of the lichen, of the bee 
and bird, on to the immensely greamr Givenness of the 
human spirit and (contrasting with, yet sustaining, all 
such Givennesses and their numberless given, real inter-
relations) the primary, absolute Givenness and Reality 
of God.3 
Religion can attain a further fruitfulness by philos-
ophy's clarification of its facts and evidences. 4 However, 
as religion is not to dictate to philosophy in matters of 
procedure, so philosophy is not to assume a final authority 
over religion. The primary authority of religion is not 
derived from philosophy any more than the facts of plant and 
animal life derive their claim to acceptance from botany and 
zoology. - The authority of religion is derived from the 
primary Givenness and Reality of God. 
1. Von Huegel, Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of 
Religion (London: J.M. Dent and Sons-:;-1921), I, 189-190. 
2. Ibid., 190. 3. Ibid. 
-- --
4. Von Huegel, Selected Letters, 239. 
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2. The Genetic Method 
In accordance with these presuppositions, von Huegel 
utilizes the genetic method as a valuable but not an ex-
haustive approach to the study of reality. This method is 
followed because it does afford constructive insights into 
the nature of the object and the historical process in which 
it is involved. It also deepens, purifies, and vivifies 
man's appreciation of the nature of reality if it includes 
a place for the development of its objects. 
Only such a study can make us enter (never quite fully, 
yet with an otherwise unattainable poignancy) into the 
homely environment, the difficulty and loneliness, the 
sweat, tears and blood, the obscurities, inhibitions, 
defeats and difficult conquests, above all into the 
varying appearances and applica!ions, of the self-
identical reality thus studied. 
The inadequacy of the genetic method is demonstrated by 
its claim to conclusiveness derived from its procedure. The 
assumption is made that the object in its early stage of 
development is simply what it appears to be. · If the genetic 
method is to be conclusive, it has to assume this fact.2 
The method is obligated to take the object through a series 
of stages, showing each predecessor to be simpler than the 
successor. The apparent richness which is found in the last 
stage of the object is not to be confused with the object in 
its first stage. The object, in spite of its apparent 
1. Von Huegel, Essays and Addresses, I, 141. 
2. Von Huege~The Reality of God and Religion and Agnosticism 
(London: J.M. Dent and Son~l931), 252. 
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richness, is really nothing more, from first to last, than 
what it appears to be in its first stage~ Therefore, the 
first stage is not to be explained by the last, but the 
last is to be explained by the first~ 1 
The illustration of the acorn and oak tree is helpful 
for clarification~ For genetic methodology the acorn is 
not in reality an oak tree in concentration~ but it is the 
oak tree 1·rhich later only appears to be something much more 
than 'vhat the acorn appears to be and really is. 
The acorn appears to be what it is; and ivhat it is, 
it appears to be; the oak sapling and the full-sized 
oalr move further and further a"vvay from the oak 1 13 true 
reality--or rather, they add more and more cloaks of 
mere appearan~e to the aboriginal kernel of the oak 1 s 
true r eality;. 
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All thing s are, in reality, to the last what they appear to 
be at the beginning . Tnis would be evident if the later 
stages of development did not obscure the earliest stage by 
further enrichment~ 
The inadequacy of this methodology is indicated by von 
HUegel in another illustration, the embryonic d.evelopment 
of man~ In the earliest stages the human b eing (in strict-
ness; the human being as he really exists from conception 
onwards) is first a shapeless material substance, next a 
plant-like organi sm, then a mollusk-like, fish-like, monkey-
like creature, and last of all, he is a distinct human body. 
1~ ~~ 
2;. Von Huegel, Essays and Addresses, I; 140-141. 
If each stage is treated by the investigator true to the 
genetic method as self-explanatory, without presuppositions 
concerning what is to follow these successive stages, then 
man is a monkey, a fish, a plant, a shapeless substance. 
The lowest designation would be the most scientific. 1 
The results of employing the genetic method alone 
afford static, artificial, unreal, and inhibited conclusions. 
If the object is, in reality, to the last what it appears to 
be at the beginning, then the investigator would be con-
cerned with the object's static poverty rather than with 
its dynamic enrichment. An artificial outlook would result 
which finds nothing real except the clear poverty of the 
object's appearances in its earliest stage rather than the 
enrichment of the object's appearances in its latest and 
actual stage of development. The observation of the ob-
ject's earliest stage depends more upon the investigator's 
imagination. The object's present stage is actually seen 
and therefore offers facts for observation. The first be-
ginnings of all objects actually observed by man are not 
seen but imagined by man. The primitive beginnings of man-
kind can only be surmised, not actually observed by the in-
vestigator. Thus the investigator who relies solely upon 
the genetic method becomes a victim of his methodology as 
he finds his conclusions concerning the first stages to be 
1. Ibid. 
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the result of scientific observation when, in truth, they 
are more an action, a choice which extends far beyond any 
constraining evidence from outside the mind or within i t . 
The genetic method inhibits the mind. It systematically 
ignores, or explains away, the evidences furnished by life 
and growth for the nature and reality of what grows and 
lives. 
By a doctrinaire violence, it drives back, as far as 
lies within its power, all the thing's later evidence 
for the thing's reality, which spring from the thing's 
present, observable appearances, into that thing's past, 
now only guessable.l 
Baron von Huegel considers the genetic method to be 
the product of the scientific quest for a maximum of clear-
ness and a minimum of postulates. The result of this quest 
has been a reduction of all reality to a flux of impressions 
whose objective constituents are essentially identical, 
inter-changeable, and evidential of nothing but themselves. 
This simplicity and clarity has been purchased at the ex-
pense of real variety. 
If von Huegel were required to limit his method to 
one approach , he wOuld prefer the analytical method. 2 This 
method affo~more life and reality and is alone capabl~ of 
furnishing man with genuine life at its fullest.3 However, 
the choice is not a final either-or. The combination of the 
two methods offers the necessary analysis of the object at 
1. Ibid. 
2. See pages 123- 125. 
3. Von Huegel, The Reality of God, 141. 
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its fullest expression. This involves an investigation from 
the beginnings to the fullest stage of development and back 
aga in. This double movement will, if worked devotedly and 
wisely, really deepen man•s sense of the worlds of beauty, 
goodness and truth. 1 
3. The Psychological Method 
Baron von Huegel candidly admits that in his study of 
mysticism- -the mysticism of Catherine of Genoa specifically--
he has not the qualifications of a physician or psychologist. 
He approaches the subject of mystical experience from the 
standpoint of the analytical methodolog~- which assumes a 
reality, a givenness of spiritual apprehension. This real-
ity is not included in a psychological study of psycho-
physical peculiarities. 
A strictly psychological methodology concerned with 
religious experience is considered by von Huegel to be no-
2 thing but a surreptitious begging of the question. To 
begin with the fullest analysis of the elementary and normal 
phenomena of consciousness and of its implications and in-
violable prerequisites, would be to imply a metaphysics in 
which the phenomena of consciousness can alone ope r ate. 
other phenomena which are outside this metaphysical explan-
ation require examination according to the facts of the 
1. Von Huegel, Essays and Addresses, I, 141-142. 
2. Von Huegel, The Mystical Element of Religion, II, 8. 
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phenomena and not according to a preconceived system. It 
is essential to guard cautiously against allowing a pre-
liminary analysis and description of psychological states 
from imperceptibly blocking the way to, or occupying the 
ground of, an ultimate analysis and metaphysical synthesis 
1 
and explanation. 
The fact that intense spiritual energizing is accom-
panied by the psychological states of auto-suggestion and 
mono-ideism is not conclusive evidence against the ultimate 
reality found in the mystical experience. All activity 
requires the mental, emotional and volitional energizing 
accompanied by nerve-states. These psychological states 
are not to be taken as the productive cause but the neces-
sary condition for the exercise of any considerable range 
and depth of mind and will. 2 This psycho-physical sensi-
tiveness is to be regarded as the instrument, or material, 
and expression of the soul's work. This work consists in 
calling up these activities of auto-suggestion and mono-
ideism in an effort to saturate the imagination with images 
and figures, historical and symbolic, as so many incarnations 
of great verities.3 
The evidence of auto-suggestion and mono-ideism is 
found not only in the religious life but also in the highest 
1. Ibid., 8. 2. Ibid., 41. 
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flights and absorptions of the philosopher, musician, and 
poet . If one is to judge the works of Beethoven from the 
standpoint of psycho-physical phenomena alone, the con-
elusion would place him among the hopeless and useless 
1 hypochondriacs. However) the truth of his music is not 
measured by neural concomitance and its cost. The truth 
of these expressions requires another judgment. 
The test of all ecstatic experiences is not the form 
but the content of the experience. The surface - similarity 
between the insane and the ecstatic person :.most frequently 
conceals a fundamental difference; that is, the content of 
the ecstatic experience offers to the experient and to the 
world a fruitfulness and applicability which is not found 
in the experiences of the insane. The insane person dwells 
upon the form of the experience. The ecstatic or mystical 
person disparages the form of the experience unless it brings 
2 
forth good fruit . Ecstatics continually teach that mystical 
capacities and habits are but meansJ not ends. It is only 
as the ecstasies leave. the soul that they become valuable. 
A philosophical objection is raised against the 
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assumpt ion of the mystic if he claims that physical impressions 
are somehow one with the spiritual realities for which they 
stand. There is no convincing indication at this point that 
1 • Ibid • , 42 • 2 • Ibid. , 52 -55. 
these physical impressions are only illustrative of the 
spiritual realities. God becomes an object of direct, 
passive, sensible perception at this last stage. Von Huegel 
disagrees with this objection. The mystic who realizes the 
fullest spiritual insights will regard the mind as deeper 
and more operative than sense. God's Spirit is understood 
as penetrating and transcending both the operation of sense 
and of mind. The mystic will, at least implicitly, 
regard those psycho-physical impressions as but sense-
like and really mental; and he will consider this mental 
impression and projection as indeed produced by the 
presence and action of the Spirit within his mind or of 
the pressure of spiritual realities upon it, but will 
hold that this whole mental process with these its 
spatial- and temporal-seeming embodiments, these sights 
and sounds, has only a relation and analogical likeness 
to, and is not and cannot be identified with, those re-
alities of an intrinsically super-spatial, super-temporal 
order.l 
The te~t to be applied to the mystic's experience is not 
the evidence of physical impression identical with God's re-
ality, but it is the deepening of the spiritual and ethical 
fruitfulness which is conveyed ·by the selflessness of the 
fuystic. The deepest apprehension of the mystical experience 
is that vision which transcends visual, tactual, and auditory 
perception. It is an experience of God which sees so dis-
tinctly and feels so profoundly that it cannot comprehend God 
at all.~ 
1. Ibid., 50. 2. Ibid. 
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The second difficulty which appears in relation to 
testing is the moral objection concerning the misuse of the 
body and its psychological effect involved in ecstatic ex-
periences. The moral issue is raised against those mystics 
who have shown more psycho-physical abnormality than spirit-
ual fruitfulness. The result has been shattered nerves and 
abused bodies that are not capable of further growth. 
Von Huegel indicates that there are several points that 
must be considered in the evaluation of this criticism. It 
is essential to point out that physical health is not the 
end of human life. The ideal man is not a perfect machine, 
but is rather one who has used his body as an instrument for 
the attaining of the spiritual personality. The true 
question to be asked is not whether such a type of life 
exacts a serious physical tribute or not, but whether the 
specifically human effects and fruits of that life are worth 
the cost. 1 It is only in relation to the value attained 
that the answer can be given. 
It is difficult to pronounce any final moral judgment 
which can be applied universally to all cases of ecstatic 
experiences which involve psycho-physical states. However, 
two extremes can be guarded against in this general area. 
First, man should not allow himself to attach a primary and 
1. Von Huegel, Mystical Element of Religion, II, 52. 
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independent importance to the psycho-physical form of these 
experiences as against their spiritual-ethical content, 
suggestions, and ends. On the other hand, man should not 
consider these experiences as ends-in-themselves. The whole 
man does not consist of specifically mystical habits and ex-
periences without reference to the social world and its 
function. 
Baron von Huegel concludes that psychological facts 
cannot determine whether the effect of the mystical exper1-
~nee ~ is or is not caused, occasioned, and directed by the 
1 
Supreme Spirit working in and through man. He regards a 
purely psychological method as similar to the genetic method 
in that both are highly desirable, suggestive, and useful 
as descriptions, but are vicious if they pretend to usurp 
2 the rights of philosophy to a fuller explanation. The 
final decision about the religious experience and mysticism 
should be made not in the light of psychology alone nor by 
an exclusively genetic method, but in light of the widest 
experience which includes and extends beyond the psychological 
and genetic methodologie·s. Experience is the unlimited possi-
bility which contains far more than any one methodology can 
formulate or systematize. 
1. Ibid., 60-61. 
2. Dakin, Von Huegel and the Supernatural (New York: Mac-
millan Company, 1934},~8. 
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4. The Analytical Method 
The method of critical analysis is considered by von 
Huegel to be the most inclusive approach to the study of 
philosophy and religion. The method is adequate, for it 
moves from the known to the unknown and not from the un-
known to the known as does the genetic method. It also 
discloses the fact that man can only know the middle of 
things, for the earliest beginnings and ultimate ends of 
1 
things remain unknown to him. "There is no making our 
knowledge of beginnings as certain in its details as can 
be our knowledge of what we actually now hold in our hands 
and what surrounds us on all sides .-"2 Von Huegel undertakes 
no serious attempt to work over again the preliminary 
epistemological inquiries into sense experience. He rather 
proposes to test the adequacy of the formulation concerning 
sense experience to see whether it can interpret fully the 
rich field of religious experience and the intimations of 
the religious Object which run through all sense perception. 
a. Its Principles 
The analytical method, according to von Huegel, in-
cludes the following four principles. (1) The primary 
concern is with what is and not with what seems to have been. 
1. Von Huegel, The Reality of God, 28. 
2. Ibid. 
12-3 
(2) The starting-point is not with an theory but with "that 
t ough, bewildering, yet immensely inspiring and truthrully 
testing thing, lire as it is and as it surrounds us. l! 1 The 
ideal procedure which works rrom the whole to the parts can-
not be used. The task is to proceed rrom the parts to the 
whole, whose nature can never be exhausted in its rich com-
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plexity. (3) There is the strange and yet certain interaction 
of any one thing with everything else. 2 This interaction 
produces the conviction regarding the relation which exists 
between the great and the small, such as the mathematical 
formulation which gives knowledge about the stars. This 
principle sustains the sense of wonder and receptivity, 
finding hardness of mind to be stupidity. "To be hard is, 
indeed, to be stupid, so we will try to remain open, and 
will smile i n welcome towards all the winds that blow in 
God's great heaven." 3 (4) There is the interrelationship 
of all of life. Each particular phase of life does have 
certain conditions and methods which are more or less ex-
elusively its own. However, no area of life is without its 
contribution to the whole. Religion, in this regard, has to 
be studied both in connection with all of life and also in 
abstraction from the rest of life. 
1. Von Huegel, The Reality of God, 28. 
2 • Ibid • , 30. 3. Ibid. 
125 
The analytical method reveals its own unique quality of 
uncertainty as derived from these principles. Reality is not 
a geometrical figure which yields the true answer or no answer 
at all. Reality is a light which is blindingly luminous at 
its center, having rings around it of lesser and lesser light, 
w.hich grow dimmer and dimmer until man is left in utter dark-
1 
ness. Von Huegel openly admits that he cannot answer the 
endless questions which are naturally provoked by his method-
ology. However, this incapacity proves only that his mind is 
finite and that although other finite minds can and will cor-
rect the weaknesses and errors, and although the realm of 
light can and will be indefinitely enlarged, the essence of 
reality will continue to be fringed with dimness and un-
2 
certainty. Reality is more than the mind's imaginings and 
more than : truth itself. 
It overwhelms whilst it supports us; and it will have 
produced one of its chief functions and effects if it 
keeps us thoroughly humbled in its presence--from the 3 
presence of the daisy to the presence and reality of God. 
b. Disposition Requisite to Religious Inquiry 
Philosophy and religion cannot be approached in a formal 
or logical fashion without reference to the dispositions of 
the minds involved in these studies. other subjects, such as 
mathematics, can be approached in a relatively logical and 
abstract manner. It is true that mathematical study becomes 
1. Ibid., 33. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 
impossible if the student does not possess the traits of 
perseverance and patience. Yet in contrast to the religious 
inquiry, mathematics is abstracted from the mathematician's 
other activities and thereby allows him to investigate his 
science impersonally. Religion is not an impersonal science. 
I t is concerned with the most complex and valuable reality, 
the nature of God. This study cannot be removed from life 
but it requires the response of the whole personality in its 
relation to all of life as the first essential step to appre-
hending this reality. 
The response of the whole personality depends partly 
on the general attitude of the knower toward life. If the 
disposition of the mind is such as to demand absolute clar-
ity in all matters, then it requires an impossible answer 
in the area of religion. Religion is not a subject for 
complete comprehension, final arguments, and absolute proofs. 
It rather seeks to penetrate the richness of Reality which 
extends beyond the comprehension of finite minds. The 
necessary disposition of the mind, therefore, is not one of 
brilliance but humility. The mind which is impatient with 
obscurity and lack of clarity will often fail to understand 
the reality which is discerned by the mind marked by humility, 
simplicity, child-like openness, peace, and patience. "Drop 
brain, open wide the soul, nourish the heart, purify, 
strengthen the will: with this, you are sure to grow; without 
1 t his, you are certain to shrinkt" 
This essential attitude of humility is not to exclude 
the brilliant efforts of the mind, but it is to suggest 
that the knowledge of man must be tempered by these quali -
ties of humility and patience in seeking to understand 
r eality. Man's knowledge is continually re-beginning; it 
is not the supreme lord of creation. Before ultimate re-
ality, man's understanding is but a beast of the field di-
gesting only the things of the world which suits its nature.2 
We indeed get to know realities, in proportion as we 
become worthy to know them, in proportion as we be-
come less self-occupied, less self-centered, more 
outward-moving, less obstinate and insistent ••• 
more rich in giving all that we have, and especially 
all that we are, our very selves.3 
c. Criterion of Truth 
The criterion of religious truth is not the test of 
clarity as enlisted by the science of mathematics. Modern 
man, von Huegel asserts, is under the spell of Descartes 
12·7 
with his insistence upon immediate unity of outlook and 
perfect clearness of ideas as the only universal tests and 
constituents of truth.4 Other demands, however, are being 
placed upon man's knowledge and his search for truth. Psy-
chology and biology present such demands, exacting different 
methods and tests distinct from the purely formal application 
1. Von Huegel, Essays and Addresses, I, 99. 2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., 104. 4. Ibid., 70. 
of mathematics. "Concrete thought •.• finds full room 
also for History, Philosophy, Religion, for each as furnish-
ing rich subject-matters for Knowledge of Science, of a 
special but true kind." 
1 
The criterion of truth varies with the subject-matter 
under consideration. The correct test for mathematical ab-
stractions and for spatial, numerical, and mechanical re-
lations is clarity and ready transferableness. Abstract 
ideas and numerical relations are undeniably clear and 
available for universal understanding. 
How can I LYon Huegel7 blame a man for sticking ex-
clusively to the lucidity of twice two makes four, if 
this knowledge, in its fullest development, gives him 
everything he requires. Yet nothing is more certain 
than that the richer is any reality, the higher in the 
scale of being, and the more precious our knowledge of 
it, the more in part obscure and inexhaustible, the 
less immediately transferable, is our knowledge of 
that reality.2 
Religion becomes unintelligible when it is asked to 
defend itself in terms of logical clarity and consistency 
alone. Its affirmations concerning religious realities 
may be dim and difficult to communicate.3 If, however, 
these affirmations prove rich and fruitful, they are both 
appropriate and true. In view of this result, a different 
criterion must be utilized for the judgment of religious 
truth, namely, the criterion of rich fruitfulness. 
1. Ibid., 70-71. 2. Ibid., 11. 3. Ibid • , 105. 
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We must seek reality and its knowledge in action and 
through self-purification, and must find the tests of 
what is reality and what is knowledge in the vividness 
(richness) and in the fruitfulness of what claims to 
be spiritually true and spiritually known.l 
The spiritually true and the spiritually real are to be 
combined with the humble spirit of inquiry thus providing 
von Huegel with the necessary conditions for an inclusive 
and constructive study of religion. 
B. Theory of Knowledge 
Baron von Huegel's epistemological position is best 
seen in relation to his concept of consciousness and its 
trans-subjective significance, and in contrast to other 
epistemological positions, namely, positivism and idealism. 
1. Consciousness: Its Trans-subjective Significance 
Von Huegel's concept of consciousness is directly 
related to his incessant appeal to the whole personality 
as the organ of knowledge. 2 Consciousness is not to be 
conceived as the subjective activities operating entirely 
within man's mind without reference to "external" things 
nor is it to be considered solely as the cognitive function 
of the mind. Man's mind is also intuitive, harmonizing 
within its ability all the forces of sense, imagination, 
1. Ibid., 107. 
2. Dakin, Von Huegel and the Supernatural, 16. 
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feeling, arld will as well as possible in order to attain 
their fullest interpenetration in the whole personality. 
It is only as these various constituents of the human per-
sonality a r.e brought into contact with other minds, other 
living beings, and other things that the data of conscious-
ness are seen as facts which bring real knowledge of ex-
1 ternal reality. 
The data of consciousness are far more complex and 
varied than the activities of the mind itself. They are 
the rich whole in which men live; a complex which is prior 
to, and including, both subject and object and the process 
2 
of thihking as commonly distinguished from either. Man 
lives throughout his life within this rich whole, gradually 
and never exhaus t ively distinguishing and articulating its 
varied contents. 3 However, the data of consciousness are 
not completely divorced, according to von Huegel, from 
reality. They give knowledge of reality in relation to 
man 's ability to comprehend their meaning. Man's experi-
ence does not begin with a clear apprehension of all the 
data of consciousness. Experience is a gradual process 
which never fully exhausts the content of consciousness. 
The data of man's actual experience are subject and 
1. Von Huegel, Essays and Addresses, I, 33. 
2. Dakin, Von Huegel and the Super natural, 17. 
3. Von Huegel, The Reali t y of God, 145. 
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object, each giving to and taking from the other. These 
subjective and objective factors are somehow and to some 
correlative extent included within the single human con -
1 
sciousness . The experience of the data as both subject 
and object provides a basis for two rational presumptions; 
first, the belief in the reality of other minds as dis-
tinct from one mind; second, the belief that other minds 
are likewise surrounded by and related to objective reali -
ties . The reduction of the data of consciousness to sub-
ject alone l~>~ould furnish no foundation for the objective 
reality of other minds and their relation to external re-
ality. This reduction would result in a hopelessly solip-
sistic conclusion . 
Within the ultimate continuum of human consciousness 
(the continuing data of consciousness apprehended by man's 
awareness), there are three ranges: first, experience, dim, 
inchoate, stretching off indefinitely into mystery; second , 
knowledge which is experience organized and articulated to 
a farily high degree ; third, truth which is experience 
? 
articulated at its best . - Truth is not to be understood 
as the final rationalist ic articulation or as the culmination 
of symbolic logic or abstraction. It is rather that point 
of light which shines through the darkness surrounding men. 
1. Von Huegel, Essays and Addresses, I, 51. 
2. Von Huegel, Selected Letters, 356; Dakin,; Von Huegel and 
the Su£ernatural, 17. 
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/ La verite est, pour vous, un point lumineux que se 
' , 1 perd, peu a peu, dans l'obscurite. · 
True thought involves rich feeling and the functioning of 
the whole personality as well as a rational articulation. 
It is never a final truth but a step toward the point 
lumineux. 
There is nothing within consciousness that enables 
man to escape himself. Man can never j ump out of his skin. 
However, this does not answer the questi on as to how far 
the skin ~Till stretch, nor what, nor how much of Reality 
really affects man and is presumably apprehended by him 
2 
with some genuine knowledge. Man realizes, especially 
in the se.cond t•ange of art lculated experience, the ex-
istence of countless realities, more or less different from 
himself. He also cand i dly grants the real influence of 
these realities upon himself and claims real knowledge 
con·cerning them. The substance of these realities and 
the influence of their external existence are found by man 
to be prior to his discursive reasoning about them • • It is 
the basic 'givenness' of realities, the objective facts of 
natural science, for example, which affords the possibility 
for contact between them and man. This contact, in turn, 
results in a mutual interaction which conveys some real 
1. Von Huegel, Selected Letters, 58. 
2 . Von Huegel, Essays and Add r e s ses, I, 40. 
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knowledge both of the self experiencing and the objects 
experienced. 
It is essential for man to recognize the dynamic force 
of the data of consciousness. Man 1 s mind is a living power 
which finds itself in close~contact with other energ i zings 
and impulsions. The entire human subject is always in the 
first instance necessar;tly: related not to an idea or re-
presentation, either of l tself or of anything else, but to 
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various concrete realities distinct from, though not entirely 
unlike itself. 1 The primary f actor involved in the dat a of 
consciousness and their effect upon the mind is the action 
of the objective world upon the human subject and, in turn, 
the manifold reaction of this human subject to the world 1 s 
action . The more real is the subject ;thus stimulateQ, and 
reacting, the more real is the object thus stimulating and 
ac ting. Areas of human experience, such as found in the 
study of history, politics, and ethics, provide the widest 
and deepest subjective stimulation of the most varied and 
often obscure kind. However, these experiences which offer 
no specially clarified and full conviction, are precisely 
the areas which convey the richest objective content within 
themselves and offer the fullest reward for the attempts to 
2 discover their meaning. 
It is true that man cannot escape the limitations of 
his mind. However, it does not follow from this that his 
1 • Ibid. , 33. 2. Ibid. 
only knowledge comes by reasoning out from his knowledge 
about himself and other minds. There is a contact with the 
external world which affords intimations of orders of more 
than merely human origin, truth and range. The data of 
consciousness refer to an objective content which extends 
beyond the subjective conclusions of the mind. This is 
especially noticed in the religious consciousness . 
The religious consciousness is always of Something 
other than itsel~ . • • an Infinite different in kind 
from any simply human prolongation or ideal, since 
the soul rests upon It, and finds its support in the 
actual presence and operation of this Infinite , this 
Perfectness.l 
Baron von Huegel maintains that there is every solid 
reason for, and no cogent reason against, holding that t he 
objects most persistently apprehended by man ' s deepest ex-
perience are trans-subjectively real. The acceptance of 
their reality brings l ight, order , and fruitfulness in the 
most unexpected ways and into the most remote places of 
man's life and work. These objects are trans-subjectively 
real and are, in themselves, not all unlike, and not dis-
connected with, what man apprehends them to be.2 
2 . Pos itiv i sm 
Positivism rejects the trans-subjective reality found 
1 . Ibid., 34. 
1~ 
in the data of consciousness. The positivist restricts 
all certain cognition to the experiences of the senses and 
to the mathematical-physical sciences which build their 
knowledge solely upon sensory experience. Valid knowledge 
is limited to direct sensory perception and to the laws of 
the so-called empirical sciences. The only indubitable fact 
found in consciousness is the bare occurv~ of man's sen-
sations and impressions which may be possibly misleading. 1 
The certain pressure which undeniably accompanies sensations 
and impressions , indicating a reality beyond mere perception 
and thus crediting them with trans-subjective validity, is 
found by the positivist to evince no positive objective re-
ality. This pressure is a meaingless occurrence which evi-
dences in itself no trans-subjective validity. 
Von Huegel finds this positivistic conclusion untenable. 
No one has succeeded in consistently carrying through a re-
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fusal of assent to the truth of this pressure which accompan~ 
2 
sensations and impressions. Scepticism and positivism de-
rive the very weapons which they employ against the trans-
subjectivity of this pressure from the acceptance of other 
impressions which exert the same ' pressure ' as trans-
subjectively valid. Logical cognition, which is used by the 
skeptic, positivist , idealist, and realist, goes beyond the 
1. Von Huegel, Mystical Element of Religion, II, 275. 
2. Ibid., 276. 
meaning of 'immediate experience ' and includes a certain 
f a ith in the trans-subjective validity of such cognition. 
No man can restrict himself to abiding systematically within 
the immediately experienced. These presentations already 
in themselves constitute a knowledge, man's first knowledge 
which possesses an absolute indubitableness. 1 Reality, down 
to its last depths, lies open to cognition. 2 These pre-
sentations accompanied by valid trans-subjectivity do not 
transform themselves directly into the Things-in-themselves. 
Objective reality is not known face to face . It is possible 
for the mind to resist the pressure which urges it on to-
wards the belief in the objective. 3 Therefore, an act of 
faith -is necessary on the part of the mind in order to affirm 
this belief in the objective which makes possible cognition 
of reality. 
The positivist and skeptic affirm this faith to some 
extent. They place their trust in thought which extends, 
communicates, and utilizes experience beyond its direct, 
4 immediate occurrence. Cognition and the necessities of 
thought which are involved therein, are continually active 
in searching out the meaning of reality . If any affirmation 
concerning the ultimate reasons and depths of reality can be 
1. Ibid. 2. Ibid. 
3. Lester-Garland, Religious Philosophy of F. von Huegel, 23. 
4. Von Huegel, Essays and Addresses , I, 69. 
shown to be necessary in the activity of cognition~ then 
this assertion possesses as rightful a claim to trans-
sub ject ive validity as any determination involved in thought 
which is concerned only with sense-impressions and the va-
lidity thereby derived. Cognition is not a simpl~ process. 
It does not involve sense impressions alone. Cognition and 
the certainty which accompanies it involve indubitable sen-
sation, clear thought~ warm faith in and through action. 1 
The acquisition of even the most rudimentary knowledge 
entails more activity than the positivist acknowledges. 
Knowledge in its initial stages includes both an emotional 
. 2 disposition and volitional action. Von Huegel refers to 
James Ward's statement that describes even receptivity as 
activity which involves the conative or selective response. 3 
It is clear to von Huegel that the deeper and richer subject-
matter demands more emotional and volitional activity from 
the experient. The part played by the intellect in the 
apprehension of Ultimate Reality is secondary to the roles 
4 played by the emotions and will. 
Von Huegel questions the separation of the objective and 
subjective in the cognitive process maintained by some 
epistemological positions. The intellectual distinction be-
tween the presentation and the thing-in-itself is not to be 
1. Von Huegel, Mystical Element of Religion, I~ 57. 
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2. Von Huegel~ Mystical Element of Religion~ II~ 277. 3. Ibid. 
4. Lester-Garland~ Religious Philosophy of F. von Huegel, 24. 
pressed so far as to result in a metaphysical exclusion of 
the one by the other. There is no fact found in experience 
or thought which prevents something which is man's pre-
1 
sentation. No fundamental dualism exists between the pre-
sentation and the thing-in-itself. They are aspects of one 
fact. The distinction made between subject and objects 
results from intellectual thought which is possible only 
within the unity of the reality in which the distinction 
2 takes place. Experience is a wider term than the knowl-
edge which constructs this discrimination. Experience in-
cludes and extends beyond knowledge. 
There is evidence, von Huegel asserts, for an original, 
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teleological interaction operating in reality which is not 
accounted for by the positivist. This interaction is found 
between the apparently non-logical facts of history and the 
logical necessities found in philosophical thought. Histor-
ical forces do not appear to follow any laws of logical develop-
ment and yet they fall into agreement with the necessities 
and ends of thought and of truth.3 It is only the presence 
of an original and teleological interrelation which can ex-
plain how historical forces advance rather than destroy 
rational thinking. Powers that seem at first sight to be 
external and sometimes destructive of each other and producing 
evidence for the· pre-existing harmony and purposiveness of 
1. Von Huegel, Mystical Element of Religion, II, 278. 
2. Ibid., 279. 3. Ibid. ~ 208. 
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the fundamental forces of reality. This basic interrelation 
between contingent fact and logical necessity is left unex-
plained by positivism. 
Von Huegel's final objection to positivism is concerned 
with its position which establishes the experience of sense 
as the most direct apprehension immediately accessible to 
man. The only experience, von Huegel asserts, immediately 
accessible to man is not sensory perception but that ex-
perience which centers in the activity of man's mind and 
will. 1 Adequate apprehension of the world of things is 
more difficult and remote than apprehension of the activity 
of mind and will. 
This means that we have direct experience and anything 
like adequate knowledge (because knowledge from within) 
not of things, but of mind and will, of spiritual life 
struggling within an animal life; and that in face, 
say, of plant-life, and still more of a pebble or of a 
star, we have a difficulty as to an at all appropriate 
and penetrative apprehension, which, if opposite to, 
is also in a sense greater than, the difficulty in-
herent to our apprehension of God Himself.2 
The apprehension of the finite and the phenomenal pro-
duces within man a sense of imprisonment and a feeling of 
mental oppression.3 It is only as man understands reality 
in its higher stages that he realizes the more satisfying 
and certain experiences. The apprehension of Spirit at the 
higher stages of reality is directly experienced by man's 
spirit. The greatest souls in history have felt most 
1. Ibid. 2. Ibid., 281. 3. Ibid • .. 
strongly the unconquerable urge which makes it impossible 
for them to dwell within the lower levels of reality. The 
quest has been for the lofty realms wherein the spirit of 
man is not imprisoned by the self-imposed limitations of 
positivism, but extends into that level wherein man's 
spirit is directly touched, affected, in part determined, 
1 by the Infinite Spirit Itself. At this level, men sense 
how "immensely the Spirit, thus directly experienced by 
their spirit, transcends, and yet also is required by and 
is immanent in, their keen sense of the Finitude and Con-
tingency present throughout the world of sense-perception 
2 
and of clear intellectual formulation. 11 
3. Idealism 
The idealistic approach to the study of knowledge and 
experience of reality is also rejected by von Huegel. By 
'idealistic' he means 11 any philosophy which is so full of 
the undoubted activities of the subject as largely to over-
look the distinct reality and influence of the object. 113 
Both idealism and positivism, von Huegel contends, fail to 
offer a theory of knowledge that accounts for the concrete 
facts of experience. 
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Modern idealism, as first clearly formulated by Descartes 
1. Von Huegel, Mystical Element of Religion, II, 282. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Von Huegel, The Reality:~· of God, 3. 
in his fundamental principle, Cogito, ergo ~' is the 
offspring from his attempt to make sure of that interior 
sincerity which must be the condition of any honest attempt 
to attain knowledge. Descartes was so eager to confirm 
this kind of interiority and sincerity that he started not 
from concrete fact (meaning, a mind thinking something), 
nor from the analysis of the ultimate trinity in unity 
found in thinking (the subject, the thinking process, the 
object), but from t .hat pure abstraction: thinking, or 
thought, or a thinking of a thought. From this unreal 
starting-point, the idealistic theory of knowledge tried 
1 to reach that now quite problematical thing, the object. 
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Von Huegel points out that Hume did not have any diffi-
culty in reaching the purest skepticism, beginning with 
this idealistic premise. Even Kant, the arch-opponent of 
Hume~sskepticism, has presented his own unique strain of 
skepticism which has bee.n especially apparent in neo-
Kantian interpretations.2 Kant, on the whole, has been 
hardly less agnostic than Hume himself. From the stand-
point of epistemology, Kant finds man to know nothing of 
the real nature of the thing-in-itself, although (strangely 
enough) man does know that the reality of the thing-in-
itself is always utterly different from what this thing 
1. Von Huegel, Essays and Addresses, I, 186. 
2. Ibid. 
1 
appears to be. 
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It is the unreal starting-point of idealistic epistemology 
which presents the fundamental difficulty for von Huegel. 
Man's actual experiences, the data with which he starts, are 
never simply impressions which are felt by man to be 
purely subjective at the time he receives them. 2 Man's 
consciousness from the very beginning includes both 
subject and object, each giving to and taking from the 
3 
other in a rich interrelationship. The data of 
consciousness, involving both subject and object, result 
in a knowledge which always entails the essential, the 
inevitable transcendence of the object. Knowledge is 
never primarily a comprehension of man's states of 
consciousness. It is rather a knowledge or a seeking 
for a knowledge, of the objects which exist prior t~ and 
after, each and every attempt on man's part to apprehend 
4 
and to articulate the meaning of experience. 
Von Huegel rejects the extreme epistemological 
subjectivism which presents man as consisting essentially 
of intellect alone. 5 Actual life of all types, different 
1. Ibid., 186-187. 2. Ibid., 51. 3. Ibid., 34. 
a. Von Huegel, The Reality of God, 3. 
5. Von Huegel, Essays and Addresses, I, 30. 
sciences with their particular results, and historical 
evidences, all prove this conclusion to be false. Man 
is not simply intellect; he is also sense, imagination, 
feeling, and will. The human personality contains all these 
various constituents,making possible their interpenetration 
within its unity. It is only when these constituents are 
brought by man into ra harmonized whole and placed in contact 
with other minds, other living beings, and other things, 
that he achieves some real knowledge of himself, other 
selves, the world and reality. 1 
Von Huegel's rejection of extreme epistemological 
idealism involves, in turn, an assertion of the truth 
of the common-sense view clarified by the examination 
of a philosophical mind. 2 The ordinary person accepts 
the fact that there is an external world which is distinct 
from himself. He also affirms that he is in touch with 
this objective world, finding in it all the necessary 
requirements for the activities of his mind and 
body. Men act upon this belief thus establishing it as 
a:· .. universal conviction. The common man is right, 
according to von Huegel, as far as he goes, and his con-
victions constitute a court of appeal to which philosophy 
may have recourse for its justification.3 Subjectiv:tty 
1. Ibid., 32-33. 
2. Lester-Garland, Religious Philosophy of F. ~Huegel, 
30. 
3. Ibid., 30-31. 
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and the idealistic starting-point is a sheer impo.SB1bil1ty 
in fact and an absurdity in thought from the common-
sense point of view. The fact is that man would not 
have known about subjectivity at all, nor would he have 
felt its intolerableness, had he not known objectivity 
as we11. 1 This objectivity is discovered in the back-
ground of subjectivities that man finds or imagines in 
his knowledge of minerals, plants, animals, and his own 
nature. In this process man also discerns . objectivity 
behind these forces. 
We must somehow possess some knowledge of, some 
contact with, the objective, the distinctly exist-
ent real. For it is not merely that we are driven 
sooner or later, willy-nilly, .. ,to have some notions 
about ultimate things, No, once given, once admit-
ted that our sense of subjectivity in our knowledge 
of these lesser things involves some dim knowledge 
of these things as distinct objects and existent 
realities, we are driven to demand and to hold ~1-
timate causes · or an ultimate cause of them all. 
The ultimate, original reality, the cause of all things, 
von Huegel ass.erts, is somehow dimly known to man in the 
process of gaining knowledge of other things. 
Any idealistic theory which tends to or admits 
deriving evidence for God from creation alone is dis-
carded by von Huegel as an inadequate position. 2 The 
1. Von Huegel, The Reality of God, 63. 
2. Ibid. 
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3. Von Huegel, Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of 
Religion (London: J:M7 Dent and Sons~td., 1926),Ii; 149-151. 
religious sense cannot restrict God to the self-limited 
creative God or to the persuasion that the whole of 
the absolute, God in and for Himself, is absorbed in 
God as Creator. The religious spirit employs the 
evidence found in creation, but then it presses on 
to the absolute. Ultimate reality is transcendent as 
well as immanent. 
God is certainly not, in any degree or sense, simply 
spatially outside of, or above us ••• but this experi-
ence itself is essentially as truly of God transcend-
ent as of God immanent; of a Spirit indefinitely more· 
spiritual, a reality which is nobler and of a higher 
nature than our highest, and leaves us with a noble 
thirst--as well as of this same Spirit as penetrating 
us through, and as satisfying our cravings.l 
Idealism, especially in its subjective epistemological 
extreme, as well as positivism, scepticism, and agnosticism, 
presents an insufficient testimony to ultimate Reality, 
which is both immanent and transcendent. It is this 
inadequacy which von Huegel finds to be the 
most serious difficulty involved in their respective 
theories of knowledge. 
4. Critical Realism 
A theory of knowledge is competent only when it 
can expalin how man is to have contact both with the 
reality manifested in the external world and with the 
1. Von Huegel, Selected Letters, 139. 
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Supreme Reality which lies behind it. 1 It is only a 
realistic epistemology, according to von Huegel, which 
begins to accomplish this task. 
The philosophy, the theory of knowledge, I needed 
and have achieved is strongly realistic in. character. 
I believe most earnestly that the future, also in 
philosophy proper, is moving away from all scepticisms, 
subjectivisms, agnosticis~ pragmatisms, to belief in 
our real knowledge of real objects distinct from our-
self and from our knowledge of them.2 
a. Its Characteristics 
The relevancy of the mind to knowledge may range 
in realism from utter agnosticism toward any feature 
of the object except its non4iependence upon the mind 
to a claim to complete comprehension which exhausts 
the nature of the object. Von Huegel does not hold 
to either of these extremes. He does not support a 
naive real ism which ignores all the mixture of truth 
and error found by the critical studies of Descartes 
and Kant, nor does he affirm an extreme agnosticism. 
A critical realism is in his view the most adequaue 
theory of knowledge for it constitutes the careful 
sifting of the various theories of idealism, material-
ism, and scepticism, discerning from these positions 
the element of truth which is essential for a complete 
1. Lester-Garland, Religious Philosophy of F. ~Huegel, 19. 
2. London Literary Supplement, "Memorial Article," May 28, 
1922. 
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theory of knowledge. 1 In relationship to epistemological 
idealism specifically, critical realism recognizes the impor-
tance of the mind's activities in its interaction with 
external objects. However, it distinguishes itself from 
the metaphysical conclusions which may result from this 
type of idealism by refusing to exalt the mind making it 
the clue to the nature and reality of its object. 
Critical realism asserts the independence of themind 
and its object, not as a spatial apartness but by af-
firming the integrity of the content of the object and 
insisting that the mind cannot influence this fundamental 
content. The mind can only apprehend it with a varying 
degree of relevance. 
The essential characteristic in critical real i sm 
for von Huegel is the belief in the independent opera-
tiveness of an objective order which is not dependent 
on the mind alone. This independent operativeness is 
evidenced in science and history. The~studies point 
to a reality which is not created by the human mind. 
I was not simply face to face with the intereeting ; 
or for the most part uninteresting history of my 
own mind, but with facts of immense length and range 
in space and time, dist:tnct from my little self, yet 
part of that great world which has environed me from 
the first moment of my existence, and which from the 
first ha s awakened me to a sense of reality and the 
1. Von Huegel, Mystical Element of Religion, I, xvi. 
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corresponding consciousness of myself; facts loved 
by me precisely in their distinctness~l · 
Science presents for man's investigation the stubborn 
irresistible facts of nature, and often in this examination, 
its proposed hypotheses extend beyond the pragmatic ex-
planations. 
If an hypothesis is indeed only a practical shift 
taken in its immediate conscious natur e, yet it is 
a shift not for the purpose of reaching some working 
arrangement which may be ultimately false, but it 
springs from the stimulation of reality other than 
ourselves and from our ceaseless thirst to know the 
truth about such reality.2 
History indicates the transcendent operativeness 
of the objective order by the fact that through its 
merely temporal events there moves value of eternal 
significance.3 This is also demonstrated by the evidence 
that history enriches rather than destroys the growth of 
science, philosophy, and religion, suggesting a harmony 
between apparently non-mental events and the human mind.4 
b. Preliminary Testimony to the Objective Order 
Not only the evidence derived from the developed 
studies of science and history, but also the testimony 
of the most elemental experiences of man testifies to 
1. Von Huegel~ The Reality of God~ 4. 
2. Ibid., 59. 
3. Von Huegel, Essays and Addresses, II, 27-34. 
4. Von Huegel, Mystical Element of Religion, II, 280. 
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the transcendent operativeness of the objective order. 
This affirmation is found, von Huegel asserts, in the 
perception of sensory objects, the occurrence of time, 
and the activity of creative effort. Within the se 
fundamental experiences, man senses the functioning 
of a transcendent nature which extends beyond man's 
own sensible and contingent apprehensions. 
i. The experience of sensory perception evinces 
the operation of the independent order of nature. It 
also reveals the activity of a spiritual order which 
penetrates nature at every point. This is evident at 
the more developed level of perception wherein knowledge 
or external objects is possible. 
There are two levels of sensory perception as des-
cribed by von Huegel: (1) the level of sensation wherein 
149 
the flux of consciousness is only sensed as simply and 
passively received without the involvement of reflective 
thinking; (2) the level of the logical order of consciousness 
where the element of subjective interpretation is realized 
and reference to the objective is recognized as crucial. 1 
It would be a simple experience if man remained on the first 
level of mere occurrence of impression. However, he would 
purchase simplicity at the cost of knowledge. It is only 
on the second level of reflective and logical thinking where 
1. Von Huegel, Mystical Element of Religion, I, 56. 
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all knowledge of single things is possible, that there comes . 
to man a sense of finitude, cont ingency, incompleteness, and 
insufficiency which is not furnished by the things themselves 
1 
even in their totality. 
It is in the experience of sensory percept ion itself at 
the level of reflection that the sense of succession and 
fleetingness is felt by man in contrast to the sense of 
simultaneity and abidingness which is keenly apprehended 
and spontaneously awakened in this experience. Out of this 
sense of contrast between the fleetingness of sensation and 
t he ab1.dingness which is somehow apprehended as superior 
to and normative of experience (giving dignity and worth to 
all flux and relativity) comes the affirmation of the dis-
tinctive thing within all sensory experience.2 This dis-
tinctive element is the deeper level involved in sense per-
ception which provides its sharply normative contrast to 
the purely descriptive sensory elements of that experience. 
The sense of contrast which is awakened and felt within 
the flux of sensory impressions is not the mere projection 
of man's empty, undisciplined wishes. 3 It finds its cause 
within the spiritual order which possesses its own primordial, 
unchanging, normative order which, in turn, impinges on the 
occasion of an experience of sensory perception. 
1. Von Huegel, Eternal Life (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 191~, 
153-
2 • Ibid. , 154. 3. Ibid. 
I LVon Huege!7 take it that the one unforced explanation 
of this universal, utterly ineradicable, boundlessly 
powerful movement throughout human life, is that we 
never do have, and never could have, this clinging, 
penetrating, stinging sense of the relative and finite, 
of the merely human, except because we are all the 
while, in some manner and degree experiencing not only 
this relative series but a contrasting other. For the 
sense of the contrast is too keen and unavoidable, 
above all too universal and operative for its two terms 
not to fall, both of t~em, somehow within and not with-
out our consciousness. 
The sensory expe r ience not only becomes the occasion 
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for this contrast which indicates the abiding level of spirit-
ual reality, but it also provides the essential foundation 
for the apprehension of the Infinite wh:lC.h springs up .only in 
connection with the apprehension of finite things. 
We poor human beings, at least in this life, never be-
gin (or in the long run keep up) the apprehension of 
things spiritual except on occasion of the awakedness 
and stimulation of the senses. There is no such thing 
as an exclusively spiritual awakening to, or appre-
hension of, spiritual realities.2 
ii. The fundamental experience of the occurrence of 
time also indicates : the transcendent operativeness of the 
objective order. This is evidenced by the dim consciousness 
within man of an abiding normative other on the occasion of 
successive temporal experience. 
Von Huegel's analysis of time and its relation to the 
eternal, includes the distinction made between the clock-
time of science, schedules, and social engagements and the 
1. Von Huegel , "Experience and Transcendence," Dublin Review, 
axxXviii(l906}, 362. 
2. Von Huegel, Selected Letters, 349. 
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time-duration involved in the individual's inner experience·. 1 
Clock-time is understood as conceptual time, described as a 
succession of fixed, mutually exclusive moments of identical 
quantity and quality. It is a "conception really derived 
from space-perception and exterior, measurable things."2 
In contrast to conceptual time, duration is defined as 
concrete time. It is essentially qualitative and in-
communicable, composed of variously rapid successions of 
heterogeneous spiritual forces and experiences, emotions, 
and volitions, 
each affecting and colouring, each affected and coloured 
by, all the others, and all producing together a living 
harmony and organic unity, all which constitutes the 
essentially unpicturable experience of the living person.3 
The distinction is seen in the contrast between clock-time 
with its fixity and mutual exclusiveness and duration-time 
with its interpenetration and mutually modifying forces and 
experiences of man's inner life. The experiences of past, 
present, and future occurrences are not conceived by man as 
merely successive facts which have no relation to each other. 
They are rather conceived to be overlapping, mutually modi-
fying, inter-penetrative events which belong to duration 
(concrete time) rather than to clock-time (conceptual time). 
These events, affirmed as belonging to the inner experience 
1. Dakin, Von Huegel and the Supernatural, 79. 
2. Von Huegel, Mystical Element of Religion, I, 106. 
3. Ibid. 
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of time as duration, transcend the temporal aspect of the 
time-sequence and approach a simultaneity similar to eternity. 
The two distinct experiences of time as succession and 
time as duration present contrasting facts in man's experi-
ence: (1) clock-time which stands beneath man's inner ex-
perience as a compromise necessary for conceptual thought; 
(2) eternal duration which stands above man's inner experi-
ence as the ultimate source of his partial simultaneity. 
The experience of clock-time is not a part of the eternal 
reality, God, nor will it be present in the experience of 
1 
man in the after-life. However, the sense of duration 
will continue after the experiences of this life have ceased 
in order that the distinction between man and God may be 
retained. 2 Man's realization of God's time as complete 
simultaneity moves man partly beyond the concept of du-
ration--while he remains within it--toward an experience of 
partial simultaneity. Time as duration continues to afford 
the necessary background for man's consciousness of God's 
time as complete simultaneity~3 It is within the sense of 
time as duration that man experiences the impingement upon 
him of reality which extends beyond the sense of duration 
to the sense of eternal simultaneity. 
1. Von Huegel, Essays and Addresses, I, 93. 
2. Von Huegel, Selected Letters, 366. "We ourselves shall 
never, either here or hereafter, be more than quasi-
eternal, durational." 
3. Von Huegel, Essays and Addresses, I, 93. 
Time then, in the sense of duration ••• is, for us 
men, not a barrier against Eternal Life, but the very 
stuff and means in and by which we vitally experience 
and apprehend that Life. Thus a real succession, real 
efforts, and the continuous sense of : limitation and 
inadequacy are the very means in and through which man 
apprehends increasingly (if only he thus loves and 
wills) the contrasting yet sustaining Simultaneity, 
Spontaneity, 1Infinity, and pure Action of the Eternal Life of God. 
Neither time nor space is an ultimate reality which has 
genuine ontological value; they are rather the media in which 
alone man can grasp the Eternal. Neither time nor space is 
to be considered illusory, for both contain a deeper level 
below the surface appearance of the specific sense detail. 
Man becomes aware of the rich, impinging Other at this 
deeper level. Von Huegel criticizes Kant at this point for 
treating the perception of time and space as necessary but 
empty forms of the mind. Kant thereby refuses to grant 
any importance to these experiences and categories when he 
comes to the soul's deepest e~perience, its religious life. 2 
Both time and space are essential media, von Huegel insists, 
for man's apprehension of ultimate Reality. 
Von Huegel also .criticizes Bergson's analysis of time 
as creative flux. The basis for the reality of time extends 
beyond Bergson's flux of becoming and is found in the sense 
of something permanent, changeless, perfect in form, yet 
rich in variety. It is the sense of infinite permanence in 
1. Von Huegel, Eternal Life, 386-387. 
2. Ibid., 144. 
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contrast to the sense of change. The experience of an ob-
jective, eternal, and normative element dimly felt in the 
experience of time is inadequately described by the con-
cept of the creative flux. 1 The reality of time and space 
is found in their relationship to the transcendent order 
which emerges by means of these experiences. 
In both time and space • . • von Huegel has sought to 
distinguish between the strietly perceptual level of 
surface events connected in spatial location or tempo-
ral successiveness and the dim but genuine knowledge 
of a transcendent order that emerges upon the occasion 
of these experiences.2 
iii. The experience of creative activity, von Huegel 
claims, affords. more evidence for the transcendent oper-
ativeness of the objective order than that which is found 
in the sense perception of objects in space or of events 
in time. The experience of creative effort testifies not 
only to the more than human reality of its Object but also 
to the essential difference between the present experience 
of creativity and the great Reality thus experienced and 
revealed.3 The creative accomplishments of science, art, 
philosophy, and morality reveal at their best and deepest 
moments the sense that some abiding, trans-subjective, 
other-than-human or even more-than-human reality, or force, 
or law, is manifesting itself; and in addition, the sense 
1. Ibid. 
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2. Douglas Steere, "Critical Realism in the 
ophy of Baron F. von Hue~elR(Unpublished 
Harvard University, 1931), 88. 
Religious Philos-
Ph.D. dissertation, 
3. Von Huegel, Essays and Addresses, I, 63. 
that these very experiences, and even more so the reasoned 
abstracts of them give but a very incomplete, ever im-
perfect, conception of trans-subjective realities. 1 All 
creative activity is penetrated by the deepest sense of 
contrast between the highest yet incomplete human achieve-
ment -and the absolute reality of an objective order. 
This sense of contrast between the Infinite and the 
finite, found in man's creative achievements, cannot be 
reduced to mere illusion or to the sheer projection of the 
race-instinct. The sense of contrast is grounded in the 
objective Reality which is the fundamental and persistent 
cause of all of man's noblest achievements and of his most 
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inalienable characteristic, namely, his dissatisfaction with 
anything and with all things merely contingent and finite. 2 
This sense of dissatisfaction basic to all fields of creative 
endeavor has a qualitative nature which is derived from the 
transcendent operativeness of Reality permeating man's ere-
ative efforts. 
To describe this sense of dissatisfaction as subjective 
projection or illusion, does not explain the qualitative 
nature of this sense which extends beyond the feeling itself. 
The explanation does not show how man, who, according to the 
subjectivist, is completely shut up within a mode of 
1. Ibid., 63-64. 
2. Von Huegel, Eternal Life, 242. 
apprehension bearing no relation to reality and therefore 
without any ontological worth, possesses a sense of dis-
1 
satisfaction with all merely human apprehensions. The 
testimony of this sense of inadequacy does not witness to 
man's subjective plight, but it testifies to a reality 
which impinges upon the human modes of apprehension. Evi-
dence for this fact is found in the studies of psychology, 
history, and epistemology. Within these studies are found 
difficulties and complexities which affirm the apparent 
inescapability and also the pain of man's mere anthropo-
morphisms. Despite this apparent sense of subjective im-
prisonment and its resulting pain, man continues in his 
persistent search for objective truth and reality. Von 
Huegel makes his position clear when he makes the following 
statement: 
For the more man feels, and suffers from feeling him-
self purely subjective, the more is it clear that he 
is not merely subjective~ he could never be conscious 
of the fact, if he were. 
c. Principles of Critical Realism 
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The principles of critical realism can be stated briefly. 
They are affirmed by von Huegel as his basic epistemological 
convictions concerning the operation of the transcendent 
order within man's fundamental experiences: (1) recognition 
1. Ibid. 
2. Von Huegel, Mystical Element of Religion, II, 338-339. 
of the existence of the object as independent of the per-
ceiving mind~ in the sense of the object's own integrity of 
content being unaltered by the act of apprehension and in 
the sense of its being operative upon~ but not as aspect 
of the mind; (2) admission of the presence of interpreted 
elements and of possible error in man's knowledge of the 
object. This fact~ however~ does not destroy the essential 
relevance of man's knowledge to the nature of the object. 
Von Huegel's own words clearly summarize these prin-
ciples. 
Everywhere such a Realism would assume or announce that 
' tinllght~ primarily and normally~ never stands alone~ and 
never is thought of thought~ but always thought of a 
reality distinct from this thinking of it; that the 
activity of the human mind and soul~ as known to us in 
this life, always more or less requires sense-stimulation, 
• • • that our knowledge is always an incomplete knowl-
edge yet a knowledge of reality--since the objects 
really reveal, in various degrees, their real nature. 1 
C. Summary 
Von Huegel's position as presented in this chapter may 
be summarized as follows: (1) The analytical method is the 
most inclusive and reliable approach to the study of philos-
ophy and religion. It begins with the facts~ with the given-
ness of external reality, rejecting any skeptical or sub-
jective methodology which denies man's contact with the 
1. Von Huegel~ Essays and Addresses, I, 189. 
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objective world. The requisite disposition to religious in-
quiry is the humble and selfless spirit. The criterion of 
religious truth in this inquiry is rich fruitfulness, the 
quest for the abundant life. (2) The most adequate theory 
of knowledge is critical realism. This position asserts 
the trans-subjective significance of the data of conscious-
ness. These data afford man a means for direct contact 
with the external world. The data also indicate the oper-
ation of an objective order which is not dependent upon 
the mind. (3) Three fundamental experiences of man testi-
fy to this transcendent operativeness of the objective 
order, namely, the experiences of sense perception, time, 
and creative activity. The qualitative nature of this ob-
jective order.:· apprehended by man in the feeling of contrast 
between the finite and the Infinite evident in these ex-
periences cannot be reduced to subjective states of man's 
mind or to illusory conjectures. This qualitative nature 
is grounded in the objective Reality which is the funda-
mental and persistent cause of all of man's activities. 
It is apparent from these conclusions that von Huegel 
insists upon an objective factor in religious experience 
which has its basis, in turn, in man's elementary experi-
ences. It will be interesting to notice von Huegel's 
references to the qualitative nature which is revealed in 
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these experiences as bei.ng an affirmation of the objectivity 
found in the specifically religious experience. The task is 
now to examine the validity of the religious experience as 
developed by von Huegel and to see in what way he establishes 
the tests for the truth of this experienc:e. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
VON HUEGEL'S INTERPRETATION OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 
A. Religious Experience 
1. Definitions 
Von Huegel's understanding of religious experience is 
directly related to his contention that throughout all of 
man's fundamental experiences there appears the activity 
of the transcendental operativeness of the objective order. 
This activity is what von Huegel calls the supernatural. 
The supernatural is that general~ dim and dumb religiosity 
--that more or less slumbering sense and need of the 
1 Abiding and the Eternal. It is the essential background 
out of which comes the articulated religious belief. 
Unless all the different departments of life and all 
the different levels of our activity and experience~ 
variously~ in some degree and way~ prepare~ imply~ 
contain~ or show spiritual realities and spiritual 
necessities as somehow the deepest facts and final 
crown and justification of life's entire movement 
and travail, Religion in general is untrue.2 
Religion would be an impossibility without the supernatural 
penetration of man's natural experiences. 
The supernatural found within the experience of man 
in the natural order is not to be identified with religion. 
1. Von Huegel~ Essays and Addresses~ I~ 66. 
2. Von Huegel, Eternal Life~ 258. 
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Convictions may be aroused by the activity of the super-
natural which are not religious. Such convictions may re-
sult in man's belief in a cosmic emotion or some other pan-
1 theistic feeling or outlook. They may be described as 
some form of dependence upon impersonal forces, or as 
factors involved in a subjective conjecture about reality. 
It is only when man's awareness of the supernatural leads 
him to articulated belief in some Superhuman Beings or 
Being that it may be called religious. 
Religion, according to von Huegel's normative defi-
nition, is evidential and trans-subjective, involving re-
lations with its ontologically real Object. 2 It is not 
to be reduced to subjective fancies, skeptical statements, 
or naive conjecture about the religious instinct of the 
human race. Religion is a sense of the Otherness, the 
distinct Reality, and the personal presence of God. A 
Supreme "Isness" is affirmed by religion in contrast to 
an ethical "oughtness"--a Reality as existent prior to and 
independent of the human subject's affirmation of It or 
Them.3 "Religion ••• has ever to do, not with human 
thoughts, but with Realities other and higher than man; not 
with the production of what ought to be, but with fear, 
pro pi ttat ion, love, adoration of what already is. n4 
1. Von Huegel, Essa~s and Addresses, II, 158. 2. Ibid., 157-
3. Von Huegel, Essays and Addresses, I, 23. 4. Ibid. 
--
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The primary characteristic of religion is its super-
humanity.1 This superhuman reference characterizes, in 
turn, a certain type of experience as being the specifically 
religious experience. Without this other-than-human refer-
ence, the religious experience would be void of the very 
heart of rel.igion. 2 Thus religious experience, according to 
von Huegel) is that particular type of experience which 
asserts as its cause the presence of the superhuman acting 
in direct r elationship to the human.3 
2. Normal Religious Experience 
There are two levels of human experience which afford 
evidence for the operation of the religious Object. The 
first level is the commonly shared dim experience of ob-
jects in space (experience of sensory perception), events 
in time (experience of the successiveness of time), and 
the volitional energizings (experience of creative activity) 
which testify to the objective independence of a vast and 
contrasting Other. At this level these experiences offer 
indirect clues to the nature of this contrasting Other, the 
religious Object. The second level is that of the specific 
religious experience which testifies to the relevance of 
man's knowledge of the religious Object. This experience 
1. Ibid., 24-25. 
3. Ibid. 
2. I b i d., 25. 
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affords the clear insight which alone makes adequate the 
indirect testimony of the first level. The dim apprehensio_n 
of this sense of contrast is dependent upon the specific 
religious experience for ~uation and 1nterpretation. 1 
The relationship of dependence between the two levels 
of human experience works both ways. The specific, concise, 
and articulated religious apprehension of the religious Ob-
ject is dependent upon the general and dim experience 
sensed in the more or le ss slumbering need of the Abiding 
2 
and the Et ernal. Without this indirect experience derived 
from the natural order, the religious articulation would be 
impossible. 
The universally human sense of the Infinite • • • ever 
springs up, as we know~ only in connection with the 
apprehension of finite things and these things are 
simultaneously felt as surrounded and fulfilled by and 
manifesting the Infinite.3 
It is the sense world which offers the basis for in-
sight into the nature of the religious Object. The ex-
periences of sensory perception, succession of time, and 
volitional and creative efforts result in a sense of in-
completeness, producing in man a feeling of his own contin-
gency in contrast to the normative challenge of the eternal. 
Out of this experience of contingency comes the religious 
experience of Perfect Reality, the Absolute, the All_-:-Inclustve, 
1. Ibid., 66. 2. Ibid. 
3. Von Huegel , "Experience and Transcendence" Dublin Review , 
G~Xlf{l906), 364. 
1 
the Simultaneous, the Utterly Satisfying. The experience 
of contingency and dissatisfaction derived from the natural 
order is, in turn, derived from the reality of the Con-
trasting Other which is prior to, the cause, and present 
throughout all of man's experiences. 2 The nature of this 
experience of contrast discloses not only the transcendent 
quality of the Contrasting Other, but it also reveals the 
relationship of likeness between Perfect Reality and man . 
If this likeness were not apparent within the experiences 
of man, he would forever remain; ignorant of his own con-
tingency. It is only the experience of the Contrasting 
Other as real and certain, as transcendent yet operating 
within the world of sensory perception, that arouses man 
out of the slumber of finitude into the awareness of his 
noblest and most inalienable characteristic--his dissatis-
faction with anything and with all things merely contingent 
3 
and f inite. When this sense of dissatisfaction is made 
articulate to its most sensitive degree, man has reached 
the level of religious experience. This level may be termed 
the normal religious experience. It does not contain the 
heightened ecstasy aosociated with the mystical apprehension 
of the religious Object. Without its normal activity, how-
ever, the mystical experience would be impossible and 
1. Von Huegel, Essays and Addresses, II, 208. 
2. Von Huegel, Eternal Life, 242. 3. Ibid., 243. 
165-
irrelevant to the world i n which the mystica.l apprehension 
occurs. 
3. The Mystical Experience 
The term mysticism includes so many types and degrees 
of experience that it is difficult to do full justice to 
the subject. Von Huegel has been criticized for his neg-
lect of the eastern type of oriental mysticism. 1 However, 
this self-imposed limitation has not diminished the im-
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portance of his study in this area. His one major work in 
mysticism, The Mystical Element of Religion, is still labeled 
"the best work on fw1yst ic ism in the English language. "2 
Mysticism, according to von Huegel, is not to be under-
stood in terms of the impersonal forces behind nature nor 
as an exclusive identification of man with God's nature. 
To identify mysticism with an exclusive and ineffable ex-
perience of man's oneness with God is to define the term 
in the most narrow sense. Von Huegel's concept of the ever-
present impingement of the world of the spiritual order upon 
the world of nature prevents a restrictive description which 
would label one experience mystical in contrast to other 
experiences. The essential relation between the world of 
the spiritual and the world of the natural is too intricate 
1. Steere, "Critical Realism in the Religious Philosophy of 
Baron F. von Huegel" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Har-
vard University, 1931), 251. 
2. EvelJll Underhill, Mysticism (London: Methuen, 1930), 498. 
to be explained in any prohibitive sense. 
Mysticism demands the most inclusive definition. It 
testifies to the ever-present nearness of the Divine Ob-
ject to the knower and to the possibility of intimate, 
first-hand, contact between the knower and the religious 
Object. Mysticism is 
the apprehension, admiration, and love of the in-
finite depth and riches of Reality--of this Reality 
no doubt present everywhere, yet in indefinitely 
various, mutually complementary and stimulative 
forms and degrees.l 
Von Huegel approaches mysticism, therefore, not from a 
strictly psychological study of various pathological states 
which resemble mysticism, nor from the normal analogues of 
mysticism in ordinary spiritual and mental life. He 
rather focuses attention on study of the experience (more 
or less clear and vivid) of God as distinct, self-conscious, 
personal Spirit. This is not to deny that all men possess 
mystical elements to some degree, 2 but it is to examine 
especially that experience of the religious Object which 
is found to be the steady, intense, life-governing factor 
in the life of the mystic. 
Baron von Huegel's specific study of the mystic St. 
Catherine of Genoa affords basic and now classical judg-
ments concerning Christian mysticism, which may aid a be-
liever in the development of his religious life or furnish 
1. Von Huegel, The Mystical Element of Religion, II, 319. 
2. Von Huegel, The Mystical Element of Religion, I, xii. 
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a student of mysticism with a point of view more compre-
hensive and circumspect than other studies now available. 1 
The study does not reduce mysticism to an acceptable lowest 
common denominator nor does it offer the uncritical a-
d9ption of any one variety of mysticism exactly as it is 
presented. It rather attempts to offer an historical and 
critical study of a specific mystical personality, with 
all the difficulties, failures, and triumphs involved in 
the mystical life. 
The particular choice of St. Catherine of Genoa re-
sulted from von Huegel's desire to confront the diffi-
culties which are apparent in mystical life. By means of 
examining and evaluating the particular limits and defects 
found within one mystical life, von Huegel is able to give 
a richer articulation and wider applicability to the study 
of the character, necessity, limits, dangers, and helpful-
ness of the mystical element of religion. By this his-
torical and critical approach, von Huegel presents his 
evaluation and conclusions concerning mysticism in general. 
4. The Mystical Mode of Apprehension 
a. Its Nature 
The mystical mode of apprehending Reality, von Huegel 
maintains, is not to be understood as a unique faculty of 
1. Dakin, Von Huegel and the Supernatural, 125. 
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man which has no relation to his other faculties. The 
mystical experience does not constitute such an entirely 
separate, completely self-supported kind of human experi-
ence.1 All the errors of an exclusive type of mysticism 
proceed precisely from this false assumption. Von Huegel, 
however, does not deny that there is no difference in the 
amount and kind of the recollective, intuitive, deeply 
emotional element possessed by persons, nor does he mean 
to suggest that there are no congenital distinctions among 
persons. Lives are strikingly divergent in relation to 
their receptivity to religious influences. Von Huegel does 
assert that there is in even the most purely contingent-
seeming soul some sense and experience of the Infinite--
however slight, implicit, or intermittent--which is evi-
denced by at least a slight dissatisfaction with the 
finite. 1 In addition, von Huegel claims that even the 
most exclusively mystical-seeming soul always depends for 
the fullness and healthiness cf its most purely mystical 
experience upon its past and present contacts with the 
contingent, temporal, and spatial, as well as upon the 
social facts and elements of its environment.2 
Von Huegel describes the mystical mode of apprehending 
Reality as that activity which occurs at the deepest level 
1. Ibid. 2. Ibid., 284. 
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of man's whole personality. At this level, the cognitive 
and volitional faculties are one. 
It is not alone in the volitional but in this inter-
pretative center that lies back of both the external 
apparatus and discursive cognitive functions that von 
Huegel found the mystical experience to be centered.l 
No specific term is given by von Huegel for this deep-level 
c .ognitive energization which is initiated by the religious 
Object in the event of the mystical apprehension. 2 Although 
the nature of this process is not explained in any system-
atic sense, the mood resulting from the mystical appre-
hension is apparent. At this crucial point of union be-
tween deep thought and deep emotion, the apprehending mood 
is one of receptivity and attention rather than critical 
analysis. This mood, however, does not reduce the experi-
ence of mystical apprehension to a lesser degree of value 
than the mood of discursive knowledge. The values derived 
from the two experiences are different. Nevertheless, both 
types of apprehension c.ontribute to the total understanding 
of the nature of reality. 
The essential marks of the mystical experience are the 
intense energizings of the deep levels of man's personality. 
These energizings center upon the will and imagination. It 
is at this point that a new intensification and concentration 
1. Steere, "Critical Realism in the Religious Philosophy of 
Baron F. von Huegel" {un{'ublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Harvard University, 1931), 218. · 
2 • Ibid • , 217. 
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of the various states of mind and will is effected by the 
supporting Divine Action within the mystical experience. 
This does not mean that Divine Action is alone sufficient. 
The increasingly deeper apprehension of God comes only to 
those who have built up their sensitivity to the divine 
Nature by the most scrupulous cultivation of the positive 
1 dispositions the will can exert. It is for this reason 
that von Huegel stresses the volitional aspect of man's 
personality as the essential prerequisite for apprehending 
the religious Object. Without the humble and continual 
exercise of the human will, mystical apprehension would 
be impossible. 
This presents an interesting paradox. As important 
and necessary as this human volitional activity may be, 
still the knowledge acquired from the mystical apprehension 
cannot be reduced to that activity.· The divine Action 
initiates the human volitional activity. It is only in 
reaction to this divine stimulation that man can respond 
to God. R~ligious apprehension is not a simple process; 
it involves fine and difficult distinctions between Divine 
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Action and human activity. It is not an isolated apprehension 
1. Von Huegel uses the terms "imagination," "psychic moods," 
"interpretative function," "emotive dispositions" in 
describing this energization. However, Steere observes 
that the lack of systematic inquiry into these terms is 
a glaring defect in von Huegel's thought. See Steere, 
.Q.E.· cit., 217. 
which occurs by means of a unique faculty within man's per-
sonality, nor is it an experience which is superimposed 
upon man without his volitional and sensitively disciplined 
activity. Mystical apprehension is rather an interaction 
between the Divine Spirit and man's response which issues 
from the deepest level of man's personality where all his 
faculties are united for this divine reception. 
b. Its Limitations 
Von Huegel makes no special claim of infallibility 
for the mystical mode of apprehending reality. The es-
sential attitude of the mystic should not be one of abso-
lute certainty but one of great humility and respect for 
the religious Object, recognizing that there is always a 
peripheral range where error is especially prone to in-
trude. The mystic should not make a demand for special 
consideration and exemption from the tests of validity and 
objectivity. He can only insist upon methods of procedure, 
expectations of resulting experiences, and tests of that 
experience which are suitable to his particular experi-
mental field. Experimental methodologies and tests are 
not to be taken from some largely alien subject-matter and 
applied to the mystical mode of apprehension. 1 
The mystical apprehension is necessarily complicated 
1. Von Huegel, _ Mystical Element of Religion, II, 396. 
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in nature. 
Religion is the deepest and most inclusive of all the 
soul's energizings and experiences, and hence all its 
constituents reveal a difference, at least in amount 
and degree, when compared with the corresponding con-
stituents of the more superficial and more partial 
act i vities of the soul.l 
The very intensity of the energizing which the religious 
Object effects in the subject makes it difficult to sepa-
rate the subjective and objective factors involved in the 
mys tical apprehension. For this reason this particular 
mode of apprehension demands a more inclusive and inter-
pretative consideration than the study of mathematics or 
natural science. 
The mystical apprehension cannot claim an exclusive 
position in religion. It is, according to von Huegel, 
only one source of the apprehension of God; it is on ly one 
aspect of religion. If the mystical apprehension were to 
assert an absolute and restrictive priority, religion would 
be void of the moral, aesthetic, and rationa l insigh t s . 
Mysticism would never be the whole of religion; it 
would become a dangerous e r ror the very moment it 
claimed to be this whole.2 
As only one aspect of the religious life, mysticism 
needs to be tested and supplemented by the philosophic a l, 
institutional, historical, social, and ordinary experiences 
1. Ibid., 115-116. 
2. Von Huegel, The Reality of God, 91. 
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of life. To be sure, mystical apprehension involves the 
deepest sense of God's presence in its moments of ecstasy . 
However, the experience of ecstasy does not attain rapture 
in isolation. It requires the harmonization of all the 
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faculties of man in addition to the guidance and conditioning 
of religious institutions. The ideal of mysticism is not to 
separate and almost to personify the different faculties - -
the intellect, will, and feeling--but it is to unify man's 
personality so that the eye may be single and the whole body 
:full of light. 1 
The objection has been raised against the mode of 
mystical apprehension for dealing only with t he emotional 
and volitional elements of personality while making no con-
tributions to the cognitive aspect of religion. Von Huegel 
admits this limitation, acknowledging the fact that the 
critical functions of the mind are largely unused in the 
mystical apprehension. This type of apprehension very often 
implies that the cognitive functions of the mind have been 
abated. However, it is certainly evident that the dis-
cursive aspect of the mind--acts that separate, divide, 
discern multiplicity, discriminate between various elements--
is operating with the mystical apprehension. There is 
always a certain cognitive element present. Nevertheless, 
1. William Inge, Christian Mysticism (London: Methuen and 
Company, 1932), 21. 
it is true that the emphasis of the mystic is upon the 
emotional and volitional aspects and not on the con-
ceptual and communicable functions of the mind. 
Von Huegel answers this objection by pointing out 
again that the mystical mode of apprehension occurs on 
the deepest level of man's whole personality, where all 
of his faculties are united for the reception of the re-
ligious Object. Its activity extends beyond the cognitive 
level and results in a mood of receptivity and attention 
rather than a mood of critical analysis. The value of the 
mystical mode of apprehension cannot be determined solely 
by its intellectual contributions. The validity of its 
apprehensions demands other tests. 
5. The Validity of the Mystical Experience 
a. Three Objections 
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Three major objections are raised against the validity 
of the mystical experience: the presence of psycho-physical 
disturbances, the neglect of sensory control, and the 
absence of cognitive insights. It is necessary to present 
these criticisms along with von Huegel's response before 
citing his own case for the validity of the mystical experi-
ence. 
1. Objections have been raised against the mystical 
experience because of the psycho-physical disturbances 
which accompany the moments of ecstasy associated with this 
type of experience. These disturbances, the critics argue, 
not only r aise doubts concerning the value of the experi-
ence, but also offer no evidence for the validity of the 
convictions stemming from these experiences. Von Huegel 
finds such objections justified if they are concerned with 
the mystics who consider the occurrence of ecstasy the end 
and not the means of thier experiences. The true mystic 
judges the validity of his mystical apprehension not by the 
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degree of ecstasy attained but by other concomitants; namely, 
the fruits of physical, mental, moral, and spiritual values 
to himself and to the rest of society. The value is thus 
not measured by antecedent physical and neural cost but by 
the central spiritual richness and fruitfulness. 1 
The problem of ecstasy and its tendency to become an 
end and not a means of the mystical experience needs to be 
treated individually. A study of a particular mystic who 
is inclined to extreme ecstasy requires a final judgment 
that is related to the contribution of his total life rather 
than to the one phase of ecstasy. The immediate decision 
regarding the value of these experiences must be made by 
the mystic himself. If life becomes empty and meaningless 
without this type of experience, then the dangers of pro-
moting its conditions are justifiable.2 The judgments of 
1. Von Huegel, Mystical Element of Religion, II, 42. 
2. Ibid., 59. 
the religious institution and history will follow and con-
firm or deny the existential decision of the mystic. In 
view of this, the validity of the mystical experience is 
not denied nor established by the occurrence of psycho-
physical disturbances. 
ii. Another criticism of the claim which the mystic 
makes for the validity of his mystical experience concerns 
the absence of sensory control. Without reference to sen-
sory data, these critics content, mystical apprehension 
becomes undisciplined speculation irrelevant to the actual 
world of experience. The data of the sense world are the 
fundamental source of man's knowledge. Any experience, 
including the mystical encounter, must ultimately be de-
rived from these data in order to claim validity. 
17-7 
Von Huegel acknowledges that reference to sensory data 
is an important test of the validity of mystical appre-
hension. He asserts, however, that the final test of the 
mystical experience is not derived from the intimate inter-
connection of its apprehension with the normal perceptual 
process. This interconnection is not a primary relation. 
The organs of sense are not the direct means of apprehending 
supernatural Reality. They are, nevertheless, the necessary 
background for man's experience of the Divine Spirit oper-
1 
ating within the natural world and within man himself. 
1. Ibid., 282-283. 
1. Ibid. 
Without the activity of sensory perception there would be 
no occasion for man's apprehension of things contingent 
and finite which, in turn, produces a keen sense of con-
trast within man between the finite and the Infinite. 2 
The absence of a primary relation between sensory per-
ception and mystical apprehension affords no final dis-
proof of the validity of the mystical experience. Sensory 
control is an additional but not final criterion. 
The activity of sensory perception operates upon the 
essential level of immediate surface relationships between 
subject and object. This level entails all the faculties 
of man as he reacts to the givenness of the objective 
world. The activity of the mystical apprehension operates 
upon a deeper level where all the faculties of man are 
united for the stimulation and reception of the Divine 
Action. The mood of this apprehension which may apprehend 
the religious Object is not likely to be identical with 
that which apprehends sensory relationships or grasps the 
relation between angles of a rig~angled triang~ To be 
sure, it is dependent upon its sensory control but it is 
not finally accountable to the perceptual level for its 
validity. 
The value derived from the perceptual level by the 
deeper level of mystical apprehension is illustrated by its 
1. Ibid. 
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use of the selfless scientific study of the thing-world. 
Through the use of the irreplaceable discipline coming 
from the close external observation and severe abstract 
generalization of science, the religious apprehension 
comes to realize ~ deepening of the spirit and a growth 
2 in awareness of humility and creatureliness. This con-
tact with the sensory world develops a finer appreciation 
of religious Things--the profoundly concrete Sacraments 
and the abstract Doctrines of the religious community. 3 
Thus the scientific approach to the world of sense be-
comes a means of purification and heightening of back-
ground or mood of apprehension by which man may most 
adequately sense the religious Object. 4 
In paradoxical fashion, however, there comes with the 
awareness of the partial dependence of the mystical appre-
hension upon the sensory world a renewed belief within the 
mystic that the sensory world and the mental processes re-
lated to it can never be identified with the realities of 
the super-temporal order.5 There is, indeed, a relation 
and analogical likeness to the realities of the mystical 
apprehension, for these sensory impressions are made 
possible by the activity of the Divine Spirit within the 
1. Ibid., 374-375· 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 
4. Steere, Q£• cit., 234. 
5. Von Huegel, Mystical Element of Religion, II, 50. 
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temporal order. Nevertheless, the essential distinction 
always remains, not only between the sensory and the 
mystical apprehension but also between the mystic's appre-
hension of the Divine Spirit and the Divine Spirit itself.1 
The essential distinction between the level of sensory 
perception and the level of mystical apprehension prevents 
the use of identical tests for the validity of the experi-
ence. The criteria of clarity and conciseness employed on 
the scientific level cannot be applied to the mystical ex-
perience. Reality is too complex to be adaptable to such 
criteria. "Reality is ever in part obscure and proves its 
presence chiefly by its indefinite fruitfulness and power 
to interpret what otherwise would remain ent~y without 
2 
meaning." It is this unexpected penetration of meaning 
derived from man's sense of the non-contingent 'Within the 
temporal order which is felt to be within and yet tran~ ·· 
scendent of the anthropomorphic level of sensory per-
ception that forever defies clear and concise definition. 
iii. The final major criticism of the claim for the 
validity of mystical experience deals with the absence of 
cognitive insights. This neglect of communicable knowl-
edge or of reflex consciousness on the part of the appre-
bending subject has caused the critics of mysticism to 
1. Von Huegel, Eternal Life, 383. 
2. Von Huegel, "Experience and Transcendence," Dublin 
Review, ~lif{l9Q6l, 377• 
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label the experience merely subjective and emotional. 
They assert that no real contribution has been made to 
knowledge of spiritual reality. 
Von Huegel confronts this criticism throughout his 
study on mysticism. At one point he astutely ·indicates 
that the experience of absorption and lack of conscious 
awareness is not unique with the mystical experience. 
Sensory perception also includes the experience of ab-
sorption and self-oblivion. Many time sensory impressions 
are being received by the subject who, occupied with other 
factors, becomes incapable of attending to and clearly 
l perceiving these impressions. These under-impressions 
received from the sensory world can only be judged by 
their after-effects and not from the direct evidence of 
an immediate impression and reaction. So it ~· is with the 
over-impressions .which man receives from the mystical 
apprehension of the religious Object. Their actual oc-
curPence and fruitfulness can be judged only by their 
after-effects, which indicate that the soul has been 
strengthened and refeshed in order to love, work, and 
suffer for God and man beyond the capability of the soul's 
2 previous level. In view of this evidence, the rnystlcal 
experience does not have to furnish immediate cognitive 
1. Von Huegel, Mystlcal Element of Religion, II, 265-266. 
2. Ibid., 266. 
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insights into the nature of reality in order to prove its 
worth. Its value may be derived from an over-impression 
of the Divine Spirit which strengthens but does not clarify 
the mystic's apprehension of the Divine Spirit. 
It is important to note again von Huegel's concept of 
the role of conceptual thought in order to understand its 
part in the mystical apprehension. Briefly, kn"Owledge in-
volves the reality of both subject and object. This means 
that the true priority of knowledge lies with the total 
subjective-objective interaction and resultant and not 
1 
with one of these constituents over the other. All knowl-
edge, therefore, entails the subjec.tive reaction of the 
experient and the objective givenness of reality. The 
objective givenness involved in the knowing process gives 
to knowledge a trans-subjective source whose integrity 
(objectivity) cannot be affected by the knowing relation. 2 
Nevertheless, the integrity of the knowing process works 
both ways; the subjective element remains, preventing an 
absolute identification of the subject and object.3 The 
interpretative element is always present. This is evident 
in the trial and error continually associated with man's 
intellectual progress. All cognitive processes, including 
the mystical apprehension, fall short of adequacy to the 
1. Ibid., 114. 
2. Von Huegel, Essays and Addresses, I, 51. 
3. Von Huegel, The Mystical Element of Religion, II, 50. 
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task of revealing the nature of reality. Cognition is re-
garded by von Huegel as .an instrumental means rather than 
an intrinsic end for the attainment of insights into ulti-
mate reality. 
The cognitive element found within the mystical appre-
hension of the religious Object offers a dual testimony. 
It indicates the inadequacy of all knowledge, and yet wit-
nesses in this sense of inadequacy to a degree of relevance 
between the cognitive process and ultimate. reality. No 
matter how ineffable the mystical experience may be, there 
is a cognitive confirmation that the religious Object ts 
love rather than hate, benevolent rather than hostile, 
1 
merciful rather than avenging. In this sense, the cog-
nitive aspect involved in the mystical experience is rele-
vant to the reality affirmed, although it may be and most 
often is inadequate. 
The cognitive aspect of man's life is not the ulti-
®~goal of absolute value. Knowledge begins in the middle 
of things and does not have the distinction of primitive 
purity or unqualified isolation. It is affected by all 
the other faculties of man's personality. Knowledge, in-
cluding religious apprehensions and convictions, will ever 
necessarily be mixed up with considerable inadequacy due 
1. Douglas Steere, "The Meaning of Mysticism within 
Christianity," Religion in Life, XXti\'1953); ~·525. 
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1 
to the presence of evil and positive error. Man-1 s knowl-
edge of the religious Object is thereby not a clear-cut 
and exhaustive description but ever remains a luminous 
center of conviction surrounded by an increasingly opaque 
periphery. 2 It is therefore essential to notice that von 
Huegel does not consider cognitive enlightenment as the 
only end of the mystical experience. Additional aspects 
being of equal, if not greater, importance are "new combi-
nations and depths of emotion, and an indefinite expansion 
and heroic Gle:fermination of the will." 3 These qualities 
concerned with the emotional and volitional faculties of 
man are as essential in establishing the importance of the 
mystical experience as are the cognitive insights. In 
fact, the strengthening and stimulating of the emotive 
and volitional faculties receive priority over the cogni-
tive aspect in this ultimate experience of the mystical 
life. 
If science and philosophy can gain anything from it 
~stical experien£i7, they are welcome, but that is 
not the reason of its being. If while crossing a 
ferry you can catch a fish, you are a lucky man, 
but that does not make the fer~yboat a fishing boat, 
nor should you abuse the f~rryman if he does not 
make fishing his business. 
1. Von Huegel, Eternal Life, 239. 
2. Steere, ·"critical Realism in the Religious Philosophy 
of Baron F. von Huegel" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Harvard University, 1931), 272. 
3. Von Huegel, Mystical Element of Religion, II, 30. 
4. R. Tagore, ~Reminiscences (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1917), 221. 
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b. Five Tests 
The validity of the mystical experience is judged, 
according to von Huegel, by five tests. The first two 
tests are inadequate for their confirmation is often 
difficult to attain. The last three tests are essential. 
However, no one test can be taken as the final appraisal 
of mystical experience. They must be taken together in 
order for the validity of mysticism to be discerned. 
The first test deals with the experience of the in-
dividual mystic. It examines the experiences of the mystic 
subsequent to his mystical experience in order to see 
whether they confirm the meaning claimed by the mystic for 
his special experience. This test is not a final one. The 
unusual mystical experience is not only difficult to repeat, 
but it is also a private encounter which the mystic seldom 
subjects to the investigation of his other experiences. 
The second test is concerned with the testimony of 
other witnesses who report experiences of si.milar meaning 
under like circumstances. This test gains in importance as 
additional witnesses come from various times and countries. 
The test, however, is not conclusive for often contradictions 
are as frequent as confirmations. 
The third test of the mystical experience's validity 
is centered upon how this experience illuminates the life 
of the mystic with fresh and vital spiritual insights. It 
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is true that these insights may be closely connected with 
the religious tradition out of which the mystic is nourished 
from birth to death. Nevertheless, individual mystical ex-
periences are not mere repetitions of the past religious 
tradition. They are unique experiences reaching down into 
the deeper level of man's experiences, where all his facul-
ties are united in an attentive and receptive attitude. 
Such experiences offer to mankind new insights into the life 
of the spirit. They so unify arip concentrate all of the 
cognitive, volitional, and imaginative powers as to heighten 
greatly their selective capacity, resulting in fresh, cre-
ative moral and spiritual insights. 1 
These fresh and creative insights may not be labeled 
strictly cognitive in nature, but they do testify to the 
. trans-subjective Reality apprehended by man's deeper ex-
periences, which bring light, order, and fruitfulness in 
the most unexpected ways and into the most remote places 
of man ' s life and work.2 This test of the validity of the 
mystical apprehension, therefore, includes the depth of 
penetration, energization, and illumination which the ex-
perience provokes in a personality. The results of the 
mystical experience are not tested immediately but by the 
continuing influence it exerts throughout man ''' s life. 
1. Steere, 2£• cit., 194 . 
2. Von Huegel, Essays and Addresses, I , 52. 
The pragmatic test is applied to the life of the mystic. 
If the results are a restoration of freshness and a re-
siliency to the ex~erient plus the energizing of the will 
to new and higher levels of integrated activity, then the 
evidence is available for the pragmatic assertion of the 
objectivity in the mystical apprehension. 
The pragmatic test of fruitfulness is not the final 
criterion of mystical experience. To stop with the practi-
cal results derived from it is not sufficient to establish 
its validity. The question still remains as to the spirit-
ual objectivity of the source. In view of this, additional 
testimony is needed as to the reality of the Object appre-
hended by the mystic. This testimony is given not only by 
the witness of the mystical experience, but by the witness 
of all experiences which afford evidence of the presence of 
a dim, unexhausted, contrasting Other. All experiences 
thereby successfully corroborate the clear, vivid, appre-
hension of this Other experienced by the mystic. A ne-
cessity resulting from the mystical apprehension is to draw 
this dim sense of the normative Other felt within all ex-
perience into the foreground so that man may recognize the 
meaning of its presence. The content of religion, es-
pecially of the mystical experience, makes these intimations 
clear by presenting to all the areas of man's experience the 
facts of its vivid and concrete apprehension of the religious 
Object. 1 Such a . task of clarification by the religiously 
awakened person would be impossible and would : make no 
appeal to men unless the reality of the religious Object 
was already present, no matter how dimly, within all the 
2 
experiences of men. 
The fifth~st of the validity of the mystical experi-
ence is now apparent in its illumination of other fields 
of experience beyond itself, thereby correcting its 
tendency toward legalism. Its testimony to the accessi-
bility of the source of good compels morality to examine 
again the deepest levels of man's own spirit. The mystical 
experience demands that philosophy go beyond an account of 
reality which satisfies only the claims and evidences of 
the physical and biological sciences. The mystical appre-
hension protests against scientific accounts of reality 
which drop qualitative elements for the sake of quanti-
tative terms. It protests against absorption in the thing-
element.3 The religious experience of the mystic does not 
intend to alter the scientific method, but it does attempt 
to give new perspective to scientific views of the uni-
verse. In addition, it desires to destroy the smug neat-
ness of some scientific conclusions in order to promote a 
more inclusive account of both the results of science and 
1. Von Huegel, Eternal Life, 382. 
2. Von Huegel, Mystical Element of Religion, II, 331, 333. 
3. Ibid., 374, 383. 
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the content of the mystical experience. 1 Mystical experi-
ence affor>ds principles to illumine the materials of all 
experience in order to set them in place in a universe 
where spiritual factors are in operation behind all of the 
phenomenal evidences. The obligation is placed upon every 
area of knowledge to consider the evidence of the mystical 
experience for an inclusive account of the nature of realizy. 
To summarize the essential tests employed in ascer-
taining the validity of the mystical apprehension, con-
sideration is given by von Huegel to the pragmatic results 
of fruitfulness which are evident in the life of the mystic, 
the testimony of all experience to the presence of a vague, 
normative Other which is illuminated by the content of the 
mystical experience, and finally to the illumination of 
other areas of experience by the mystical experience. It 
is this last test which points to that trans-subjective 
reality operating within all of life that is now articulatoo 
to its fullest extent by the religious apprehension. This 
test goes beyond any pragmatic consideration and rests its 
case upon the undeniable reality of the Spiritual Order. 
B. Specific Problems 
It will be helpful to discuss some specific problems 
relevant to von Huegel's concept of religious experience in 
1. Von Huegel, Mystical Element of Religion, I, 45. 
order to have a deeper appreciation of his position. 
These considerations will include a brief discussion of 
mysticism and pantheism, exclusive and inclusive mysticism, 
1 
and the nature of God. 
1. Mysticism and Pant heism 
Mysticism and pantheism a r e not unreaated. Both stress 
the need for unity, the stric.t . call to abandon all self-
centeredness, and the final demand for the death of the 
self. In this process the self is to be rejected for the 
sake of an enlargment which draws wider circles including 
other selves and the universe. There is also a peculiarity 
about the pantheistic mode of thought which approximates 
the mystical habit of mind. This peculiarity is centered 
upon the absorption with the simultaneous and eternal 
aspects rather than the successive and temporal qualities 
2 
of experience. These affinities have resulted in a close 
if not dangerous association between mysticism and pan-
theism. Von Huegel finds it necessary, therefore, not only 
to acknowledge the service rendered by pantheism to mysti-
cism3 but to clarify the permanent distinction which exists 
between them. 
The understanding of the essential distinctions between 
1. All of these topics are worth much more investigation 
than can be given in the present dissertation. 
2. Von Huegel, Mystical Element of Religion, II, 328-329. 
3. Ibid., 329-334. 
mysticism and pantheism is essential to the basic con-
victions underlying the mystical experience. The unity 
of the Christian experience is not simply a final reso-
lution of human spiritual consciousness and personality 
back into a morally indifferent All. It is rather an ex-
perience which becomes a means and passage for the soul 
to advance from the worthless self-entrenchment within a 
merely psycho-physical apartness and lust to live into the 
level of spiritual devotedness, an incorporation as one 
necessary subject into the Kingdom of Souls. 1 This unity 
is not a mechanical-physical-determinist extension or an 
automatic, unconscious emanation. It is a voluntary out-
going and a communication of the self with the supreme 
self-conscious Spirit, God. 2 
The relationship between man and God within the re-
ligious experience of unity is not simply a positive en-
actment of God. It is expressive in its degree and mode 
of God's intrinsic moral nature. God's Infinity "is not 
the negation of the relatively independent life of His 
creatures, but the very reason and source of their freedom."3 
There remain within the Christian experience of God two 
centers of consciousness: the selfhood of God and man. 
This is the necessary condition for the experience of 
1. Ibid., 334. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid., 335. 
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worship; the distinction between the relatively insignifi-
cant worshipper and the absolutely real, transcendent, all-
, 
perfect Object of Adoration. 1 
The pantheistic tendencies of some mystical affir-
mations are viewed by von Huegel as utterances derived from 
the enthusiastic awareness of God's presence in the soul. 
It is the immediate longing for the total presence of God 
within the mystic that has resulted in pantheistic state-
ments that do not philosophically separate the desire from 
2 
the Desired, the hunger from the Food. There is no clear 
affirmation made by the mystic that the desire and the 
hunger do not cause but are themselves preceded and caused 
by their Object. 
It is the over-vivid perception of this real dynamism, 
rather than any a priori theory of static substances 
and identities--which certainly in many cases, has 
produced the appearance of Pantheism.3 
Pantheism fails to account for the reality of sin 
felt so keenly within Christian mysticism. The experience 
of sin and individual suffering cannot be explained in 
terms of final selfless absorption. It requires the candid 
confrontation experienced within the Christian life to over-
come evil and transmute suffering into a deeper faith and 
love.4 This heroic and transforming element is totally 
1. Von Huegel, Essays and Addresses, II, 154. 
2. Von Huegel, Mystical Element of Religion, II, 336. 
3. Ibid. 
4 .. Von Huegel, The Reality of God, 65-68. 
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lacking in the pantheistic understanding of man's life. 
Such essential distinctions prevent von Huegel from 
accepting pantheism. He cannot accept the pantheistic 
attractions of keeping alive the dim sense of God~ empha-
sizing God's immanence and uniquity~ and of ~llustrating 
the value of deterministic science and impartial law in 
awakening the petty and self-centered person~ 1 without 
the vital qualifications (the sense of sin, the her.oic 
and transforming life) of the Christian religious experi-
ence. 
2. Exclusive and Inclusive Mysticism 
In discussing the meaning of the term mysticism, von 
Huegel wishes that the English language afforded two terms, 
like the German words Mystik and Mystizismus, for indicating 
the relative place of emotion in the constitution of the 
religious life. 2 The alternative choice for von Huegel is 
to use three terms: "mysticism," covering both the right 
and . wrong use of feelipg in religion; "true" or "in-
clusive mysticism," denoting the proper use of feeling; 
·and "pseudo-" or "exclusive mysticism" for representing 
the misuse of the emotional element in religion. 
The one-sidedness of exclusive mysticism in its 
emphasis upon the emotional element of religion, while 
1. Von Huegel, Mystical Element of Religion, II, 325-332. 
2. Ibid., 291. 
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excluding the institutional and intellectual elements es-
sential to the vrhole religiou s life, is apparent to von 
Huegel~ This one-sidedness appears in its tendency to 
over-emphasi ze the eternal at the expense of the tem poral; 
to exalt the ingoing , r ecollective, passive, other-vmrldly 
attitude to the detriment of the practical; social, active 
and this-1·mrld ly movement; and to look so steadily into the 
skies to the supernatural action of God as to fail to see 
the reality, the necessity, and the wort~- o~ nature and 
human efforts~ Exclusive mysticism needs to be corrected 
by close contact 1·vi th other objects and with the means of 
experi en ce;. 
Only in the shoclr: bet"t;·reen simply finite-seeming mind 
and simply finite-seeming ~act, like cold steel striking 
against cold flint, does the latent fil~e; the affinity 
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to the Inf inite of all true life, spring forth for a 
moment; only in the patient pressure applied by the mind 
to these dusty looking facts, as i.vhen our hands press an 
apparently empty s ponge, are the hidden -vraters of life 
-v.rrung from the seeming ly arid g ivenness of the contingent~ 
Inclus ive mysticism has a place f'or the ingredients of 
the c m1tingent ·world~ It safeguards its ovm health by 
continual reference to the institutio11al and intellectual 
elements of religion. 
The stress upon the institutional, the social, and the 
commandment, 11 Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," 
tends to check the solus ~um solo tenden cy inherent in 
pure exclu.s ive mysticism. 
1~ Von Huegel, "Experience and Transcen d.ence, 11 Dublin Review, 
CXXXVIII(l906), 377-378. 
2;. Dald.n, YQ!l Huegel and ~ SUpernatura1, 155;. 
Inclusive mysticism's stress is on the inevitable, 
mutual necessity and interaction among the three elements 
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of religion and the three corresponding forces of the human 
soul. The institutional, rational, and experimental-mystical 
elements of religion and the corresponding sensational, in-
tellectual, and volitional forces of the soul are indispen-
sable to one another and to religion as a whole. It is ex-
tremely difficult to maintain the correct balance among 
these elements and forces. The problem of controlling one 
element and its corresponding force has appeared throughout 
the historical account of man, illustrating first the ele-
ment-1 s corrective dominance and then its dominant weakness .1 
Exclusive mysticism is only one illustration of this occur-
rence. Its only corrective is that most difficult of ac-
complishments--inclusive mysticism, a type of mysticism 
which brings into harmony the elements and soul-forces of 
the religious life. 
3. The Nature of God 
Von Huegel's total approach to religion indicates that 
the nature of God is apprehended by man's normal faculties 
of knowledge when these are properly directed to that end 
and suitably trained and assisted by divine grace. God's 
nature is not apprehended solely by means of intuition, 
1. Von Huegel, Mystical Element of Religion, II, 387-396. 
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nor is it grasped by some unique mystical faculty. A ma-
tured concept of God involves a keen sense of the objective, 
given, full reality ofGod which is discerned by the normal 
cognitive faculties of man. This givenness of God eliminates 
neither the intuitional nor the inferential methods of knowing. 
It involves no interruption of man's ordinary faculties but 
it does often involve a willful neglect by man. 
a. Transcendence and Immanence 
Man's awareness of the givenness of God and yet his 
willful neglect illustrates one of the primary factors 
which indicate the transcendent and immanent nature of God. 
His immanent presence is within His creation stimulating 
man to the awareness of Divine Action. At the same time, 
God's transcendent nature is revealed in the freedom He 
bestows upon man in the finite choice or neglect of this 
Presence. God's nature extends into and beyond His creation. 
His immanence and transcendence operate simultaneously. 
The concepts of transcendence and immanence are inter-
penetrative and complementary. They are not mutually ex-
clusive concepts. Worship would be . impossible without 
enough likeness between worshipper and God to make per-
sonal communion possible. 1 It would also be impossible if 
the likeness were one of identity resulting in a pantheistic 
1. Von Huegel, Eternal Life, 366-367. 
rather than a panentheistic effect. 1 Immanence and tran-
scendence must be mutually interrelated in the religious 
life. It is only when they are "taken and working thus 
together, that they give to the soul a height without in-
flation, and a concrete particularity without pettiness."2 
Von Huegel disagrees with S~ren Kierkegaard 1 s empha-
sis upon God's transcendence to the neglect of His imma-
nence.3 To stress the qualitative, absolute difference 
between God and man is to go beyond the transcendent ele-
ment of God's nature into an absolutistic conception which 
has no : relation or explanation of creation. The "deep 
solitary Dane's theory of transcendence overlooks the Chris-
tian conception of God's utterly prevenient, pure ecstatic 
love of man, His ceaseless overflowing into creation."4 
The transcendence of God does not negate the essential 
likeness between God and man. It rather establishes a 
similarity sensed by man's religious apprehension which 
finds the Infinite to be his eternal home. The eternal 
distinction remains between the Infinite and the finite 
along with the eternal similarity. 
Von Huegel insists that the infinite and eternal God 
is continually .present in the finite and the contingent, 
1. Von Huegel, Mystical Element of Religion, II, 325. 
2. Von Huegel, Eternal Life, 359. 3. Ibid., 260-262. 
4. Dakin, Von Huegel and the Supernatural, 199. 
in all the departments of life, in institutions, sacraments, 
body, matter, and, above all, in the Incarnation. 1 This is 
indeed evident in his conviction concerning the operation 
of the transcendent order within the natural order. All 
areas of experience witness to the immanent and yet tran-
scendent nature of the Infinite. 
Religious experience is the most clearly articulated 
apprehension of God as both immanent and transcendent. The 
religious apprehension leaves the human spirit with a thirst 
for the continued presence of the Divine Spirit but also 
with a penetrating and partial satisfaction of this thirst. 
If one were to take • • • clear-cut Immanentism as final 
and complete, that noblest half of the religious experi-
ence of tip-toe expectation, of unfulfilled aspiration, 
of sense of a Divine Life, of which our own but touches 
the outskirts, would have no place.2 
b. The Personality of God 
V·on Huegel maintains that God is personal in nature. 
He rejects the charge of anthropomorphism and its re-
sulting limitations when applied to the Infinite. To 
classify anything personal as rank anthropomorphism while 
accepting such concepts as thought, love, law, and sub-
stance as being above the anthropomorphic condemnation is, 
according to von Huegel, an illogical conclusion. All 
1. Von Huegel, Essays and Addresses, I, 85-86. 
2. Ibid., 50. 
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concepts knowable to man have the specific characteristics 
of human thought which formulates them. 1 
Natural science and philosophy do not fully discover 
the Personal God. Natural science is not concerned with 
ultimate questions; and philosophy, in its endeavor to bring 
to man certain more-than-human orders or laws, fails to under-
stand fully the Orderer.2 Von Huegel maintains that there 
is nothing intrinsically unreasonable in thinking of the 
ultimate Cause, Ground and End of the world as "certainly 
not less than, as somehow not all unlike, what we know our 
own self-conscious mind, feeling and will to be." 3 
The necessary condition involved in this personalistic 
conviction regarding God is the distinction sensed within 
man between himself and God. This is realized especially 
by man in the religious experience of adoration and worship. 
God is understood as the perfect personality, ultimate 
Reality, capable of maintaining the intimately satisfactory 
relations of religion . God as personal is not one Object 
among other objects nor one Subject among subjects. God 
is not only more perfect than all subjects and objects 
but also distinct and different from them although he is 
variously presen~ and operative in them. Von Huegel agrees 
with Lotze in concluding that Personality is not only 
1 • Ibid • , 50 • 
3. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. 
compatible with the Infinite but also finds its completion 
only with the Infinite; thus it will ever remain incomplete 
on the finite level. 1 The personalistic nature of God is 
therefore an incomplete concept for man. It is only on the 
eternal level that he will find its completion in his re-
lationship with God. 
God as perfect personality is not finite. Von Huegel 
considers the belief in a finite God contrary to the affir-
mations of a whole-hearted religion. His discussions con-
cerning suffering and God are now classical expressions of 
the divine impassibility. Suffering if correctly trans-
formed by religious sensitivity may help in the development 
of human personality. There is no reason for ascribing 
suffering to the eternally perfect personality of the 
2 
realized Ideal. The serious difficulties, von Huegel 
insists, arising from divine impassibility are less than 
those connected with the concept of a suffering God. The 
only value derived from this concept of a finite God is 
that it points to the likeness between God and man. Beyond 
this conviction the value of the suffering God ceases. God 
is limited only by His relationship to creation. Outside 
of this relation, He remains the absolute, unconditioned) 
ultimate Reality, "Perfect Love, Unmixed Joy, Entire 
1. Von Huegel, Essays and Addresses, I, 50. 
2. Von Huegel, Essays and Addresses, II, 198-199. 
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Delectation •.• not a Sufferer~ but indeed the Sympa-
thiser, God, Joy, the Ocean of Joy, our Home. 111 
C. Summary 
Baron von Huegel's concept of religious experience, 
and of mystical experience in particular, reflects his 
total view concerning the supernatural and religion. 
(1) Religion is the articulated thirst for ultimate 
Reality that is sensed within the normal experiences of 
sensory perception, the succession of time, and the 
volitional and creative activities of men. Such everyday 
experiences which convey to men the sense of contrast be-
tween themselves and the Infinite witness, in turn, to the 
presence of the supernatural order within nature. This 
dim awareness of the contrasting and normative other is 
clearly articulated by the religious experience. 
(2) The religious apprehension does not take place 
by means of a unique faculty within man's nature. It is 
similar to all areas of knowledge~ open to all its errors 
and delusions. There is, however, behind this religious 
apprehension the reality of the Divine .Action which evi-
dences its validity by its givenness, a fact which extends 
beyond the pragmatic verifications of human life. 
1. Ibid., 213. 
2oa 
(3) The religious apprehension, nevertheless, requires 
the evidence derived from the spiritual fruitfulness re-
sulting from the life of the experient. Such practical 
proof indicates the intricate relationships among God, man, 
and the natural world. A religious or mystical experience 
which becomes exclusive of the sensory world is not of full 
worth and dignity. "Only thus does Mysticism attain to its 
true, full dignity, which consists precisely in being, not 
everything in any one soul, but something in every soul of 
man . nl 
(4) Inclusive mysticism cannot be denied validity due 
to the appearance of psycho-physical disturbances, lack of 
sensory control, or absence of strictly cognitive insights. 
This type of mystical experience has its own contribution 
to make to life. This contribution takes the form of new 
emotional combinations and fresh volitional insights which 
reflect, in turn, a penetration into and a stimulation of 
the deeper level of man's total nature by the religious Ob-
ject. Mysticism cannot be eliminated from the fruitful 
experiments in the common life and in the spiritual ad-
venture. It continually remains the means by which man is 
awakened to the sense of the supernatural and the means of 
"resuscitation of religion, as by far the richest, the 
1. Von Huegel, Mystical Element of Religion, II, 284. 
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most romantic, the most entrancing and emancipating fact 
and life extant or possible anywhere for man."l 
1. Von Huegel, Essays and Addresses, I, 280. 
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CHAPTER SIX . 
COMPARISON AND EVALUATION OF THE INTERPRETATION 
OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE IN THE THOUGHT OF 
TENNANT AND VON HUEGEL 
A. Introduction 
1. Contrasting Approaches 
The w~rk of Tennant and von Huegel illustrates two 
approaches to an interpretation of religious experience. 
Tennant understands religious experience as an implicit 
part of the cumulative teleological argument for theism. 
This type of experience does not afford independent evi-
dence for the reality of the religious datum. Von Huegel, 
in contrast to this teleological approach, assumes a type 
of ontological view--"not an ontologism, for we here 
neither deduce our other ideas from the idea of God nor 
do we argue from ideas and their clarity but from living 
forces and their operativeness"~-which finds in religious 
experience an independent 'givenness' stimulating man's 
rullest articulation of Reality. It is the initial ex-
perience from which theism evolves. 
The contrast existing between these views does not mean 
that there is no agreement between the two thinkers. Von 
1. Von Huegel, Mystical Element Q! Religion. II, 282-283. 
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Huegel's ontological approach makes religious experience 
dependent upon man's ordinary experiences and yet he 
ultimately establishes it as the most convincing and in-
dependent experience of God. This qualification (its 
dependence upon and relation to all other experiences) 
provides some points of agreement with Tennantis position. 
In order to clarify these similarities and also the areas 
of controversy, it will be helpful to compare and evaluate 
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the thought of Tennant and von Huegel on two related issues 
before examining their interpretations of religious experi-
ence. These areas are (a) methods of inquiry and (b) theori,=s 
of knowledge. By this approach, the basic points of their 
philosophical and theological foundation will be inves-
tigated before an evaluation is made of their respective 
theory of religious experience. Before beginning this 
inquiry, it is necessary to establish a criterion which 
will be used in the evaluation of these theories. 
2. Criterion 
The criterion of comprehensive coherence will be used 
in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses found in Tennant's 
and von Huegel's positions, and it will be ~mployed in 
reaching a conclusion between the two interpretations. !his 
criterion is the method of verification which examines an 
idea or object in the widest possible context of thought 
and experience. It asks whether a given proposition is 
self-consistent and consistent with facts and other prop-
ositions.1 The essential task of comprehensive coherence 
is to establish meaningful relations among all areas of 
experience. To accomplish this task no possible source 
of information can be eliminated. 
The application of coherence does not result in fixed 
and static conclusions. It involves a principle of constant 
reorganization, a law of criticism and growth, rather than 
a closed system.2 This does not mean that there is no 
truth available. It rather entails the continual search 
for new data which will reinforce or correct the truth now 
held. 
B. Method of Inquiry 
1. Comparison 
There are two major issues involved in a comparison 
of Tennant's and von Huegel's methodologies. One issue 
entails the examination of the basic principles found in 
their methodological approaches; the other deals with the 
methodological procedure which results from these principles. 
1. E.S. Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion, 128. For a 
defense of this criterion see also L. Harold DeWolf, 
A Theology of the Living Church (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1953~28-29; and John Hick, Faith and Knowl-
edge, 12. 
2. Brightman, QE• cit., 129. 
a. Basic Principles 
Von Huegel does not present the thorough study or 
the reasons ror using a particular methodology such as is 
round in Tennant's magnum opus . He describes his approach 
concisely as the analytical method which involves certain 
principles . In order to compare this method to Tennant's 
psychogenetic approach, it will be helpful to examine these 
principles in view of Tennant's methodological theory. 
Von Huegel's first principle s t ates that man begins 
his inquiry in the middle of things since the "first be-
, 
ginnings and ultimate ends are and remain unknown to him." ... 
Tennant also acknowledges this principle asserting that 
man begins in mediis rebus . His use of the genetic method 
does not mean reduction, a denial or the richness and 
variety of the data which are present for man·1 s inves-
tigation. Tennant agrees with von Huegel ' s criticism of 
an exclusive use of any methodology. He shares with von 
Huegel the concern for the most inclusive approach. One 
method does not do justice to all data of experience. How-
ever, there is a priority involved in the use of various 
methodologies. This priority is given by Tennant to the 
ordo cognoscendi , the psychogenetic study of man ' s knowl-
edge, not to an analytical approach which assumes certain 
principles without a thorough examination or the assumptions 
1. Von Huegel, The Reality or God, 28. 
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underlying these principles. Before man can asPume any-
t hing , he must understand the processes involved in his 
assumptions. The first task of any inquiry, therefore, is 
to examine the nature of the presumptive k"!'lO\'rled ge vrhich 
makes these assumptions. It is not ellough to begin 11 in 
the middle of things 11 vTi thout examining the origin and 
development of "things" into their present articulated 
form~ 
The second principle involved in von Huegel's ana-
lytic a l methodology pertains to the es sential starting-
point, that is, 11 11ith life as it is and as it surrounds 
men~"l Von Huegel's concern is for the fullest under-
standillg of the data which are found in man 's experience. 
This means an inquiry into experience as 8.n unlimited 
possibility 1·1hich contains far more than any one method-
ology can f ormulate or systematize~ In or-der to conduct 
su.ch m1 investigation, all the insights of the genetic 
and psycholog~eal .. studies are combined by the analytical 
method~ 
Vo11 Huegel criticizes, in his analysis of the psy-
chologi ca l method, that approach 1·1hich finds no other 
phenomena outside of the elementary 8.nd normal phenomena 
of con sciousness~ Such a methodology is not inclusive in 
1 ts analysis~ It does not account for or explain the 
1. Von Huegel, The Reality of God, 28. 
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facts of experience which extend beyond the boundaries of 
man's normal consciousness. There is more to life than 
the data of man's awareness. Experience involves a 'given-
ness' (realities which testify to the unitary and unifying 
supreme Intelligencel) which is not explained fully by a 
psychogenetic analysis of man's conscious awareness. The 
data of consciousness have a trans-subjective significance 
which needs to be recognized as a part of the starting-
point of any inquiry. The experience of the data involves 
an awareness of an object as well as a subject from the 
very beginnings of man's consciousness. A method which 
does not account for this trans-subjective reality of the 
data of consciousness at the initial stage of its investi-
gation will ultimately fail to allow for a real contact 
between man and reality. 
Tennant again agrees with von Huegel's methodological 
ideal; to attain the fullest understanding of the data 
found in man's experience. He, however, questions the 
assumptions involved in von Huegel's starting-point. To 
begin with life as it is and as it surrounds men raises 
the question of which "life" is meant. Tennant objects 
to a position which does not make clear the distinction 
between the psychic object of man's private world and the 
1. Ibid., 74. 
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epistemological Object of his shared l'lOrld. Objectivity 
is involved in both worlds. Therefore, when von Huegel 
speaks about an awareness of an object which is given from 
the very beginnings of man's consciousness_, the issue re-
garding the metaphysical reality of the object is not 
answered. The objects which make up "life as it is" re-
main vague and unqualified in any metaphysical sense. 
Tennant's psychogenetic method attempts to eliminate 
any conclusions at the beginning of an inquiry regarding 
the nature of the data of experience. This is not to imply 
that there is no objective factor in experience. Careful 
analysis, says Tennant, will indicate that there is the 
brute, irreducible, and objective factor present in con-
sciousness from the very beginning. This objective element 
is sensation which first breaks in upon the experient with 
qualia and relations of its own . 1 Tennant agrees with von 
Huegel that the object and subject are both involved in con-
sciousness. However, Tennant does not establish the ob-
jective fa ctor as 1 given' in the sense of revealing 'pure' 
actuality. Sensation, he finds, is from the beginning a 
joint-product between its qualia and the subject's act of 
sensing. The occasion never arises when the subject 
receives the metaphysical Object as pure actuality ("life 
as it is") without its own unique activities of retention, 
1. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, I, 35. 
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fusion, and differentiation. For this reason the data of 
consciousness cannot be understood as abstracted or iso-
lated ' g iven• factors. The data rather involve intricate 
inter•act.ions bet1•reen subjects and obj ects~ Experience, 
Tennant believes, is never seen as it is--metaphysically 
1 pur e '--but it is seen as it is interpret ed by the mind 
itself;. 
Similarly, the data of experience are the data of 
con s cious experie11Ce. 11 The tiny spark of consciousness 
is the beginning and the middle and t he ending of all 
attained kn 0\vledge. 111 Data \IThi ch extend beyond the 
boundaries of t his "tiny spark" are out of man 1 s range 
as da ta; they can be only inferences~ 
ThE third and fourth principles of vo11 Huegel 1 s 
analytical method en tail the interaction and the inter-
relationship betvJeen the subject and the object in experi-
ence;. These last two principles are more related to the 
the ory of lmO\·rl ed ge than to a methodological approach. 
Von Hu egel's basic assumption that man derives "some real 
knm·rled.ge 11 from this r e l a tionship and interaction needs 
to be examined in light of his definition of kn Oi,rledge. 
b. Met hodological Procedure 
Ten:man t 1 s analytical-genetic methodology includes the 
1;. Edgar S ~ Bri ghtman, 11 The Dialectic of Religious Exoeri-
ence," The Philosoohical Review, XXXVIII(l929), 563. 
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procedure of analogical inference. All concepts are 
derived from life; that is, they are built up by man from 
the percept which is grounded in the objective data of 
sensation and are developed into the abstract idea. Man's 
concepts are derived ultimately in this way making them 
both anthropic and mundane. 1 This pr:Jcess of conceptual 
development from the percept through the imaginal to the 
ideational invo lves analogical inferences. Man's first 
crude notions of permanence, unity, and individuality were 
derived from the early experience of his own body. In a 
similar manner, man ascribes by means of analogy the 
notion of force or activity to things which resist his 
movements. These interpretative notions are the fore-
runners, the actual source, of the categories of substance, 
2 
cause, etc. 
It is to the contingency that human beings are embodied 
in solid flesh, that ultimate ly is due the particular 
form of the primary concepts through which the world is 
' known' and from which human thought and reasoning are 
spun.3 
Man, therefore, infers h i s concepts by analogy from 
his experience of embodiment. His particular type of em-
bodiment is directly related to the particular types of 
thought-forms he formulates. His concepts are seen by 
Tennant to be the result of reading- into not reading-off 
1. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, I, 50. 
2. Ibid., 49. 3. Ibid., 50. 
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from the external world. Concepts are 'of the mind ' and 
are a priori only in the harmless sense that they are 
regulative and not constitutive instruments through which 
man 's knowledge comes to be what it is. All ideas, in-
cluding the concept of God, are derived ultimately; they 
are 'mediated' inferences drawn on the basis of analogies. 
In light of this analysis, Tennant finds von Huegel's 
assumption concerning the 1 givenness 1 of reality un-
warranted. It is rather an assumption which is not given 
in the sense of immediate apprehension of the psychological 
factor in the data of consciousness, but it is a mediated 
inference drawn from man's experience (1) of himself as a 
consci':lus and embodied self 1-'lho (2) infers by analogy a 
meaningful interpretation or all the facts found in experi-
ence, as organized by sense , logic, and morality. 
Von Huegel's methodological procedure does not rely 
upon mediated inferences alone. He also includes the in-
tuitional (direct acquaintance) procedure in order to 
account for what he labels the "primary factor" in any 
methodology. This is the action of the real world upon 
man, the external energizings and pressures upon his mtna.l 
Man begins to know the world by means of his immediate 
contact with various concrete realities distinct from, 
1. Von Huegel, Essa~s and Addresses, I, 33. 
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though not entirely unlike himself. 
Man thus possesses a continually accumulating experi-
mental knowledge of his not being alone, in the great 
world in which he finds himself. He is not alone be-
cause he finds innumerable creatures , possesslng 
various degrees and forms of intelligence and con-
sciousness, distinct from his own, yet sufficiently 
like himself for him to penetrate with spontaneous 
delight; and, still more~ he finds them as evidences 
and degrees of a unitary and unifying supreme In-
telligence, which again he finds, from ceaseless ex-
perience, to be indeed distinct from and immeasurably 
higher than his own, yet sufficiently like his own 
intelligence for him to2be able thus tc penetrate and rejoice in its effects . 
Man, therefore, is not related primarily to an idea or 
representation which has been inferred from the awareness 
of his own bodily self. Such ideas or representations do 
not account for man's immediate sense of objective reality 
which he derives from experience . 
Von Huegel defends this intuitional procedure by 
pointing out the weaknesses involved in Tennant's theory 
of mediated inferences . 3 Man employs his imagination, von 
Huegel contends, more in the genetic approach than in the 
analytical inquiry . The earl iest beginnings of man's cog -
nitive processes are not available for empirical study. 
The initial stages of this process remain a matter for 
speculation . The important presuppositions of this method 
are not subject to direct experience as a means of verifi-
cation. · In contrast, the analytic method begins with mants 
1 . Ibid . 2 . Von Huegel, Reality of God, 73 . 
3 . No systematic discussion is given by von Huegel concern-
ing this problem. Two other sources, John Baillie ' s Our 
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p r esent level of development, seeing in this level a real 
interaction between subject and object. 
Another weakness connected with Tennant's method of 
inference, as von Huegel sees it, grows out of the lat t er's 
conviction regarding the immediate and real interrelation 
between man and the world. Von Huegel's contention is that 
man's consciousness of his body does not receive priority 
over objective things reacting upon the body. The two are 
given together, nou successively. The primitive notions 
of substance and of cause, for example, could have been 
derived from external objects and then by reverse analogy 
applied to the body. 
There seems to be no reason for giving the body a 
place prior to the physical world in the evolution 
of consciousness, or in making it alone peculiarly 
responsible for the origin of primitive thought -forms. 1 
The d i fficult i es of analogical inference are apparent 
to von Huegel in connection with man's knowledge of other 
selves. He (implicitly) objects to Tennant's position that 
finds man's knowledge of other pe r sons to be the outcome of 
analogical projection and, in a more developed manner, man's 
knowledge of God growing out of the same method of mediated 
inference. Von Huegel understands man's knowledge of other 
Knowle~ of God, and 
sophical Theology, do 
ferential knowledge. 
clarification of this 
D.L. Scudder's Tennant's Philo-
refer directly to the method of 
They will be used for further 
issue. 
1. Scudder, Tennant's PhilosoEhical Theology, 107. 
in-
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selves as developing by means of man's immediate contact 
with other minds. It ts through this primary relation that 
man attains some real knowledge not only of other men, but 
1 
also of himself. The process is reversed. Man's mind 
does not stand by itself developing theories of the nature 
of reality by inference. On the contrary, man's mind is 
in touch with reality which presents to it real knowledge 
? 
of other selves and the world.-
Von Huegel's critic :i.sm is directed toward Tennant's 
methodological starting-point which emphasizes the role of 
the individual's self-awareness rather than the role of 
self-consciousness as a socially conditioned being. Man 
acquires self-consciousness through his relation with 
other persons. 3 The infant's first word, for example, is 
usua lly 'mama' not 'baby.' The life situation, however, 
does not demand an either-or. It is rather a situation 
which entails intricate and interwoven relationships between 
the self and other selves from man's first moment of aware-
ness. A methodology, von Huegel holds, which does not give 
equal importance to both factors of the private and social 
development involved in man's conscious experience fails 
to interpret the data accurately. 
1. Von Huegel, Essays and Addresses, I, 33. 2. Ibid. 
3. John Baillie, Our Knowledge of God (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons:-1939), 209.-----
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Although von Huegel does not develop systematically 
his objections against that type of theory which Tennant 
employs, it is apparent that he would reject any position 
that does not include the following: (1) There is a real-
ity underlying all of man's experiences which is "given" 
and not mediated through analogical inference derived 
originally from man's awareness of his bodily self. (2) 
Man attains some real knowledge of himself and of his 
world, including other selves and other things, not in 
abstraction from but in relation with all these objective 
contacts. (3) This interrelationship and interaction be-
tween man and the objective realities afford some "real 
knowledge" and not merely reasonable certainty. These 
points lead into a comparison of von Huegel's and Tennant's 
theories of knowledge. Before discussing these theories, 
an evaluation will be made of the essential views involved 
in the foregoing methodologies. 
2. Evaluation 
The preceding comparison suggests two important 
questions for evaluation: (1) What is the most inclusive 
starting-point for an inquiry into the meaning of life's 
data? (2) What procedure, following this initial decision, 
is to be used in order to arrive at the most coherent con-
clusions concerning these data? These questions indicate 
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in the context of this study an evaluation of (1) the ana-
lytical starting-point (von Huegel) which assumes a given 
kind of reality· in contrast to the initial concern of the 
analytic-genetic approach (Tennant) which assumes the 
necessity of examining first how man deveil:e-ps his knowl-
edge; of (2) the analytic procedure which stresses the 
.immediate relation between subjects and objects in con-
trast to the analytical-genetic method which emphasizes 
the process of mediate analogical inferences. 
It is evident that both Tennant and von Huegel are 
sincere in their endeavors to attain the most inclusive 
methodology. · Their sincerity, however, draws them into 
opposing centers of concern. Von Huegel, in his desire 
to avoid skepticism and subjectivism, stresses the im-
portance of accepting that starting-point which assumes 
the objectivity of reality. Tennant, on the other hand, 
fears the inadequacy of such an assumption in view of the 
conflicting reports which have been made throughout his-
tory concerning the nature of reality. In light of these 
contradictions and apparent errors, Tennant undertalces to 
examine how man develops knowledge in order to discern what 
goes into the composition of man's assumptions. 
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An evaluation concerned with the advantage of one 
methodological starting-point over another method's primary 
concern cannot escape being influenced by Tennant's thorough 
and critical approach to this problem. He does not assume 
that there are no suppositions operating in the initial 
task of the psychogenetic approach. This inquiry, for 
example, involves the assumption that knowledge can crit-
icize itself and render coherent even the presumed knowl-
edge about itself. 1 Similarly, Tennant does not deny that 
there are no difficulties connected with this starting-
point. He recognizes the danger of subjectivity, the 
tentativeness regarding man's knowledge , and the lack of 
direct evidence (experience) for its most basic assumptions. 
However, if it can be shown that these difficulties are not 
so crucial as those found in von Huegel ' s position, then 
support can be given to Tennant's theory . 
The danger of subjectivity which is most serious for 
von Huegel is recognized candidly by Tennant . Both thinkers 
avoid the pitfalls of extreme subjectivism by acknowledging 
the essential role of the external data in experience. It 
appears, however, that Tennant ' s analysis escapes the charge 
of extremism more effectually than von Huegel ' s position. 
Tennant ' s examination of the data of experience reveals the 
activities or both the subject and the object within man's 
conscious awareness . The objective datum is not assumed 
out of a metaphysical necessity , but it is seen by Tennant 
in relation to an intelligent and meaningful theory of 
1. Bertocci , The Empirical Argument for God , 197 . 
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knm'fledge. Von Huegel's statements about the objective 
reality as 'given' include no analysis concerning the 
possibility for an intelligible interaction between real-
ity. Tennant, however, perhaps at the risk of being 
labelled a subjectivist, proceeds to analyze this inter-
action from the psychological standpoint of the experient 
in order to discern the intricate relations between sub-
jects and objects in the cognitive process. 
The tentativeness concerning man's knowledge which 
results from the psychogenetic study is admitted by 
Tennant. He shares von Huegel's conviction that man's 
analysis of the origin, nature, and scope of his own 
knowledge does not result in any final conclusions which 
would establish man's knowledge as having an immediate 
cont act or identity with the real world. If this means 
220 
that man remains in a state of relative and not absolute 
certainty, then the conclusion is granted by Tennant. If, 
hov;ever, this tentativeness is assumed to be positivistic, 
then the conclusion is denied. The uncertainty connected 
with man's knowledge which accures from the analytic~genetic 
study is not irrelevant to the actual world nor is it un-
qualified. Man is in rapport with reality. Bisthought 
constructions form some versions or functions of the real. 
They do not afford an identity ' Or an immediate knowledge 
of metaphysical Reality. They thus provide relative not 
real knowledge. The tentativenes s associated with man's 
knowledge, therefore, is a correct description of his cog-
nitive state and is a reasonable conclusion stemming from 
the psychogenetic starting-point. 
Von Huegel's criticism of the genetic method finds 
this tentativeness not only in r e l ation to man ' s knowledge 
of reality but also in relation to the verification of its 
own methodological conclusions . Tennant offers no way to 
check his theory by direct experience . 
It does not appear that Tennant is warranted in his 
·insistence that this analysis is fact . Admittedly 
there is no direct introspection of it , and conse -
quently there is no way to check the theory by ap-
peal to direct experience . l 
Tennant, however , has made a more exhaustive effort in 
this direction than' that which is evident in some opposing 
theories . Von Huegel, for example, does not furnish the 
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possibility for a direct experience which would verify his 
theory of the immediate contact between men and concrete 
realities, nor does he verify the real knowledge Which 
results from this contact by an appeal to direct experience 
The appeal to qirect experience, on the other hand, often 
contradicts von Huegel's theory concerning man ' s attain-
ment of some real knowledge by evincing examples of errors 
coming from the claims to immediate and real knowledge . 
The presence of tentativeness, therefore, is involved not 
only in Tennant's approach ; it is evident in the results 
of von Huegel's methodology. In the latter such uncertainty 
1. Scudder, Tennant's Philosophical Theology , 106 . 
implies a greater risk for it is, as such, not an integral 
part of the methodology. Von Huegel's basic assumptions 
concerning the 1givenness' of reality and man's contact 
with concrete realities are not tentative. They are the 
foundations for his entire system. If these prove un-
certain, then the basic structure of his methodological 
approach collapses. 
It is fair to indicate at this point that Tennant's 
entire system also rests upon tentative assumptions con-
cerning the origin and development of man's cognitive 
process. 
approach. 
An important factor, however, favors Tennant's 
This factor suggests that Tennant's suppositions 
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have grown out of his theory concerning the facts of experi-
ence and have not been . superimposed upon the data in order 
to arrive at a certain theory. This is not to imply that 
von Huegel has arranged the facts of experience to his own 
liking. It is rather to intimate that Tennant's basic 
assumptions involved in the psychogenetic study of knowl-
edge are more indigenous and consistent with his system. 
The important assumption concerning the activity of divine 
love is made at the end not the beginning of his study. 
Tentativeness is still evident but now it is grounded in 
reasonable certainty which is derived from man's understand-
ing of himself, other selves, his world, and God. It is no 
longer an assumption which is grounded in faith which makes 
possible both the beginning and the end of a system such 
as that presented by von Huegel. 
The final issue for evaluation centers upon Tennant's 
use of mediated analogical inferences as a primary and 
essential methodological procedure in contrast to von 
Huegel's stress upon the immediate relation which occurs 
between subjects and objects. Von Huegel's greatest con-
cern is for the independence of the object which is not 
recognized fully by other theories, such as Tennant's in-
ferential procedure. The external world affords immediate 
and direct contact between men and concrete realities. 
This contact does not require the med~ated process of in-
ference which is derived originally from man's awareness 
of his own bodily self. Such a procedure of inferring, 
von Huegel feels, involves more imagination than factual 
data, gives priority to the body when it belongs to the 
objectivity of the external world_, offers incorrect as-
sumptions concerning the process by which man acquires his 
knowledge of other selves, and finally presents a false 
distinction between man's private and social conscious 
development. Tennant's response to these criticism affords 
the essential issues for evaluation. 
It has been indicated before that the operation of 
man's imagination is active not only in the methodology of 
Tennant, but it is evident also in von Huegel's approach. 
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Von Huegel's claim that "we really are touched, that we 
definitely are grasped by reality genuinely distinct from 
ourselves and from our knowledge• of it," 1 illustrates 
that some of his statements also lack factual description. 
What facts are available concerning the nature of this 
reality? The data which can verify this reality extend 
beyond the data of man's self-consciousness and thereby 
are irrelevant to his actual experience. It is true that 
von Huegel does not claim to offer a thorough study of 
epistemology, but this fact does not exempt him from a 
coherent defense of such a statement. 
Tennant's procedure of analogical inference which 
gives priority to the body appears most consistent with 
the facts involved in the development of man's knowledge. 
His embodiment does determine the kind of concepts which 
he formulates. Without the initial experience of his own 
body as a constant group of sensations which forms, in 
turn, a constant background for all other sensations, 2 man 
would possess no means of cognitive development. The pri-
ority does belong to the body for it is his first and 
fundamental instrument for understanding the external 
world. It is necessary to point out again that by this 
1. Von Huegel, The Reality of Gody 5. 
2. Bertocci, The Empirical Argument for God, 200. 
emphasis on man's awareness of his bodily self, Tennant 
does not eliminate the objective factor in experience. 
This objective datum is described as that "irrational 
surd which pure thought cannot eliminate." 1 In view of 
this, the procedure of analogical inference does not neg-
l .ect; ·- t he object of experience which is "before the mind" 
but it recognizes it in the meaningful context of man's 
cognitive process. 
The last two criticisms of Tennant's analogical pro- · 
cedure center upon h i s neglect of man's socia l develop-
ment and his denial of man 's immediate cognitive contact 
with reality . Tennant, however} does not claim to estab-
lishment of his theory of the mediated analogical inference 
without reference to man's social environment . He rather 
attempts to shOi'i how this mediated inference concerning 
knO\vledge of other selves and the development of the cate-
gories of cause and substance was accomplished by a ve r y 
rudimentary self and that the abi lity to infer was im-
plicit and not rational~explicit . Tennant does maintain 
that the "knowledge of one's self, and knowledge of other 
selves} proceed pari nassu from the humblest beginnings," 2 
but he believes also that man 's first center of self - con-
sciousness is located in his awareness of his own bodily 
1. Tennant, Philosophical The ology, I, 36. 
2. Ibid. , 72 . 
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self. This awareness is~ therefore, the original deter-
minate of how man comes to know himself', other selves, and 
the world. 
A criticism of Tenna:nt•s procedure has been made in 
reference to his description of this implicit ability to 
infer by analogy which is found in the rudimentary self. 1 
This description appears to imply that Tennant is attempting 
to include an element of intuition or direct acquaintance 
in the process of cognitive growth without calling it by 
this name. This criticism also applies to Tennant's theory 
or ini'erring the categories of cause and substance i'rom 
man's primary awareness of his body. Both the analogical 
procedure of ini'erring other selves and of inferring the 
categories or substance and cause result in a subjectivism. 
This subjectivism is corrected only if the rudimentary 
process of implicit inferring also includes the factor of 
intuition, the realm of direct acquaintance. If the element 
of direct acquaintance with external reality is not included 
in this inferential process, then there is no possibility 
for explaining how new ideas arise. 
Inference and hypothetical ejection of ideas may lead 
to a discovery of new racts , but these new racts are 
always of the same general order as those which sug-
gested the hypothesis. Inferences from sensa may lead 
to a discovery of new sense, but never to underlying 
active causes. Ini'erences from bodies may lead to a 
discovery of more racts about bodies, but not to dis-
covery of other minds.2 
1. Scudder, Tennant's Philosophical Theology, chapter two. 
2. Ibid., 130-131. 
226 
227 
This is a crucial objection. The difficulty, ho -v1ever, 
pertaining to the arrival of ne\v ideas is not solved by the 
theory of direct acquaintance~ The activity of the factor 
of intuition does not clarify the si tuatio:n• The question 
may be asked how the functionine; of direct acquaintance 
(intuition) arrives at the discovery of other minds and 
the knm,Iledg e of Reality. The theory of direct acquaint-
ance attempts no critical e.xamination of thes e crucial 
probl ems• It does not explain the episte:m ologic~l process 
which mak e s possible man's immediate intuition of reality, 
nor does it account for the fact of error 1.vhich sometimes 
accompani e s the experience of real knowledg e• The alter-
native to this theory is not skeptical solipsism• Tennant's 
method of analog ical inference does not end in subjectivism. 
Aithough man has no immediate knovdedge of the metaphysical 
1vorld, he is still in dynamic rappor·t Trri th the vrorld, ac-
quiring relative knm'lledge ivhich "ministers as much to 
- 1 
spiritual vrisdom as to practical prudence~" 
Before concluding this evaluation of methodological 
procedure, it is important to notice that von Huegel does 
not represent this extreme type of criticism of the in-
ferential method • His approa.ch does not r e ly on direct 
acquaintance alone• In accordance i·iith his inclusive 
1~ Tennant, "Agnosticism," Encyclopaedia Britannica, 14th 
ed*; XXII, 353~ 
concern for all the facts, von Huegel includes both the 
intuitional and inferential procedures. However, in view 
of the foregoing inadequacies connected with the intui-
tional procedure and the basic assumption regarding the 
'givenness' of a kind of reality underlying the analytical 
approach which is not critically examined by von Huegel, it 
appears that Tennant's method of inquiry affords the more 
thorough and consistent study of all the data . 
C. Theory of Knowledge 
1. Comparison 
In the preceding discussion concerning methodology, 
the problem of the nature of knowledge has appeared. It 
is a basic ill s sue evident in Tennant ' s and von Huegel's 
philosophical approaches and in their interpretations of 
religious experience . The process of comparing and eval-
uating their respective theories of knowledge involves 
three essential questions: (a) What is the situation of 
knowing? (b) What kind of knowledge is derived in the 
knowing-situation? And (c) what is the significance of 
the knowledge gained? 
a. The Situation of Knowing 
Tennant and von Huegel alike stress the importance of 
the whole person as being involved in the knowing situation. 
It is essential to have a unified conception of man's entire 
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1 personality in the "situation experienced" in order to 
understand the complex nature of knowledge and its re-
lation to the external world. 
Von Huegel and Tennant also share the conviction that 
the knowing situation refers beyond itself. Man's con-
scious awareness does not remain without a reference be-
yo~ its own activities, that is, it retains a capacity 
of being itself and yet pointing beyond itself. 2 This ex-
perience of objective reference is described by Tennant 
as the experient's being aware of that which is nover a-
gainst the mind." Von Huegel refers to it as the objective 
content of the data which extends beyond the subjective 
activities of the mind. However, when an analysis is made 
of what the experience of objective reference reveals, a 
contrast can be seen between von Huegel and Tennant con-
cerning the nature of the objective side of experience. 
Before discussing von Huegel's realistic description 
of objective reference in the knowing -situation, it is 
important to notice that he does not clarify the dis-
tinctions found in the cognitive process such as expounded 
by Tennant. Knowledge, as Tennant sees it, denotes not 
one sole psychological process and product but several 
1. E.S. Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion, 348. 
2. Peter A. Bertocci, "The Nature of Cognition: I"linimum 
Requirements for a Personalistic Epistemoloe;y," The 
Review of Metaphysics, VIII(September, 1954), 51-.--
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which are distinguishable~ 1 These have been labelled as 
the psychic or private world of certitud.e (objectivity), 
the epistemological or conceptual vmrld of certainty 
(Objectivity), and the metaphysical Object (the Real) 
vlhich is not 11 knmm 11 by man in its pure actuality. Be-
cause von Huegel does not make clear the distinctions 
which thes e term s denote , it is difficult to discern the 
exact meaning he gives to the lvords 'obj ect! and 'ob-
jective~ t . Ps ychic certitude and epistemological certainty 
are not distinguishable in a statement such as this: : 
We find · ~ ~ ~ the most delicate apprehension of Re-
ality present within our lives previously to any 
detailed, analysed knm.'!ledge of it in our minds; we 
knou it; thought, without such analysis, "'re do not 
yet kno11 it -vlith such a clearness transferable to 
· other minds as analysis, vlhen it comes to operate 
within our minds, can, to a certain extent, give to 
this our knm·lledge~2 
The objective factor of experience, von Huegel con-
tends; is independent of the experient in the sense that 
it retains an integrity of content 1-·rhich the mind cannot 
influence in it s activities of apprehension ~ The mind 
apprehends the object only 'I>Tith a varying degree of rele-
vance~ Von HUegel refers to the theory of critical realism 
for the most adequate account of man's kno,:ring situation. 
1~ Tennant, "Agnosticism," Encyclopaedia Britannica, 14th 
ed~~ XXII, 353~ 
2• Von HUegel, Reality of God, .. ~6~ 
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This theory of knowledge is a reac tion against the neo-
realistic claim of immediate and direct knowledge of ex-
te rnal reality, and a lso against the idealistic view which 
establishes a dualism betv;een man as knower and the ex-
terna l reality as known. Critica l realism presents a 
compromise between the epistemological monism of naive 
realism and the epistemological dua lism of idealism~ by 
maintaining the integrity and the kn.owability of the ob-
jective data. 
The knowing situation for a cr:l.tical r ealist involves 
(a) the perceiving mind, the knower, or the conscious or -
ganism; (b) the outer object, the given, or the stark re-
al ity with its primary qualities; and (c) the sense data 
which connect the perceiving mind and the outer object 
affording man with a fa ~irly direct c:>ntact with objects, 
which reveals in large part what objects are, and indi-
1 
eating the nature of the external world to man. These 
principles are evident in von Huegel 1 s thought \vhen he 
analyzes the knowing situation as consisting of three ele-
ments, the subject) the object, and the thinking process. 
The subject by means of the thinking process 'knows' the 
objec t . Von Huegel does not mean by this that the object 
is kno\'ln immediately. . He insists as a critica l realist 
1. Harold H. Titus, Living Issues in Philosophy (New York: 
American Book Company, 1946), 227. 
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upon the distinction between the object and the content, 
that is, between that which is before the mind and that 
which is within it. The acts of perceiving and of knowing 
are not to be identified directly with the objective factor 
of man's experience. Percepts are simply man's means of 
perceiving the object. Similarly, man's thoughts are the 
1 means of thinking, not the object of his thought. Ideas 
derived by means of percelving and thinking do not imprison 
man within his own mind . They are a part of the necessary 
means of external reflerence and communication. 
In view of these principles, the knowing situation can 
never be reduced to the activities of man's mind . The 
action of the objective world upon man and his reaction to 
it are the primary facts for von Huegel . The abstracting 
activity of the human mind is secondary and instrumental. 
The functioning of the human mind never fully exhausts the 
primary facts which are given by man ' s contact with the 
external world . 2 Man lives within the wider context of 
experience which includes himself as subject~ the objective 
factors, and the process of thinking. This rich whole in 
which he lives extends beyond his knowledge and refers be-
yond itself to another reality which sustains both the who~ 
1. James Bissett Pratt (ed.), Essays in Critical Rea lism 
(London: Macmillan and Company, 1920), 104. 
2. Von Huegel, Essays and Addresses, I, 33. 
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of experience and man's inadequate apprehension of the 
whole . 
This leads into another aspect of critical realism 
which is crucial for von Huegel; namely, the transcendent 
element found in the knowing situation . The object of 
man ' s experience is not "wit hin the mind." It transcends 
the subject, involving a separation of the mind f r om the 
object which, however, does not prevent man from having 
direct contact with the external world and thus deriving 
some real knowledge . 
Von Huegel applies this principle of transcendence 
to the object itself as well as to the relationship be-
tween the object and the subject. He finds that the ob -
ject refers beyond itself, indicating a metaphysical re-
ality which lies beyond it . This is most evident in man's 
consciousness of religious data. 
The religious consciousness is always of Something 
other than itself . . • an Infinite different in kind 
from any simply human prolongation or ideal, since 
the soul rests up on It, and finds its support in the 
actual prese~ce and operation of this Infinite , this 
Perfectness. 
This transcend ent reference also is found in man's experi-
ences of sense pe r ception, the succession of time , and h is 
moments of creativity . Within all theBe experiences, the 
'' transcendent 11 objects point beyond themselves to the real ity 
1. Von Huegel, Essays and Addresses, I, 34 . 
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which sustains them. This experience von Huegel describes 
as man's awareness of a qualitative natupe sensed in the 
areas of his contact with external .reality. 
With this description of the qualit~tive nature of 
(metaphysical) objective data, von Huegel goes beyond the 
usual self ·-imposed limitations of critical realism . This 
particular theory of knoi'vledge does not pretend to include 
a metaphysical analysis concerning the inner and ultimate 
nature of these metaphysical objective factors (non-human 
entities). 1 It rather assumes an agnostic position claim-
ing only the following epistemological principles: (a) that 
there are existent physical entities which are independent 
of the minds that know them, but which stand in some sort 
of causal relation to these minds; (b) that the human sub -
ject is so c-::>ord ina ted with the. r est of nature that when 
his psycho-physical organisms are acting normally his per-
cepts refer to and (in a pragmatic and functional sense) 
correspond with existent entities which are not part of 
his mental contents; (c) and that the subject makes these 
various independent entities the objects of his thought, 
and by reasoning upon his experience can come to conclusions 
about them which are true and which deserve the name of 
knowledge. 2 
1. Pratt, ~· cit., 109. 2. Ibid., 105. 
It is not difficult to understand why von Huegel 
chooses critical realism as the most adequate epistemo-
logical approach to the problem of knowledge. Here is a 
theory which confirms man's contact with the reality mani-
fested in the external world wh ile affording implicit 
support for a metaphysical conclusion which f inds evidence 
for the Supreme Reality lying behind man's experience of 
the external world. Von Huegel feels that critical realism 
offers a lso a more realistic solution to the experiences of 
illusion and error~ and renders the most adequate answer to 
the question concerning the significance of knowledge. 
These will be discussed after Tennant's analysis of the 
knowing situation has been examined. 
Tennant describes the knowing situation as a product 
of the coactivity of the conscious subject and of the in-
dependent reality. It is a joint-product not reducible 
to the activities of the mind alone nor to the immediate 
imposition of external reality. Employing the empirical 
approach which sets out from the observable data~ Tennant 
finds that the knowing situation results in an epistemic 
dualism. Man's understanding of the world of reality is 
never identical with rea lity. His concepts are built up 
from his initial contact with sensations. They are his 
1. Pratt~ Q£· cit.~ 105. 
235 
tools for describing the world. Man's response, therefore~ 
to the external world is not mere reception. It involves 
his own creative react ion which prevents an identity or 
assimilation between the epistemological object of man's 
awareness and the metaphysical object which stimulates the 
awareness . 
The mind does not "rub noses" with its object, it does 
not "embrace11 its object. The mind cognizes its ob-ject, and this means that the epistemological object 
is always a dynamic product, and never identical with, 
the stimulating process.l 
In contrast to von HuegelJ Tennant does not support 
a realistic position which presents the objective data as 
independent of the mind . The (epistemological) objective 
factor in the knowing situation is not independent in the 
sense that it contains an integrity qf content which is 
unaffected by the knowing situation. These data are de,. 
scr'ibed by Tennant as data "over against the mind 11 having 
qualia an.d relations of their ot.vn. vlhat · these qualia and 
relations mean outside of the knov1ing situation is irrele-
vant to man's actual experience. Von Huegel's reference 
to the wider context of experience which extends beyond 
knowledge is a meaningless abstraction for Tennant. Such 
an unrelated content which has no interaction with man's 
1. Bertocci, "The Nature of Cognition: Minimum Requirements 
for a Personalistic Epistemology," The Review of Meta-
physics, VIII( September~ 199~), 54.-- -- ---
situation experienced remains a matter for speculation not 
for affirmation. 
The experience of objective reference contains an 
independence, Tennant, claims, which is not necessarily 
the specific kind asserted by von Huegel when he states 
that the object referred to in knowledge contains an 
integrity of content which is not influenced by the mind. 
It is essential to distinguish between two different stages 
in the knowing process, the experience of objective ref-
erence and the particular view given by the subject of 
1 
what the reference entails. The opinion of the subject 
may be the correct description of what is involved in 
many instances of objective reference, but it is not as 
transparently clear as is the fact of objective reference 
itself. 
Whether I experience the bent stick in the water, 
or the straight stick outside, I do, in the act of 
objective reference, attribute both objects to some-
thing not the act of attributing. But I certainly 
do not know that what I have attributed is "wholly 
undisturbed" by the attributing. I know simply that 
I attribute my object beyond the act of attributing, 
and nothing else. Everything beyond this point is 
interpretation, and, so far as I know at this moment, 
the realistic interpretation may be corre~or some 
other may be correct.2 
Tennant emphasizes the necessity of interpretation as 
the essential factor in the knowing situation. An object 
which has no·' counterpart in the ,actual experience of man 
1. Ibid • , 52 • 2. Ibid. 
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has 3 in turn, no relation to knowledge. There is no medium 
in which the object interacts with the subject affording 
direct or mediated knowledge of its nature without the sub-
ject's interpretative activities. 
In conclusion, Tennant shares von Huegel ' s conce~n for 
the objective reference in the knowing situation. He dis-
agrees, however 3 with von Huege l' s realistic position 
regarding the independent status of the object. This is 
seen clearly in a comparative examination of their views 
concerning the kind of knowledge derived from the knowing 
situation and the significance of this knowledge. 
b. The Kind of Knowledge: Its Significance 
Tennant describes the knowledge derived from the 
knowing situation as always relative. The Object {meta-
physical) is never known in its native purity, but only 
with the subject's modifications and additions due to his 
organs of sense and the structure of his mind . Knowledge 
is not pure . It is a mixture resulting from the interaction 
between the subject and objective data . 
The relativity of knowledge does not imply the irrele-
vance of knowledge to Reality . Tennant insists that the 
phenomenal through which the noumenal is known does not 
serve the purpose of deception. It is the utterance of 
the ontal to the experient . It may be possible that a 
' pure copy ' of Reality is the least significant and 
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valuable type of knowledge, especially if its 'truth' extends 
beyond man's experience. The relativity of knowledge is ir-
relevant, Tennant asserts, if knowledge remains relative to 
Reality. 
The significance of knowledge is not lost due to its 
relativity. Although Tennant does not establish an identity 
between the knower's epistemological object and the meta-
physical Object, he still maintains that there is a rele-
vance between man's cognitive responses and the structures 
of things. The dependent interaction between man and 
external reality is seen in relation to a cosmos which 
makes possible this relatibnship. Man does not 6onstruct 
his knowledge without reference to the limitations which 
are imposed upon him by the sense-data of experience, nor 
does he find that his reasonable conclusions concerning the 
world are irrelevant if these conclusions are established 
out of his sensory contact with the world. Knowledge is 
not making (without reference to sensory data), nor is it 
finding (without reference to the activities of the mind). 
Knowledge is finding by making. 
The significant relationship of knowledge to reality 
is compared by Tennant to the relationship between a key 
and lock. The key is not identical with the lock, yet its 
structure is not irrelevant to the structure of the lock. 
Thus when the key fits the lock, it operates in such a way 
as to satisfy the experient 1 s demands. Similarly, man's 
cognitive structure in its relation to actual experience 
satisfies his demands for knowledge. 
~0 
Tennant draws no final line between knowledge and belief. 
Both belief and knowledge indicate assertions that receive 
assent which fall short of being certain in the epistemo-
logical sense of knowing Reality face-to-face. All areas 
of knowledge, including religious statements of belief, 
are established by probable not absolute certainty. Faith, 
likewise, is involved in every cognitive inquiry. While 
knowledge (belief) is more or less tied down by fact or 
Actuality which is posited for man, faith reaches beyond 
these facts to the ideally possible. In this unique activ-
ity, the exercise of man's creative imagination, faith may 
not be identified with an formulated belief, nor may it be 
described as having a supernatural origin. Faith is the 
conative aspect of man's experience in contrast to the 
cognitive element which is emphasized by belief. Both of 
these activities are involved in man ' s understanding of his 
world . 
Von Huegel's position pertaining to the kind of knowl-
edge which is derived from the knowing situation affords a 
contast to Tennant's thought regarding the degree of real 
knowledge that is attained thereby. The theory of realism 
which von Huegel supports avoids the extremes of a final 
agnosticism respecting the nature of the object and the 
naive claim to complete comprehension which exhaus·ts the 
nature of the object. It retains~ however~ the basic con-
viction that there is a direct encounter between man and 
external reality which conveys "some real knowledge" both 
of the self experiencing and of the objects experienced. 
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There is a given kind of reality which provides the 
conditions for man's interaction with the objective factors. 
This fundamental relation affords, in turn, the intimations 
of orders which extend beyond the origin~ range , and truth 
of human thought. These intimations of contingency and 
finitude (sensed in contrast to the abiding and the Infinite) 
discerned by man in all of his experience, indicate the 
trans -s ubjective reality of the objects apprehended by him 
in the knowing situation . It is this realization of the 
object ' s trans-subjective significance which provides man 
with a real insight into the nature of reality. 
Knowledge is not described by von Huegel in light of 
sensory apprehension alone . Man's experience of God is 
not a discursively reasoned conclusion from the data of 
sense. It is rather an experience which occurs on the 
occasion of man's interaction with trans-subjectively real 
objects which point beyond themselves to the reality which 
lies behind them. In view of this contention, von Huegel 
disagPees with an epistemological dualism which attempts to 
qualify man 's primary and direct relationship to external 
realities. He claims that such a dualism could not have 
been proposed unless there existed the unity of reality 
1 in which the distinction takes place . This unity of 
reality, von Huegel points out once more, is the basic 
kind of given reality, making possible man's situation of 
knowing from which real knowledge is derived. 
Ultimate Reality is somehow dimly known to man in the 
process of gaining knowledge of his world. This Presence 
is felt by man in the 'pressures' which accompany all his 
experiences, causing him to seek a meaning which refers 
beyond his own subjective interpretations. The kind of 
knowledge , therefore, which von Huegel finds coming from 
man's knowing situation, is 
a knowledge of or a seeking for a knowledge, of the ob-
jects which exist prior to, and after, each and every 
attempt on man's part to apprehend and to articulate the 
meaning of experience.2 
This type of knowledge refers beyond man 's cognitive struc-
ture and beyond the object itself to the Ultimate Reality 
which sustains both subject and object and provides the 
basic unity ( 1 givenness') for their operation. 
Von Huegel's realistic position does not deny the 
presence of interpreted elements and of possible error in 
man 's knowledge of external realities. Man's knowledge is 
1. Von Huegel, Mystical Element of Religion, II, 283. 
2. Von Huegel, The Reality of God, 3. 
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always incomplete . It is always rebeginning . Von Huegel 
describes man ' s understanding before Ultimate Reality as 
a beast of the field digesting only those things of the 
world which suit i ts nature. He also notes that the pres-
entations accompanied by valid trans - subjectivity do not 
transform themselves directly into the Things-in- Themselves . 
Objective reality is not known face-to-face . It is pos-
sible for the mind to resist the pressure which urges it on 
towards the belief in the objective . It is here that faith 
is needed on the part of the mind in order to confirm this 
belief in the objective (metaphysical Object) which makes 
possible cognition of reality . 
These factors, however, do not reduce the significance 
of knowledge for von Huegel . Although knowledge is in-
complete, it still remains a knowledge of reality since 
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the objects apprehended do really reveal, in various degrees, 
their real nature. 1 Reality is always impinging upon the 
human modes of apprehension causing man to feel a basic 
dissatisfaction with the finite and the contingent. This 
dissatisfaction only ceases when man sees in his under-
standing of the world the inevitable transcendence of his 
objects . 
Before evaluating von Huegel's a.nd Tennant ' s theories 
of knowledge, it is important to notice again what truth 
1 . Von Huegel, Essays and Addresses, I, 189 . 
means to von Huegel. He describes truth as that point of 
light which shines through the darkness surrounding man. 
It is never a final accomplishment but only a step toward 
the point lumineux. Tennant shares this conviction with 
von Huegel. Both men affirm the great task of truth which 
lies before men along with the increasing need for humility 
and patience. 
2 . Evaluation 
In evaluating Tennant's and von Huegel's respective 
theories of knowledge, it is helpful to consider two ques-
tions: {a) What reasons do they give for supporting their 
theories and (b) what crucial issues of disagreement result 
from these theories? 
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Von Huege l states candidly that critical realism offers 
the only competent theory of knowledge . The reasons for this 
opinion are: (1) it affirms man ' s contact with the external 
world 1 providing him with some 'real knowledge' of objects 
distinct from himself and from his knowledge of them; (2) it 
explains the experiences of illusion and error in realistic 
terms, describing man 's knowledge as incomplete and con-
tinually in the process of 'rebeginning;' (3) and it gives 
implicit support for a metaphysical conclusion regarding 
man's sense of a qualitative Other (a 'givenness' which is 
dimly known by man from his first moments of awareness) which 
is realized within all the areas of his experience. 
Tennant, in contrast to von Huegel, gives a phenome-
nalistic interpretation of knowledge for the following 
reasons: (1) it is consistent with his analytic-genetic 
analysis of man's cognitive development; (2) it explains 
knowledge as coactivity resulting from the interaction 
between man ' s cognitive activities and the metaphysical x 
which produ~ qualia and relations not complete ly dependent 
on man; (3) it accounts for the experiences of illusion and 
error by indicating that knowledge is fallible since man is 
. in rapport and not noetic identity with Reality ; (4) and it 
offers no direct metaphysical conclusions pertaining to the 
nature of Reality . 
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These reasons evince basic agreements between von Huegel 
and Tennant which have been pointed out previously, namely, 
that man 's knowledge is not final or absolute and that man 's 
knowledge involves objective reference. These points of 
agreement will not be evaluated for they are more in ac -
cordance with the data of experience than the position of 
naive realism which leaves the problem of error unexplained 
and also the theory of idealism in the stage of extreme 
subjectivism which negates the reality of objective data. 
The areas of disagreement, however, will require consider-
ation for they are more crucial to an interpretation of 
religious experience . 
One issue of divergence centers upon the factors which 
make up the knowing situation. It is apparent to von Huegel 
that man's situation of blowing cannot be reduced to the 
coactivity of subject and object. The data of man's sen-
sory experiences afford the occasion for experiencing the 
qualitative Other thus transcending the ordinary subject-
object relationship. Religious experience is the fullest 
articulation of this experience, illustrating conclusively 
the transcendent quality of man's knowledge. 
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Von Huegel's claim to this third factor, the 'givenness' 
of Reality 1-rhich permeates all of man's experiences, is the 
necessary ground of man's knowledge. It is an undenible 
fact that "we really do hold, that we really are touched, 
that we definitely are grasped by reality genuinely distinct 
from ourselves and from OUl"' knowledge of it." 1 This is the 
essential factor in the knowing situation: man must first 
be directly confronted by some reality which he knows, not 
because he knows something else first, but rather as it is 
itself, the ground of his knowledge of other things. 2 
Tennant does not deny man's rapport with the 'ground 
of knowledge.' However, he does not begin his systematic· 
study of Reality with a definition regarding its nature . 
He maintains consistently that it is only after man has 
built up his knowledge through interaction with other selves 
1. Von Huegel, The Reality of God, 3. 
2. John Baillie, Our Knowledge of God, 148. 
and the world that he can proclaim the 'ground Qf knowledge' 
as a given kind of Reality which is enough like him that he 
can apprehend i t s nature . Man's initial experiences do not 
contain developed concepts which 'know • Reality directly 
without contact with other things . The materials of knowl-
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edge, including religious knowledge, are non - cognitive , that 
is, they contain both an alogical quality and an ental agency 
suggestive of orderliness . 1 The mind as self-conscious comes 
into possession of these materials by perception , relating 
them according to its own structure of understanding and of 
interest . It does not begin by 'knowing' the 'ontal agency' 
as having a nature similar to its own. This is the con-
elusion of reasonable certainty not the introduction of 
absolute certainty to the study of Reality. 
The decisive issue becomes clear at this point: How 
is man to define that knowledge which comes from his experi-
ence of Reality? If man kno\'ls God in the same way a s he 
knows other selves and the world, then there are no grounds 
for describing this knowledge as man's sense of ' givenness' 
of Reality impinging upon his modes of apprehension. If , 
on the other hand, man ' s knowledge of God somehow transcends 
or widens his usual modes of cognition, then there is reason 
for defining religious knowledge as man's initial awareness 
1. Paul R. Helsel , !!Tennant's Approach to Religion," The 
Personalist, XXVIII(l947) , 34 . 
of Real i ty ltlhich permeates all his experiences . 
?4(") 
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Tennant and von Huegel share the contention that knowl-
edge of Reality does not arise in isolation nor does it 
come by means of a unique faculty operating within man. 
The discrepancy appears , however, in relation to the act iv-
ity of faith in man 's apprehension of Reality. Von Huegel 
states tha t man's knowledge o·f Reality comes !21L means of 
faith whereby man widens hi s awareness of the qualitative 
Other which is dimly knol'Tn from the beginning of his con-
scious awareness. Man can resist this 'pressure' of faith 
which accompanies a ll his experiences. In contrast to this 
conception , Tennant finds the function of faith to be the 
conative activ ity of all knowledge, involving the creative 
activ ity of man's imaginat ion, in contrast to belief, the 
cognitive aspect of a ll knowledge. In view of this defi -
nition, man's knowledge of God is not increased by the 
activity of faith alone. 
Von Huegel replies ( implicitly) that Tennant's defi-
nition of faith is inadequate . . It is true that faith is 
active in all knowledge. However, it is also true that 
in man's apprehension of Reality, his knowledge is widened 
by the activity of revelation and the response of faith . 
The self-manifestation of Spirit--a Spirit so perfect 
and so richly real as Itself to be the ultimate over-
flowing self-conscious cause of man's very capacity 
for apprehending It--and the human spirit's response 
to It, render superfluous all attempts ••. to 
construct God a priori, or even to demonstrate Him from 
the facts of nature and of human life.l 
This activity enables man to proclaim the 'givenness• of 
Reality before beginning theoretical discussions concerning 
its existence. Faith in the Reality of this self-manifesting 
Spirit is the basic affirmation upon which all arguments for 
God begin and end. Without it, a philosophical position 
such as represented by Tennant revolves in an infinite 
regreBs which only increases the darkness of uncertainty 
around men.2 
In order to evaluate this crucial issue regarding 
faith in relation to religious knowledge, it is helpful to 
consider some criticisms of Tennant's conclusions per-
taining to faith. His definition of faith as fides, an 
epistemological status referring to a state, act, or pro-
cedure which may be compared with standard instances of 
knowing and believing, excludes faith as fiducia, a trust 
which is maintained by man despite indications that the 
divine purpose toward man is not wholly good and loving. 3 
If faith is reduced to fides solely, then both sc ience and 
religion would have a common epistemological status. " Such 
an analysis of religious faith amounts to "a disguised 
1. Von Huegel, Essays and Addresses, I, 57. 
2. Brand Blanshard, Review of Philosophy of the Sciences, 
Journal of Philosophy, XXIX( 1932), 614-.- --
3. John Hick, Faith and Knowledge, xi. 
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surrender of its claims." 1 While science often claims a 
higher degree of probability, theology can only rightly 
affirm that its conclusions have a beneficial effect upon 
the believer. The evidential weight which these effects 
may have is counterbalanced by the admission that illusions 
might have no less beneficial effects. Thus Tennant's 
theory presents faith as a precarious factor that affords 
less certainty for religious knowledge than for scientific 
knowledge. 
Religion gains entry into the courts of science by 
claiming to be a hypothesis susceptible to verifi-
cation; but it must remain forever in the outer courts, 
for its verification is weak and its probability un-
certain and impossible of access. Under such conditions 
religion could only wither and die.2 
Critics of Tennant's view of faith assert also that 
he has riot understood faith as the activity of the whole 
man. 3 His emphasis is upon man's will--man discovers what 
is reasonable and then proceeds to believe by choice the 
most probable presumptions. Faith is not to be understood 
as volitional activity alone. It is the activity of the 
whole man resulttng in absolute and implicit belief. In 
view of this conclusion, religious faith affords a per-
manent contast to scientific faith. The scientist acts on 
policy, working with provisional assumptions seen in the 
1. Ibid. 2. Ibid. 
3. Paul Tillich, Dynamics of Faith (New York: Harpers and 
Brothers Publishers, 1957), 34-35. 
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light of probability. To the religious believer, faith is 
a certainty, not a probability. It is related to some-
thing ultimate or unconditional which cannot be defined in 
1 terms of probability. 
Tennant's response to these criticisms relates directly 
to his theory of knowledge. Religious knowledge is on an 
equal epistemological status with man's scientific knowl-
edge. Religious faith is not grounded directly in the 
'givenness' of Reality to a greater degree than the prob-
ability of scientific postulations. Faith may provide 
more private convincedness but it requires the additional 
verification which comes from the common world of shared 
beliefs. To claim that this method of verification reduces 
religious knowledge to a lower level of probability than 
scientific knowledge, suggests that the individual making 
this claim holds certain presuppositions concerning •evi-
dence' for religious belief. If a person begins his re-
ligious inquiry with the conviction that faith affords 
immediate awareness of God, the evidence given for inferring 
God from the facts of the world will appear useless and ir-
relevant. If, on the other hand, an individual starts out 
without this presupposition, then the facts discovered 
appear equally necessary and convincing for the reasonable 
assumptions of both science and religion. 
1. Ibid. 
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These last statements suggest a necessary consideration 
for a fair evaluation of Tennant's and von Huegel's positions. 
It is essential to discern the purpose motivating these 
thinkers in their approach to the issues of religious knowl-
edge. Von Huegel begins and ends within a religlous frame-
work. He is in agreement with 
the great Mystical Saints and writers who continuously 
have, in the very forefront of their consciousness and 
assumptions, not a simply moral and aspirational, but 
an Ontological and Pre-established relation between the 
soul and God; and not a simply discursive apprehension, 
but a direct though dim Experience of the Infinite and 
of God.l 
Man, according to his view, starts out with this dim aware-
ness of the 'givenness' of Reality in all of his experiences 
and ends with the . full articulation of this awareness in 
the religious experience. Tennant begins, on the other 
hand, with the self-conscious subject and his experience of 
objective data and ends with the socialized person under-
standing _his world in terms of God as the good and pur-
poseful Creator. He states that his purpose in this ap -
proach is to convince the unconvinced. 2 In comparison to 
this, von Huegel's intent may be described as stabilizing 
the confirmed. This is not to minimize the differences 
between the two thinkers, but it is to recommend a conclusion 
1. Von Huegel, Mystical Element of Religion, II, 338. 
2. Tennant, Review of The World and God, by Herbert Farmer, 
Mind, XLV( 1936), 24~ 
which would favor conclusively one point of view over the 
other only after consideration has been given to the basic 
purpose influencing these theories. 
An evaluation may be given in relation to these fun-
damental intentions. Religiously, man affirms by means of 
faith his direct encounter with Reality. This is the 
absolute certainty upon which he builds his belief in God. 
Philosophically, he builds his concepts concerning his knowl-
edge of God and the resulting conviction of certainty from 
his interaction with other selves and the world. This 
philosophical procedure does not negate the emotional and 
volitional values derived from the religious interpretation. 
It attempts rather to qualify any dogmatic affirmation 
coming from an 'immediate encounter' with Reality from a 
viewpoint which considers all the data pertaining to man's 
common understanding of his world. These qualifications 
are essential tools for the explication of religion. They 
provide the means wher~by the religious interpretation is 
taken out of man's private world of convincedness and 
brougttforth for examination and possible verification. 
Tennant is fighting against religious dogmatism which 
attempts to establish one interpretation of revelation as 
final, or one interpretation of the nature of Ultimate 
Reality as the truth. He is aware of the. dangers re-
sulting from a type of knowledge which has no common 
foundation for conceptual agreement. There is no knowledge 
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that is independent of the data of all experience nor is 
there a type of knowledge that is self-validating. Von 
Huegel, cognizant of the conflicting interpretations coming 
from man's experience of revelation, acknowledges but ac-
cepts the risks involved in the religious framework. He 
affirms a certain kind of reality in spite of the epistemo-
logical difficulties which are evident; for example, the 
affirmation pertaining to the trans-subjective reality of 
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the data affording conclusive evidence for the nature of 
metaphysical Reality, and the relation between knowledge as 
trans-subjective and the occurrence of error. The.se problems 
are not examined critically by von Huegel. However, the 
religious affirmation in faith is made by him in contrast 
to Tennant's philosophical analysis which is also made in 
faith. 
The objection may be raised at this point that Tennant's 
method of empirical verification cannot be applied to the 
religious experience which affirms an 'immediate meeting' 
with God. The task is now to compare von Huegel's and 
Tennant's views regarding this contention and others 
relating to religious experience specifically, and finally, 
to evaluate their conclusions. 
D~;. Interpretation of Relig ious Experience 
1~ Comparison 
It has been stated previously that von Huegel and 
Tennant present t•r10 ways of vie\•ring relig ious experience. 
For further clarification of these interpretations, three 
related issues 1vill be compared: (a) the definition of 
religious experience, (b) its nature, and (c) its valid-
ity;. 
a. Definitions 
Both von Huegel and Tennant agree that a definition 
of relig ious experience must include the activity of the 
vlhole man, responding to a superhuman obj ect I.Yith all his 
faculties;. One fundamental divergence appears, ho1vever, 
1-1hen Tennant concludes that the idea of God precedes re-
lig ious experience;. 1 This conviction gro1,rs out of his 
analytic-genetic approach vrhich finds all lm o~'lledge a-
rising in the sensorily perceptual;. The idea of God, 
therefore , appears as a b elief i'rhich has been constructed 
by man out of his perceptual contact i'l"ith the world, other 
selves~ and human history. In vievr of this appro~ch, an 
experience is constituted religious v1hen it is conceived 
as coming from a superhuman object \IThich; in turn, 
1;. Tenna.:nt, 11 Theology, 11 Encyclopaedia Britannica, 14th 
edi., XXII, 62. 
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provokes emotional and volit i onal responses. 
Von Huegel describes religious experience as that 
particular type of experience which asserts as its cause 
the presence of the superhuman acting in direct relation-
ship to the human. It is the fulles t art i cul ation of 
man ' s dim awareness of the 'givenness' of Reality which 
is sensed by him within all of his experience. The idea 
of this superhuman presence is preceded, therefore, by 
the experience of its presence. 
Religion, even more than all other convictions that 
claim correspondence with the real, begins and pro-
ceeds and ends with the Given--with existences, re-
ality, which environ and penetrate us, and which we 
have always to capture and combine, to fathom and 
to apprehend • • • as stimulated and sustained by a 
tenac ious conviction that a real, if dim, uconfused" 
knowledge of reality is with us already prior to all 
our attempts ciearly to analyse or completely to 
synthesise it. 
A problem for later ewUuation will be concerned with 
this issue, namely, what is the primary factor stimulating 
the religious experience. Is it man's experience derived 
directly from the 'givenness' of Reality, or is ·it stim-
ulated by his conceptual ideas pertaining to Reality which 
have been derived originally from his contact with sensory 
data'? 
1. Von Huegel, Essays and .Addresses, I, xiii. 
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b. The Nature of Religious Experience 
Von Huegel stresses the interpenetration of two levels 
of human experience; the commonly shared dim experience of 
objects which testifies to the objective independence of a 
vast and contrasting Other, and the level of the specific 
religious experience which witnesses to the relevance of 
man's knowledge of the religious Object. He shares with 
Tennant the contention that it is the sense world which 
offers the basis for insight into the nature of the re-
ligious Object. These experiences give rise to man's feel-
ings of contingency and dissatisfaction with the finite 
which, in turn, culminates in the religious experience of 
the contrasting Other. The mystical experience, similarly, 
is dependent upon the •normal' religious experience. With-
out this relationship, the mystical apprehension would have 
no relevance to the world in which it occurs. 
From these statements it is clear that von Huegel does 
not represent that type of mysticism which Tennant con-
vincingly criticizes. He does not support the inarticulated 
mystical experience which claims complete and infallible 
union with Reality, nor does he defend any assertion which 
would establish a unique faculty within man which functions 
only during the mystical apprehension. The religious ex-
perience, including the ecstatic experience of the mystic, 
grows out of man's contact with the world. However, this 
257 
does not mean that von Huegel and Tennant are in agreement 
regarding the nature of religious experience. 
Von Huegel describes the religious experience as a ~, 
unifying activity which occurs at the deepest level of 
man's personality, the level where the cognitive and vo-
litional faculties are one. This interpretative center 
which lies back of both the external apparatus and the 
discursive cognitive functions is the focus of the mys-
tical experience. Tennant's analysis of experience does 
not include such an interpretative center. The inter-
pretation man gives to his experiences develops gradually 
from the percept into the idea. There is no point at 
which man refers to an 'interpretative center' which lies 
beyond his normal cognitive development. Tennant may in-
quire from von Huegel how it is that he accounts for this 
center and how it is related to the ordinary process of 
perception. 
Von Huegel might reply that the interpretative center 
is not 1 given 1 in the way that the percept is derived from 
the sensory data. Man is 'prepared' for the reception of 
the Divine Action by the intense energizings of his will 
and imagination which occur within this center. Thus the 
level of his personality at which all of his faculties are 
united requires the development of a sensitive nature, a 
performance of past acts of will conforming with the desire 
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for Divine Action within the personality, the discipline 
which will release the will from surface demands of the 
self-centered self, and continuous interaction with the 
world of sense. This is not to imply that man constructs 
his experience of God by an act of will or imagination. 
Man's preparations for God are useless without God's 
presence. Mystical apprehension, von Huegel insists, is 
an inter-action between the Divine Spirit and man's re-
sponse which is only possible because God first acts and 
then man responds. 
Tennant's analysis of the nature of religious experi-
ence excludes such an interpretative center as described 
by von Huegel. He does not deny, however, the personal 
emotional and volitional values which are derived from 
such experiences. Tennant negates any objective verifi-
cation which is asserted from the mystic's private world 
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of experience. All experience, including the religious 
experience, requires the confirmation which comes from 
man's shared world of convictions (psychol~gical certainty). 
The mood of the mystical apprehension, von Huegel in-
sists, is one of receptivity and attention rather than one 
which affords material for critical analysis on the psycho-
logical level of certainty. This mystical mood cannot be 
placed on a lesser level of value than the mood of dis-
cursive knowledge because it is not subject to the thorough 
investigation of man's common world. Its value is different 
but it is also equally valuable in its contribution to the 
total understanding of Reality. 
This last statement raises the question of the valid-
ity of religious experience. A comparative study of this 
problem will disclose the essential contrast between von 
Huegel and Tennant. 
c. The Validity of Religious Experience 
Before comparing Tennant's and von Huegel's positions 
concerning the validity of religious experience, it is im-
portant to point out again that von Huegel does not support 
an extJE?eme type of mysticism. Von Huegel does not claim 
for mystical apprehension infallible knowledge of Reality 
nor does he test its truth by the claim to absolute cer-
tainty which the mystic may hold. He insists repeatedly 
that the mystic who attains the greatest spiritual depth 
reflects the mood of humility and respect for the religious 
Object. In addition to these assertions von Huegel does 
not regard mysticism as the exclusive element in religion. 
Its contributions are not exempt from the tests applied to 
the everyday experiences of man. However, the test of its 
validity must be the most inclusive, for the mystical ex-
perience is man's most comprehensive and demanding experi-
ence. 
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Von Huegel is aware of the objections which are raised 
against the claims which establish religious experience as 
a unique and self-validating source of apprehending God. 
26l 
He recognizes the dangers connected with its lack of 
specific objective factors such as are involved in the 
experiences of sensory perceptions, and the absence of 
cognitive insights into the nature of Reality. His caution 
against the abstract and isolated mystical experience il-
lustrates this concern. Von Huegel, therefore, acknowledges 
(implicitly) Tennant's criticisms related to these weak-
nesses, namely: (1) the absence of specific qualities with-
in the religious Object which provides no definite ob-
jective reference such as found in sensory apprehension, 
(2) the lack of specific objective control which indicates 
conclusively that this religious apprehension has not been 
caused by the imaginal or ideal, and (3) the lack of any 
universal response which demonstrates a consistent contact 
with the Real. 
These dangers are not determinative for von Huegel. 
In response to such criticism as presented by Tennant, von 
Huegel maintains that while religious apprehension has a 
necessary relation to sense data, it still retains a "given" 
transcendent element within man's experience which points 
beyond the perceptual experience to the Reality which sus-
tains it. The organs of sense are not the direct means of 
apprehending Reality. They are only the instruments which 
operate on the essential level of immediate surface re-
lationships. Tennant agrees with von Huegel, stating that 
man's immediate contact with sense data does not give in-
fallible knowledge of Reality. However, when von Huegel 
asserts that there is an essential distinction between the 
activity of sensory apprehension and the mystical appre-
hension, Tennant disagrees in view of his empirical study 
of man's cognitive development. He may inquire again from 
von Huegel how it is that he accounts for this distinction 
which prevents the use of identical tests for the validity 
of these experiences, and may ask how the religious appre-
hension is related to the ordinary process of perception. 
At this point von Huegei, in turn, may wonder how Tennant 
accounts for the unexpected penetration of meaning derived 
from man's sense of the non-contingent within the temporal 
order which is felt to be within and yet transcendent to 
the anthropomorphic :.level of sensory perception. 
Regarding the second weakness of the religious appre-
hension, the absence of cognitive insights, von Huegel 
asserts and Tennant agrees that cognitive enlightenment 
is not the end of religious experience. Its value is not 
measured by knowledge, man's inadequate and fallible instru-
ment for revealing Reality. The strengthening and stimulating 
of the emotional and volitional faculties receive priority 
over the cognitive aspect. 
This indefinite apprehensibleness becomes an actual 
ever increasing apprehension, more through the puri-
fication of the heart than through the exercise of 
the reason, and without some experience (following 
no doubt upon some light) the reason has no adequate 
material for effective conclusions.l 
Tennant's response to this type of reasoning relates 
to his demand for acknowledging the differentiation between 
psychic certitude and psychological certainty. The renewal 
of emotional and volitional energies as derived from the 
religious experience remains upon the level of private 
convincedness. It has no relation to psychological con-
victions from which reasonable verification is attained. 
The religious experience who affirms psychic certitude con-
cerning his apprehension of the religious object is an 
11 invulnerable as he is harmless." 2 However, when he claims 
certainty as to the immed i acy, validity and inference for 
metaphysical implications, then his religious experience 
must be subject to the examination of man's common world 
of shared convictions. 
Tennant's critical evaluation o~ religious experience 
culminates in the contention that this type of experience 
per ~does not afford evidential value for the theistic 
belief. He rejects von Huegel's pragma~c test which con-
siders the results of fruitfulness as one of the evidences 
1. M.D. Petre, Von Huegel and Tyrrell (London: J.M. Dent 
and Sons, 1937), 31. 
2. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, I, 313. 
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for its validity. Tennant considers pragmatic results 
(fruitfulness) not enough for establishing a universal 
criterion of the truth of the belief, or of the Reality 
of the Object. F·ruitful results may be caused by the 
imaginal or the ideal as well as the Real. Von Huegel 
realizes the truth in Tennant's objection and therefore 
does not rely upon this evidence solely. He includes it 
in addition to two other tests which prove conclusive for 
him: (1) the testimony of all experience to the presence 
of a vague, normative Other which is illuminated by the 
content of the mystical experience, and (2) the illumination 
of other areas of experience by the religious experience, 
evincing the trans-subjective reality operating within all 
of live which is fully articulated by the religious appre-
hension. The pragmatic yerification is reinforced because 
it represents not only an idea that works, but also an 
idea which represents the undeniable Reality of the spir-
itual order. 
Von Huegel's affirmation pertaining to the 'givenness' 
of Reality which is most fully apprehended in the religious 
experience, is interpreted by Tennant as a learned causal 
belief in God derived from all experiences. The 'givenness' 
of Reality, the idea of God, is not derived from religious 
experience but has been ascertained from experiences con -
cerning man and the world. "He that would come to God must 
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first believe that he is." 1 This belief is made evident 
by man's teleological understanding of his world which, in 
turn, supports theism. 
The essential contrast between von Huegel and Tennant 
is now apparent. The former views religious experience as 
the fundamental experience which stimulates man's fullest 
articulation of Reality. It is the initial experience from 
which theism evolves. The latter finds such an experience 
meaningful only as an implicit part of the cumulative 
teleological argument for God. It is an experience which 
results from theistic belief. The task of evaluation will 
be to discern the strengths and weaknesses involved in 
each of .these views with the anticipation of arriving at 
a conclusion between them. 
2. Evaluation 
a. Strengths and Weaknesses 
Tennant's analysis of religious experience affords 
the following statements of fact which cannot be eliminated 
from a coherent study: (1) Man does not apprehend God as a 
specific quale such as he experiences in the apprehension 
of the color yellow. He, therefore, has no common datum 
which exerts refractory control (such as exerted by the 
1. Ibid. 
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sensory datum) which is referable as a common epistemic 
object to intersubjective discourse. 1 (2) Man's experi-
ence of God is not immediate in the sense that it ex -
eludes the influence of past experience and interpre-
tation. Man does not 'encounter' God with an empty mind. 
(3) In view of this fact, man's experience is known as 
uniquely religious, not by the presence in it of a unique 
psychological element, but by its reference to a religious 
object.2 Such an experience necessarily involves concepts. 
The question pertaining to the evidential value of 
the religious experience therefore does not arise·, .until 
conceptual propositions about God are organized into some 
kind of system, and the system itself is proposed as true. 
This process involves the principles of thought and of 
intersubjective discourse. It is not derived from the 
ground of faith (intuitive insights) which cannot be 
formulated into conceptual reasoning. Thus the definition 
of evidential value supports this conclusion: something 
has evidential value when it can be reasonably adduced to 
support a claim about reality or matter of fact. 
In view of this definition, Tennant's coherent con -
clusion is that the evidential value ot religious experience 
1. Peter Bertocci, Review of Philosophy of Religion, by 
David Elton Trueblood, The Journal of Bible and Religion, 
XXVI(January, 1958), 63-.- - -
2. J.S. Bixler, R.L. Calhoun, H.R. Niebuhr {eds.), The 
Nature of Religious Experience (New York: Harper and 
Brother~ 1937), 52. 
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cannot be established by the occasion .or by the cause of 
such an experience. The occasion of such an experience 
involves data which are so private, exclusive, and auto-
biographical that they cannot be constructed into common, 
conceptualized thought-objects. It involves also the 
difficulty of assuming that the psychologically immediate 
is as certain as the epistemologically mediated. In 
addition, the occasion of the religious datum may be con-
sidered psychologically immediate, but it is found to be 
actually epistemologically mediated. 
The cause of religious experience likewise is unable 
to affirm its validity. The data of the experience lack 
specific quality which provide no common epistemic object. 
The data thereby prove to be so vague that they are 
connected with all kinds of objects throughout the history 
of religion. 
These facts .support the conclusion regarding the evi-
dential value of religious experience. Such an experience 
cannot be autonomous · or self-validating. It must be sub-
ject to the data involved in all experiences and presented 
for man's synoptic judgment arising out of his total view 
of experience. "Thus the validity of religious experience, 
like the validity of reason, is to be found in its appeal 
to the largest and most inclusive view of experience." 1 
1. Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion , 437· 
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Tennant's comprehensive conclusion regarding the evi-
dential value of religious experience clarifies a weakness 
involved in von Huegel's position . After acknowledging 
the necessity of the intellectual and the institutional 
factors entailed in religious apprehension3 von Huegel 
concludes that this experience would be impossible without 
the 'givenness' of Reality which is present from the first 
moment of man's awareness . Tennant does not deny this 
aspect (ontal agency suggesting orderliness)3 but he does 
emphasize the need for knowing not only the that but also 
the what concerning the nature of this 'givenness.• This 
information is not forthcoming from the mere fact of the 
'givenness• of Reality nor from the 'presence' of God 
affirmed by the religious experient. 
This issue illustrates the strength inherent in the 
epistemic dualism represented by Tennant in contrast to 
von Huegel's realistic pdsition. It has been stated that 
critical realism affirms a non-inferential direct aware-
ness of independent reality through the configuration of 
the data.l This means that the subject has a comprehensive 
personal acquaintance with an object which rises above the 
discursive reason: "We definitely are grasped by reality 
genuinely distinct from ourselves and from our knowledge of 
1. Scudder, Tennant's Philosophical Theology, 257. 
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it."l It also means that there is an immediacy which is 
not simply an immediacy of subject and representation 
(sensory data) but of subject and the noumenal through 
the phenomenal: "The Eternal Living Spirit (though 
necessarily incomprehensible by our own) can be, and is, 
continuously apprehended by us--since that Spirit really 
penetrates us and all Its creatures."2 The difficulty 
appears, however, when the critical realist considers the 
experience of objective reference more than an experience 
which refers beyond the experienced state.3 The critical 
realist claims that this experience refers to an external 
non-mental world (von Huegel's reference to man's funda-
mental experience of a contrasting other). Tennant finds 
that the experience of objective reference is not enough 
to afford conclusive evidence for a non-mental external 
world, an extra-human value-datum, or a div-ine presence 
(contrasting other). other evidence is required for such 
metaphysical conclusions. 
The weakness of von Huegel's epistemic position be-
comes apparent when the one experience {religious experi-
ence) which affords the fullest articulation of the tran-
scendent other provides only a new stimulation of will and 
1. Von Huegel, The Reality of God, 5. 
2. Von Huegel, Eternal Life, 384. 
3. Bertocci, ~· cit., 62. 
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imagination and no cognitive insights pertaining to the 
nature of the transcendent other. The advantages of his 
epistemic realism (a direct encounter with Reality in the 
myatical experience) thereby are negated by the affir-
mation that the knowledge derived is above reason and is 
centered upon the purification of the emotion and the will. 
If religious experience cannot be trusted to tell us 
what the nature of God is, what advantage is a "vivid 
sense of acquaintance with God himself ••• " es-
pecially if the explanation of error still goes a-
begging?l 
Von Huegel represents the critical realist who 
attempts to have the advantages of being both an epistemic 
dualist and monist. Von Huegel, though dualistic in his 
position regarding the fact of error (the fallibility of 
man's knowledge), claims the certainty of epistemic monism. 
He affirms that there is an immediate, objective experience 
of God's presence and yet like a dualist, realizes the fact 
of error which enters into the interpretation of this ex-
perience. He, therefore, assumes that there can be no 
final statement pertaining to the nature of this experi-
ence. The inconsistency of this theory is discerned in a 
statement such as this: 
With reference to each of these ontological predicates, 
infinity, eternity, immutability, omnipotence, omnis-
cience, impassibility, and the rest, it may therefore 
be shown that they are all first discovered by us in 
the divine Reality that confronts us, and only then 
1. Ibid., 63. 
set in contrast to our finite~ temporal, changeable, 
weak, ignorant~ and suffering selves.l 
By what process are these concepts derived if the religious 
experience is described finally by the critical realist as 
an experience that God is present while not affording any 
statement (due to the possibility of error) regarding what 
God is present? 
In the light of these considerations, Tennant's theory 
seems to be more inclusive of the factors involved and im-
plied by religious experience. Additional evidence is 
needed to support the contentions derived from religious 
experience. This evidence is fo~thcoming first from man's 
teleological understanding of his world and then is applied 
to his ~ interpretation of religious experience. 
Another major weakness in von Huegel's position is 
related to his epistemological realism. This issue is 
cancerned with the relationship between the interpretative 
center which is the center of religious experience and 
man's normal perceptive process. Von Huegel does not ex-
plain how the faculty of sense perception whose most 
characteristic acts are the presentation of nature in 
discriminable units, is able in the same act to present 
man with a dim but distinguishing sense of an unbroken 
normative order. 1 He does not clarify how ~piritual 
1. Douglas Steere, "Critical Realism in the Religious 
Philosophy of Baron F. von Huegel" (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Harvard University, 1931), 293. 
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apprehension issues from either the senses or from dis-
cursive conceptual function when its content is so alien 
to the usual content of either. How is the function of 
normal perception enlarged for the recognition of this 
spiritual content? 
Although von Huegel does not attempt a systematic 
account of the processes within and beyond the normal 
perceptual process, he is still obligated to make a more 
intensive defense of this interpretation. He needs to 
explain more adequately how this faculty of mystical 
apprehension which is not a new faculty but is centered 
in the imaginatiOn operates in relation to the conceptual 
activity of the mind. Von Huegel does regard man's con-
ceptual formulation as instrumental and as an incomplete 
tool for arriving at truth. However, he does not clarify 
how this interpretative center which unites the sense, 
will, and discursive reason of man avoids the pitfalls of 
error and contradiction. It is a~parent that von Huegel's 
approach is practical rather than theoretical • . However, 
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the major criticism remains that he "did not formulate a 
philosophical account of the relation of the hints of spirit-
ual order that occur in all apprehension . . • and the vivid 
sense of that order in the mystical apprehension." 1 
1. Ibid., 309. 
The preceding critic isms of von Huegel d o not refute 
the value f ound in his view of reli gious experience~ His 
interpret a tion offers certain correctives to Tennant's 
position ~! i<Thich must be considered i11 order to arrive at 
a comprehens ive conclusion. These correctives are con-
cerned 1:ri th the role of f'ai th, revela tion , and intuition 
in religious experience. 
Relig ious experience is not the sole source of re-
lig ious lm o-v·rl edge . However, to 1-'Jhat extent does religious 
experience afford reinforcement and provid.e the roots for 
religious k:nmdedge? "The development of l"'eli g ious knoHl-
edge i s ; in part at least, a development of r elig ious 
faith, and relig ious faith can be maintain ed only in the 
closest conn action ivi th religious experienc e·;it 1 This 
issue is related to the activity of r evela tion in re-
lig iou s knm.1ledge and the possibility of its stimulation 
within the experient. If revelation is to be vi ei•!ed as 
the i mposition of the divine vlill upon man , destroying 
the possibility for ethical developm ent, t hen 1 ts activity 
is to be refut ed as it is by Tennant~ Hb"~:Jever, the possi-
bility remain s that revelation can be understood as the 
process of creative intuition in the soul of the religious 
genius as stimulated by the divine activity. This concept 
does not n egate critical evaluation of thi s process since 
1~ Bixler; Calhoun, Niebuhr O~ds.), .QE• ,ru;., 54-55. 
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revelation along with all other sources of knowledge needs 
to be investigated in light of further evidence. It does 
make possible an explanation of the arrival of religious 
insights which cannot be explained in terms of man's per-
ceptual contact with his world. Revelation may be viewed 
as the realization within man of a deep dissatisfaction 
with the finite, and the awareness of a spiritual nature 
within man and the world. 
The development of this revelatory insight into 
reasoned convictions is not dependent upon man's cog-
nitive process alone. It develops from the non-rational 
factors of will, feeling, and action. In view of this, 
von Huegel concludes that religious knowledge is mainly a 
product resulting from the purification of the heart rather 
than the reason. It is primarily a product of willing r ather 
than thinking, a moral r ather than an intellectual achieve-
ment. "For though will is not an organ of truth, the 
growth and refinement of religious truth are dependent 
from first to last upon sincere desire for and surrender 
to the Sovereign Good. 11 1 
It is helpful to have these correctives in view be~ore 
a conclusion is reached regarding the two interpreta tions . 
Tennant's effort to tie these volitional and emotional 
values to a rational belief is now seen in contrast to 
1. Ibid., 63. 
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von Huegel's contention that these values affirm a Reality 
(extending beyond cognitive insights) which is "the very 
heart and inmost reality of things, 11 "the nameless secret 
of existence," and the "Quiet, as the Highest beyond whom 
is no other."l 
b. Conclusion 
Evidential value is arrived at by means of cognitive 
judgments supporting a claim about reality. In view of 
this, the eyidential value of religious experience cannot 
be established without reference to cognitive statements 
which men reach by means of intersubjective discourse re-
garding their understanding of Reality. Its validity is 
not confirmed by a statement that the presence of God is 
felt by the religious experient to be the very life of his 
2 life nor is it affirmed by the contention that ·"the heart 
of the matter is not • information, but the sense of 
new life which comes from the Divine Source of power."3 
The epistemological position of critical realism does 
not succeed in establishing religious experience as self-
validating nor as an autonomous testimony to the 'givenness' 
of Reality. The affirmation concerning the immediate 
1. C.C.J. Webb, "The Nature of Relie;ious Experience," The 
Hibbert Journal, XXXII(1933-1934J, 21-23. ---
2. W.R. Inge, Christian Mysticism (8th ed. rev.; London: 
Methuen and Co., 1948), 325. 
3. D.E. Trueblood, ~hilosophy of Religion (New York: Harper 
and Brothers, 1957), 157. 
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presence of the contrasting other in all experiences is 
not conclusive f or substantiating the resulting cognitive 
insights connected with these experiences. This testimony 
to the mere presence of God does not afford religious 
verification. Additional evidence is needed, namely, 
that evidence which is derived from man's shared con-
victions concerning the metaphysical meaning behind the 
experience of God's presence. 
The emotional and volitional values derived from 
religious experience are not to be discarded in ascer-
taining the answer to the problem of metaphysical meaning 
underlying all of man's experiences. They are not to be 
viewed as an antithesis but as a reinforcement of man's 
ideas of Reality. Although these values do not provide 
evidential value per se, nevertheless, they are essential 
factors in arriving at a total understanding of Reality. 
Religious experience gives us not ideas, but notions, 
of a real God, of whom nature is sign and language; 
these notions are hypotheses which must be tested by 
our total Weltanschauung.l 
1. E.S. Brightman, "The Dialectic of Relie;ious Experience," 
The Philosophical Review, XXXVIII(l929), 573. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSIONS 
The following eight statements may be given as the 
conclusions drawn from this study of the interpretation 
of religious experience in the thought of Tennant and 
von Huegel. 
1. Tennant's psychogenetic study which investigates 
the order of knowing by criticism of presumptive knowl-
edge provides a most inclusive approach to the study of 
philosophy and theology. This method avoids major a 
priori propositions concerning the nature of man, the 
world, and Reality. It avoids the dangers of subjectivity 
by recognizing the role of sensory data in the con-
struction of knowledge, of tentativeness by affirming 
man's meaningful rapport with the world, and of the lack 
of verification by illustrating that no methodological 
approach avoids allusion to unproven postulations. 
2. The procedure of analogical inference involved in 
Tennant's methodology is integral and consistent with his 
approach to the development of knowledge. Man's initial 
awareness is of his own body which provides a constant 
group of sensa, forming a background for all other sensa. 
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Von Huegel's reference to the role of intuition is not 
clarified and defended to the extent that the questions 
pertaining to man's immediate knowledge of other selves 
and Reality are answered. The theory of direct acquaint-
ance does not explain the epistemological process which 
makes possible man's immediate intuition of reality, nor 
does it coherently account for the occurrence of error 
which sometimes accompanies man's experience of direct 
contact with reality. 
3. Von Huegel's and Tennant's descriptions of the 
knowing situation entail the experience of objective 
reference (man's knowing situation retains a capacity for 
being itself and yet pointing beyond itself) and the fact 
of man's incomplete knowledge. Tennant's interpretation 
of the knowing situation as the coactivity between the 
interested subject and an objective continuum gives a 
more intelligible explanation than does von Huegel's 
conclusion which finds the data of sensory experiences 
affording the occasion for man's apprehension of the 
qualitative· other. Von Huegel fails to clarify the re-
lationship between man's ordinary perceptual process and 
the process of apprehending the spiritual order which tran-
scends the ordinary subject-object relationship. 
4. Von Huegel's contention that man knows Reality 
because he is grounded in it (the 'givenness' of Reality) 
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is not assumed by Tennant. This contention involves an a 
priori supposition that the ground of knowledge is that 
Reality enough like man in order for him to apprehend its 
nature. The data of man's experience support Tennant's 
conviction that it is only after man has built up his 
knowledge through interaction with other selves and the 
world that he can proclaim belief regarding the nature of 
Reality. Man does not begin with this belief; it is 
rather a conclusion drawn from man's teleological under-
standing of the world. 
5. The activity of faith is evident in the theories 
of von Huegel and Tennant. Von Huegel's definition of 
faith as man's response to the presence of the Divine 
Activity which widens his normal perceptive functioning, 
arises out of his religious framework. Tennant's descrip-
tion of faith as the conative activity which underlies all 
knowledge stems from his philosophical approach. In view 
of this, it is not necessary to draw a final antithesis 
between the two definitions. It is more constructive to 
enlist both, recognizing the essential emotional and 
volitional values coming from religious trust while em-
ploying the philosophical interpretation which relates this 
trust to all the data of man's experience. 
6. The contrasting definitions of religious experience 
given by Tennant and von Huegel again do not provide an 
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absolute antithesis. It is a fact that man's theological 
concepts precede his religious experiences in the sense 
that he employs ideas in interpreting the meaning of his 
experience. It is also a fact that man has an experience 
of emotional and volitional stimulation which requires an 
explanation which extends beyond abnormal psychology. In 
light of these facts, the two activities of interpretation 
and stimulation can be seen as necessary and related factors 
in religious experience rather than presented in opposition. 
It is important to note that the most overpowering experi-
ences of God's presence combine the factors of truth and 
1 power. 
7. Tennant offers a coherent conclusion regarding the 
evidential value of religious experience. Its validity 
cannot be established without reference to cognitive 
statements which men reach by means of intersubjective 
discourse with one another about the nature of Reality. It 
is not sufficient to proclaim a 'presence' nor is it con-
elusive to affirm an 'interpretative center' within man 
which experiences God's action without clarifying its 
function in relation to man's normal perceptual process. 
The affirmation of the "thatness" of religious experience 
requires the further clarification which comes from the 
"whatness" derived from man's cognitive conviction · 
1. S.P. Schilling, "Religious Experience," motive, XVII, 
May~ · · i9 57; 7 ~ 
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concerning the metaphysical meaning behind the experience 
of God's presence. 
8. The preceding statement does not imply that the 
emotional and volitional values derived from religious 
experience should be negated. It rather means that although 
these values do not provide evidential value per se, they 
continue to be essential factors involved in man's total 
understanding of Reality. 
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.ABSTRACT 
The purpose of the dissertation is to compare and 
evaluate the interpretations of religious experience in 
the thought of F.R. Tennant and Baron F. von Huegel. The 
expository, comparative, and critical methods are used. 
The methodological and epistemological theories of the 
writers are presented followed by an exposition of their 
vie\'IS of religious experience. The study then proceeds to 
compare and evaluate the affinities and disagreements found 
in the expository material. The writings of Tennant and 
von Huegel which have specific relevance to these topics 
are considered. The sources used are mainly primary. Brief 
biographies of the thinkers conclude the introductory ma-
terial of chapter one. 
Tennant's interpretation of religious experience grows 
out of his analytic-genetic methodology and phenomenalistic 
theory of knowledge. He gives priority to the psychogenetic 
study which investigates the order of knowing by criticism 
of presumptive kno\'lledge. This approach establishes sen-
sory impression as the only original source of knowledge. 
All ideas are reasonably probable, originating in a process 
of ideational construction and inference from facts per-
ceived originally by the senses. Religious experience, in 
light of this empirical approach, does not afford an 
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independent, unique, or self-validating datum which provides 
direct knowledge of Reality. It is an implicit part of the 
cumulative teleological argument for God providing intel-
lectual, moral, and aesthetic inspiration after theism has 
been rendered the most probable conviction concerning God. 
Von Huegel's analytical methodology -and critical 
realistic theory of knowledge supports his interpretation 
of religious experience. This approach affirms the trans-
subjective significance of the data of consciousness, 
affording man a means for direct contact with the external 
world. There is evidence for the operation of the tran-
scendental operativeness of the objective order in man's 
ordinary experiences of sensory perception, the succesive-
ness of time, and creative activ ity. The qualitative 
nature of this objective order dimly known by man in these 
experiences is clearly articulated in the religious experi-
ence. Religious experience, although it cis --not exempt from 
critical examination, testifies to the reality of the Divine 
.Action. This type of experience has its own contribution 
to make to life, namely, new emotional and flr.esh volitional 
insights which reflect a penetration into and a stimulation 
of the deeper level of man's total nature by the religious 
Object. 
The conclus i ons of thi s study may be summarized as 
follows: ( 1) The psychoger~tle study, which avoids a priori 
propositions concerning the nature of 'realities,' provides 
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the most coherent approach to an 1.nquiry into the nature 
of religious experience. (2) The procedure of ana logical 
inference in comparison to a theory of direct acquaintance 
explains more consistently the manner in which man arrives 
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at his reasonable knowledge about Reality. (3) The inter-
pretation of knowledge as the coactivity between the inter-
ested subject and an objective continuum gives an intel-
ligible explanation of the factors involved in religious 
experience. (4) It is constructive to enlist the definitions 
of faith as conative activity (fiducia) and as trust (fides), 
recognizing the essential emotional and volitional values 
coming from religious trust while employing the philosophical 
interpretation which relates this trust to all of man's ex-
periences. (5) The activities of interpretation (cognitive 
insights) and stimulation (energization of will and imagi --
nation) are necessary and related factors in religious ex-
perience. (6) The evidential value of religious experience 
cannot be established without reference to cognitive state ·-
ments which men reach by means of intersubjective dis-
course with one another regarding the nature of meta-
physical Reality. (7) The emotional and volitional values 
derived from religious experience are essential although 
not self-validating factors involved in man's total under-
standing of Reality. 
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